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!ABSTRACT'!
BETWEEN TWO FIRES: 
 THE ORIGINS OF SETTLER COLONIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRENCH 
ALGERIA 
 
By 
 
Ashley Sanders 
 
This dissertation is a comparative study of the establishment of settler colonies in the 
American Midwest (1778-1795) and French colonial Algeria (1830-1848). It examines how 
interactions between the Indigenous populations, colonists, colonial administrators, the military, 
and the métropole shaped their development and advances the theory of settler colonialism. This 
study centers on the first fifteen to twenty years of conquest/occupation in the American 
Midwest, focusing specifically on southern Illinois and Indiana, and the province of Constantine, 
Algeria. Despite differences in geography, relative size of the military presence and Indigenous 
demographics, the process of establishing settler colonies in both locations followed similar 
trajectories. The study analyzes the founding moment of initial military occupation in 
Indiana/Illinois in 1778 and Constantine in 1836-1837 as well as subsequent land policies, 
settlement, and Indigenous resistance movements.  
I argue that settler colonies in the American Midwest and Algeria resulted from a bottom-
up process in which settler desires for land and greater economic opportunities compelled them 
to migrate (or emigrate) and stake their claim to these territories. This movement then served as a 
catalyst for initially makeshift colonial policies that only became systematized over time. The 
relationship between settlers and the Indigenous populations in both locations, as well as 
administrators’ responses to prevailing circumstances on the ground shaped the establishment of 
stable settler governments.  
!This research broadens our conceptions of American history and deepens our 
understanding of the processes by which settler colonies formed and “worked.” Settler 
colonialism’s legacy continues to influence geopolitics, national policy decisions, and people’s 
daily lives. Hence, the formation and eventual structures of settler colonies help researchers 
explain the founding of many contemporary societies and, taken together, recast empire, settler 
roles, and Indigenous actions within colonial contexts.  
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Introduction: Striking Comparisons 
 
On arrival in America, the Europeans found a territory of immense 
expanse, inhabited by a population, which by comparison, was insignificant. 
Understanding the advantages of colonization, of civilization, they were able, 
without great injustice, to repel the hunters who were before them in the vast 
forests that covered a part of the country, forests in which these people were able 
to continue to live by hunting as they had in the past. 
It is not the same in Algeria, where the Europeans found a limited 
territory, inhabited by a population of 2,500,000 inhabitants of a proud, 
energetic, [and] militant race, who in every case had the enjoyment of all of the 
country's land, and who, moreover were supported more or less directly by the 
Muslim country which neighbored it. … 
I regret that M. Michel Chevalier, who reported to us very interesting 
documents from the United States, has not I believe been obliged to visit our 
colony.  I think that if he had traveled not only the cities in the Littoral, but the 
agricultural centers of the interior, he would have had better impressions of the 
state of the country.  I believe it to be true to say that these centers, with the 
exception of a very small number, which were established principally in less-
viable and unfavorable conditions, are in a satisfactory state.  The occasional 
hardships through three years of drought and from diverse scourges are today in 
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great part repaired and the villages are in a state of prosperity equal at least to 
that of the villages of France.1  
 
Patrice de MacMahon – royalist, Commander of the Foreign Legion, proud Governor-General of 
the French Algeria he had helped to conquer, future Prime Minister and President of the French 
Third Republic – could hardly leave unanswered the unfavorable comparisons between America 
and Algeria published in the parliamentary journals by the well-known statesman, engineer, and 
traveler, Michel Chevalier.  Using immigration, Indigenous policy, and industrialization as 
evaluative criteria, Chevalier found Algeria sadly lacking.2  MacMahon's rebuttal, which he sent 
from Algeria to be read before the French Senate in 1870, maintained that, given the immense 
and hostile Indigenous population the French faced in Algeria, their colonization project was 
proceeding well by 1870. 
Governor-General MacMahon presents prevailing nineteenth-century European 
conceptualizations of the colonization and development of North America and the United States. 
His address exemplifies common perceptions of North America as a “virgin territory,” Native 
Americans as hunter-gatherers who simply melted into the woods before the American 
advancement west.3 Most importantly, it reveals the belief that the obstacles Americans faced 
                                                
1 Patrice de MacMahon, duc de Magenta, “Discours au Sénat du duc de Magenta sur une pétition 
relative à la constitution de l'Algérie” (Paris, 1870), pp. 4-5. Centre des Archives d’outre-mer, 
Aix-en-Provence, France. File: F/ 80/ 1681. Author's translation. 
2 Moncure Robinson, “Obituary Notice of Michel Chevalier,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 19, no. 107 (1880): 28-37. 
3 For more on the origins of European representations of Native Americans and the colonization 
of North America, see: D. K Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the 
Eighteenth Century, Weidenfeld and Nicolson Universal History 29 (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1966); James P. Ronda, “The European Indian: Jesuit Civilization Planning in New 
France,” Church History 41, no. 3 (September 1972): 385–95, doi:10.2307/3164223; Robert F. 
Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian, from Columbus to the 
Present, 1st Vintage Books ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); James Axtell, The Invasion 
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and those the French confronted in Algeria were grossly different in nature. MacMahon's address 
was the fruit of a specific historically selective discourse regarding colonization. Consequently, 
the Governor-General paints the toil of two hundred years with simple brush strokes that obscure 
the complicated negotiations, treaties, mutual assistance, and violence that ensued between 
Native peoples and Euro-Americans. Portraying the retreat of Native Americans as a peaceful 
migration into the woods where they could “live by hunting as they had in the past” belies the 
numerous treaties and bloody conflicts that often preceded Native communities’ withdrawal 
from territory Euro-Americans sought to acquire.4  
                                                                                                                                                       
Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America, The Cultural Origins of North 
America 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Gordon M. Sayre, Les Sauvages 
Américains: Representations of Native Americans in French and English Colonial Literature 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Christian F. Feest, ed., Indians and 
Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1999); Alan Taylor, American Colonies, The Penguin History of the United States (New York: 
Viking, 2001); Harry Liebersohn, Aristocratic Encounters (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); John Smolenski and Thomas J. Humphrey, eds., New World Orders: Violence, 
Sanction, and Authority in the Colonial Americas, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Peter C Mancall and James Hart Merrell, eds., 
American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian Removal, 
1500-1850, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2007); Michael Gaudio, Engraving the Savage the 
New World and Techniques of Civilization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
4 Note on Word Choice: While recognizing that the following term did not come into use until 
the twentieth century, to simplify semantics, I will use “Algerian” to refer to the totality of 
people who inhabited the region at the time of conquest, which included Jews, Arabs, Berbers 
(especially Kabyles), “Moors,” (or Andalusian descendents), Turks, and Koulouglis (children of 
Ottoman fathers and local mothers), as well as a few Europeans. Facing a similar problem of 
complexity in North America, I will refer to the Indigenous peoples as “American Indian,” 
“Native American,” by tribal affiliation when known, or by their language group. The Wabash 
and Ohio Valleys were predominately populated with Algonquian speakers, so when referring to 
collective groups, I will occasionally use this identifier (see Richard White, The Middle Ground: 
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991 for an example of this convention). I recognize how fraught 
the terms “Native” and “Indian” are in African studies and Native American studies, 
respectively. In this dissertation, I looked to the existing and recent historiography as well as 
Indigenous self-identification to guide my word choice as much as possible. “Native” does not 
carry the same weight in Native American studies, where it is a term of respect, as it does in 
African studies, where the term carries heavier colonial baggage. I use “Native” and 
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My study proposes another reading of the American and French-Algerian colonial events. 
By adopting a diachronic comparison, I expose the complex relations between settlers, Native 
communities, and metropolitan officials by using the Wabash River Valley between 1776 and 
1795 and Algeria between 1830 and 1848 as case studies.5 This comparison not only debunks 
MacMahon’s specious depictions of American colonization, but it examines how Indigenous, 
settler, metropolitan, and military leaders shaped the formation of settler colonies in the 
American Northwest Territory and French Algeria.  
This dissertation will examine the factors that motivated the establishment of settler 
colonies, as well as the structures built to sustain both colonies in the American Wabash Valley 
and Algeria.  It seeks to understand the processes by which these two settler colonies developed 
through an analysis of the relationships between the métropole, settlers, colonial 
administrators/military, and indigenous populations in order to deepen our understanding of why 
and how these types of colonies came into existence and how relationships among diverse 
populations and interests shaped the formation of settler governments. It seeks to answer the 
following questions: What forces, people, and decisions drove settler colonialism in these two 
locations?  How did the relationships between the métropole, settlers, colonial administrators, 
and the Indigenous populations shape settler colonial government?6 What factors in these 
relationships had the greatest effect on the formation of the colonies?  
                                                                                                                                                       
“Indigenous” interchangeably to distinguish between the people already residing in Algeria and 
the Wabash and Ohio Valleys prior to conquest and the arrival of colonizing forces. The 
capitalization of  “Indigenous” and “Native” follows conventions in Native American studies. 
5 The Wabash River Valley comprises territory in present-day southern Illinois and Indiana. 
6 I use the term métropole to refer to the seat of colonial administration in the “mother country.” 
In the United States, the location of the capital changed 14 times between 1776 and 1795. 
Regardless of its specific physical location, the métropole was always distant from the colonies, 
creating a lengthy communication delay in the early stages of settler colonial development in 
both the American and French-Algerian contexts. This distance allowed military commanders, 
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Literature Review 
Nineteenth-century French statesmen, such as Gouverner Général Patrice de MacMahon 
and Monsieur Michel Chevalier, used the United States as a benchmark in their analysis of 
Indigenous relations and the rate of colonization in Algeria. However, scholars have not yet 
followed in their footsteps. This study follows the logic of French statesmen and argues that the 
United States became an important model for modern settler colonialism and Indigenous policy. 
Likewise, Algeria has long been considered a model of European settler colonialism, but the 
                                                                                                                                                       
colonial officials, and settlers on the ground to make decisions based on local knowledge and 
exigencies that would ultimately shape the form of colonial governance and relations with the 
Indigenous population at least as much as, if not more, than those of the metropolitan 
administrators. My definition of the métropole in the context of settler colonies is grounded in 
historical and theoretical colonial and settler colonial studies, including Jack P. Greene, 
Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British 
Empire and the United States, 1607-1788, Richard B. Russell Lectures, no. 2 (New York: 
Norton, 1990); Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., Negotiated Empires: Centers 
and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820 (New York: Routledge, 2002); Eric Hinderaker and 
Peter C. Mancall, At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America, Regional 
Perspectives on Early America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); David 
Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 (Cambridge [England]: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and 
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, 3rd Printing (Oxford University Press, USA, 
1981); Ann Laura Stoler, “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the 
Boundaries of Rule,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 
134–61; Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview 
(Princeton: M. Wiener, 1997); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: 
Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Anne 
McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, eds., Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and 
Postcolonial Perspectives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Julia Ann 
Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family 
Life in French and Dutch Colonialism (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998); Ann 
Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Colony and 
Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); 
Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010); Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in 
America and Australia, 1788-1836, Harvard Historical Studies 166 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010). 
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process of its formation has left important questions unanswered. Furthermore, previous studies 
of settler colonial governance have focused almost exclusively on the actions of administrators, 
whereas my study reveals the ways in which military commanders, settler and Indigenous 
populations also shaped the colony and its governance. My research, then, contributes to settler 
colonial theory by exposing the processes by which settler colonies were formed and “worked,” 
and it does so from the perspective of an Indigenous Studies historian. 
As a field, colonial studies has shifted away from political histories and studies that focus 
on process in favor of cultural- and linguistic-studies approaches, however, we need more 
nuanced studies of the former that take into account the voices and actors revealed by the latter.7  
In other words, we need political histories of colonization and colonialism that considers a 
broader range of actors who experienced and shaped policy creation and implementation, 
including local administrators, Indigenous peoples, and settlers, in addition to governmental 
officials. Several recent works have demonstrated that this is possible and that there is growing 
interest in the marriage of these two approaches.   
Over the past three decades of scholarship, the characterization of modern European 
colonial project has been strongly influenced by larger historiographical trends, particularly 
perspectives emerging from postcolonial and gender studies. Some have described the essence of 
colonization as exploitation – of land, labor, and the extraction of commodities – while others 
                                                
7 “The ‘new’ imperial history pits itself as a revision of the ‘old imperial history, and focuses on 
culture, gender, and race rather than high politics, the economy, or military expansion.” Durba 
Ghosh, “Another Set of Imperial Turns?” American Historical Review 117, no. 3 (June 2012), 
772. Frederick Cooper, in Colonialism in Question also points to the shift in focus from 
processes of colonization to “stance” or positionality. Cooper also observes, “To a significant 
extent, the former focus on the political structure of the colonial state and the economics of 
empires has more recently taken a backseat to an emphasis on cultural conceptions of politics.” 
(Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History [Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2005], 50.) 
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have focused on the perception of colonies as exotic lands in which European sexual norms may 
be transgressed and in which business practices that became untenable in the nineteenth century 
could be employed for maximum profit.8 Still other scholars have characterized the colonies as 
“laboratories of modernity,” or as Europe’s Other by which it refined its own self-definition.9 
However, as Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper note, these views and representations of 
European colonial projects obscure the messy and complex realities of relations on the ground.10 
In an effort to unpack some of those dense social systems, historians and anthropologists have 
focused on the impact of conquest and colonization on Indigenous communities, as well as their 
responses to both.11 The work of Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and the Southeast Asian scholars 
                                                
8 Headrick, The Tools of Empire; Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge 
[Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Prochaska, Making Algeria French; 
Allan Christelow, Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1985); Malek Alloula, The Colonial Harem (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1986); Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power. 
9 Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism; Edward W Said, Orientalism, 
Reprinted with a new Afterword (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995); Sara Mills, Discourses of 
Difference: An Analysis of Women’s Travel Writing and Colonialism (London: Routledge, 
1991); Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991); Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation 
(London: Routledge, 1992); Clare Midgley, ed., Gender and Imperialism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998). 
10 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Métropole and Colony: Rethinking a 
Research Agenda,” in Cooper and Stoler, Tensions of Empire, 4–5. 
11 Ranajit Guha, ed., A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997); Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections on the History of an Idea (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Jodi Byrd and Michael Rothberg, “Between 
Subalternity and Indigeneity,” Interventions 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 1–12, 
doi:10.1080/1369801X.2011.545574; Jodi A Byrd, The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques 
of Colonialism, First Peoples!: New Directions Indigenous (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011); Julia Ann Clancy-Smith, Rebel and Saint Muslim Notables, Populist 
Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904), Comparative Studies on Muslim 
Societies 18 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Cheikh Anta Mbacké Babou, 
Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-
1913, New African Histories Series (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Richard White, The 
Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, 
Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
 8 
who launched Subaltern Studies initiated “postcolonial” critiques that seek to de-center Europe 
in the narrative, focusing instead on the experiences, voices, actions, and agency of Indigenous 
populations.12 In a similar way, since the inauguration of “New Indian History” in the 1970s, 
scholars of Native American history have sought to topple the previous narrative of American 
history that portrayed their removal and their perceived disappearance as inevitable and 
necessary to make way for American “progress.” More recent Native American Studies 
scholarship undermines early American myths and representations of diverse Native 
communities as undifferentiated, violent populations in need of civilizing and contests the 
assumption that only Euro-Americans made American history.13  
                                                                                                                                                       
1991); Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in 
the Western Great Lakes, Native Americans of the Northeast (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2001); John W. Hall, Uncommon Defense: Indian Allies in the Black Hawk 
War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Adam Joseph Jortner, The Gods of 
Prophetstown: The Battle of Tippecanoe and the Holy War for the American Frontier (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
12 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, 
Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Partha 
Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton 
Studies in Culture/power/history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Frantz Fanon, 
The Wretched of the Earth (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1963); Albert Memmi, The Colonizer 
and the Colonized, Expanded ed (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991); Guha, A Subaltern Studies 
Reader, 1986-1995. 
13 The second wave of New Indian History began with James Merrell’s The Indians’ New World: 
Catawbas and their Neighbors From European Contact Through the Era of Removal (1989), 
which recognized the “new world” that Indians faced after European arrival and examined 
encounter from the “bottom-up,” as historians recognized the significance of local relations and 
the actions of people other than chiefs and colonial officials.  This study, together with Richard 
White’s 1991 The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 and Daniel Usner’s 1992 Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange 
Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783 also pioneered regional analyses that 
complicated and challenged the dominant narrative of British colonial history and acknowledged 
and examined Indians’ essential role in shaping the history of these regions. Additionally, White 
and Usner’s studies refocused historians’ attention west of the Appalachian Mountains to the 
Great Lakes, Louisiana, and the Western borderlands. More recently, Kathleen DuVal’s The 
Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (2006), Brian Delay’s War 
of a Thousand Deserts: Indian raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (2008), David J. Silverman’s 
 9 
 Only within the past decade have scholars begun the difficult task of understanding the 
diversity of populations once viewed as cohesive and analyzing their distinct positions, 
ideologies, and actions. Some historians, such as James Searing, interrogate how the various 
Indigenous communities residing in colonized territories related to one another as well as to the 
colonial government.14 Still, more work needs to be done on this front, as one people group or 
another – settlers, Natives, metropolitan administrators, or colonial/military officials – is 
generally portrayed as monolithic and undifferentiated.   
In studies of the modern French Empire, scholars have examined Indigenous political, 
social, and cultural histories in relation to French actions and actors in the colonies.  Several 
historians have also begun to compare different colonies within the French Empire and examine 
phenomena in both France and its colonies.15 Decolonization and memory have increasingly 
become the focus of recent studies such that nearly one of every two studies on French Algeria 
                                                                                                                                                       
Red Brethren: The Brothertown and Stockbridge Indians and the Problem of Race in Early 
America (2010), and Michael Witgen’s An Infinity of Nations (2011) analyze Native American 
history to challenge the misapplication of models and have developed new frameworks with 
which to understand Euroamerican-Indian encounter. In so doing, they are rewriting important 
aspects of the American historical narrative. For more on this historiography, see: Robert F. 
Berkhofer, “The Political Context of a New Indian History,” Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 3 
(1971): 357–82; Colin G. Calloway and Gregory Evans Dowd, “American Indians: Resistance or 
Accommodation?,” in Interpretations of American History: Patterns and Perspectives, ed. 
Francis G. Couvares et al., 7th ed, vol. 1, 2 vols. (New York: Free Press, 2000), 61–99; Ned 
Blackhawk, “American Indians and the Study of U.S. History,” in American History Now, ed. 
Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, Critical Perspectives on the Past (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2011), 376–99. 
14 James F. Searing, “God Alone Is King”: Islam and Emancipation in Senegal!:the Wolof 
Kingdoms of Kajour and Bawol, 1859-1914, Social History of Africa (Portsmouth, NH: 
Heinemann, 2002). 
15 Eric Thomas Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, 
Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); J. P. 
Daughton, An Empire Divided Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 
1880-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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examines some aspect of Algerian War for Independence (1954-1962).16 A few scholars, like 
Benjamin Brower in his recent study A Desert Named Peace, continue to confront the violence 
of conquest that France would sooner forget.17 Nabila Oulebsir’s Les usages du Patrimoine en 
Algérie also includes the period before 1871 in her study of buildings, monuments, and art, as 
part of the national project to construct a French Algerian past, identity, and heritage. However, 
their studies are unusual in considering the period prior to 1871 in Algerian history.  Less than 
eight percent of recent studies do so, and of those, most examine the history of French medicine 
in Algeria.18 
In a similar way, a number of Americanists are pushing the United States to come to 
terms with its own history of violence and the colonization of Native Americans by recognizing 
it in the national narrative.19 In some ways, however, it is easier to discuss such issues in the 
                                                
16 Alice Conklin made this observation in her review essay, “Histories of Colonialism: Recent 
Studies of Modern French Empire,” French Historical Studies 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007), and the 
statistics come from my own examination of books, articles, and theses written on studies of 
French colonial Algeria over the past decade. 
17 Benjamin Claude Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the 
Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902, History and Society of the Modern Middle East (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009).See also French Loi 2005-158, 23 February 2005 that 
mandated that the history of French colonialism be portrayed in a positive light in lycées 
(Available: http://www.admi.net/jo/20050224/DEFX0300218L.html) Some of the most 
offensive parts of it were later repealed by Jacques Chirac in 2006, but it illustrates France’s 
inability to come to terms with its colonial past. 
18 These figures are based on a review of “Recent Books and Dissertations on French History” in 
the journal French Historical Studies between 2000 and 2013. 
19 Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 
1600-1860, 1st ed. (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1973); Andrea Smith, 
Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 
2005); Ned Blackhawk, Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American 
West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Robert M. Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s 
Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); Barbara Alice Mann, George Washington’s War on Native 
America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008); Margaret D. Jacobs, White Mother to a 
Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the 
American West and Australia, 1880-1940 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); 
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United States because of the perceived distance between its violence against American Indians 
and because it never faced a war that brought about Native American decolonization.  On the 
other hand, this last fact makes it imperative to confront this past and observe the ways in which 
it is also American and American Indians’ present. Thus, decolonizing methodologies are 
essential to studies of United States history.20 
The field of comparative colonial studies has followed a similar historiographical course 
as the broader history of colonization. However, several significant themes have emerged in the 
last decade, following more traditional works of comparative political history, such as D. K. 
Fieldhouse’s foundational work, The Colonial Empires; A Comparative Survey from the 
Eighteenth Century (1966), comparative compilations of essays, such as Daniel Headrick’s The 
Tools of Empire, as well as edited volumes that consider more recent approaches to colonial 
studies, such as Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler’s Tensions of Empire.21  Fruitful 
comparative colonial studies have used gender and race as analytical lenses, often linking the 
two to demonstrate how issues of gender, sexuality, child rearing, and race were central to 
imperial policies of exclusion and the maintenance of social hierarchies necessary for the 
preservation of colonies.22  These studies also examine the ways in which imperial power was 
                                                                                                                                                       
Stephen J Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
20 Byrd, The Transit of Empire; Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research 
and Indigenous Peoples (Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago Press, 1999); Devon A. Mihesuah, 
Indigenous American Women: Decolonization, Empowerment, Activism, Contemporary 
Indigenous Issues (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003). 
21 Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century; 
Headrick, The Tools of Empire; Phillip Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and 
American Approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870-1970 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); 
Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments; Cooper and Stoler, Tensions of Empire; Robert Gregg, 
Inside Out, Outside in: Essays in Comparative History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
22 The categories of race and gender are often linked in studies of colonialism.  For several 
examples in a large and growing body of literature, see: Lowe, Critical Terrains; Nupur 
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inscribed on bodies through regulations of sexuality, family life, and the enforcement of laws and 
punishment.23  
More recently two additional significant trends may be observed.  First, increasing 
numbers of scholars have become interested once again in “big” history but now seek to address 
the marginalization of actors previously overlooked in top-down analyses of imperial regimes.24  
Other studies have examined crime, law, and issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction to interrogate 
structures of inequality, the creation of institutions through which colonial powers attempted to 
legitimize their rule, and, most recently, to examine the ways in which Indigenous populations 
                                                                                                                                                       
Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel, eds., Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and 
Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Robert Young, Colonial Desire: 
Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race (New York: Routledge, 1995); McClintock, Mufti, and 
Shohat, Dangerous Liaisons; Clancy-Smith and Gouda, Domesticating the Empire; Midgley, 
Gender and Imperialism; Antoinette Burton, “Thinking beyond the Boundaries: Empire, 
Feminism and the Domains of History,” Social History 26 (January 2001): 60–71, 
doi:10.1080/03071020010004417; Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race, and Politics: Policing 
Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge, 2003); Sue Peabody and Tyler 
Edward Stovall, eds., The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 2003); Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British 
Empire, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Ann 
Laura Stoler, ed., Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History, 
American Encounters/Global Interactions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Radhika 
Mohanram, Imperial White: Race, Diaspora, and the British Empire (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007).  
23 Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette M Burton, eds., Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial 
Encounters in World History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Discipline and the Other 
Body: Correction, Corporeality,Colonialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
24 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France 
C. 1500-C. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Bouda Etemad, Possessing the 
World: Taking the Measurements of Colonisation from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century, 
European Expansion and Global Interaction, v. 6 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Jane 
Burbank, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 
1405 (London!; New York: Allen Lane, 2007); John H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: 
Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
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shaped the policies that could be enacted.25 While these studies have added greatly to our 
knowledge of the formation and practice of colonial law and the establishment of both 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, none of them have examined the political structures of colonial 
administration through the lenses provided by postcolonial critiques. The utility of this approach 
is best demonstrated in Lisa Ford’s analysis of how Native people in both New South Wales and 
the American state of Georgia were able to establish the boundaries and terms on which colonial 
legislation could be formed and executed in the colonies through the early decades of the 
nineteenth century.  
Some scholars resist considering the United States in an imperial framework. They argue 
that the label of empire “obfuscates more than it explains,” because it “asserts a core American 
similarity with historical empires that overrides too many fundamental differences.” However, 
comparative studies of United States’ colonialism, such as Lisa Ford’s Settler Sovereignty, are 
appearing with increasing frequency, greater analytical depth, and have begun to provide 
meaningful and substantive critiques of exceptionalist portrayals of American history and 
imperialism.26 Two forms of revisionist history have attempted this before with regard to 
American imperialism but have not been able to fully escape allusions to American 
exceptionalism.  The first revisionist histories proclaimed that American imperialism was 
different from the modalities of modern European empires because of its “liberal and benign 
                                                
25 Christelow, Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria; Barry S. Godfrey 
and Graeme Dunstall, eds., Crime and Empire, 1840-1940: Criminal Justice in Local and Global 
Context (Cullompton: Willan Pub, 2005); Lauren A. Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures Legal 
Regimes in World History, 1400-1900, Studies in Comparative World History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and 
Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); 
Ford, Settler Sovereignty. 
26 Quote from Jeremi Suri, “The Limits of American Empire,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire in 
the Making of the Modern American State, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 524; Ford, Settler Sovereignty. 
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character.” Unlike European powers that ruled their colonies with an iron fist, scholars 
maintained that the objective of American imperialism was the altruistic promotion of freedom 
and democracy.27  The second form of revisionist history considered American imperialism to be 
just as harmful to Native populations as European imperialism, but argued that American 
imperialism was less focused on territoriality than other empires and more informal in its use of 
power.28 Scholars in this second stream of revisionist history ground their work in Tocqueville’s 
perceptions of the United States and its “unique” social system, which was not, according to 
Tocqueville, founded on a caste system with a special ruling class.29  They, then, extend this 
perspective to explain the forms and objectives of American power in the world. Despite placing 
the United States in a comparative perspective, both of these trends perpetuate the idea that the 
nature and aims of American imperialism were and are unique. Native historians and 
anthropologists’ work, most of which is not comparative, seeks to address these problematic 
depictions.30  Others, like Lisa Ford and Margaret Jacobs use settler colonialism as a framework 
                                                
27 Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16; Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really 
Need Saving? Anthropoligical Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American 
Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (September 2002): 783–90. 
28 Go, Patterns of Empire, 17; Anthony Pagden, “Imperialism, Liberalism, & the Quest for 
Perpetual Peace,” Daedalus 134, no. 2 (2005): 46-57. See also, Bernard Porter, Empire and 
Superempire: Britain, America and the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). 
29 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Henry Reeve (Union, NJ: Lawbook 
Exchange, 2003). 
30 This is an enormous body of literature. For a sample, see Jean M O’Brien, Dispossession by 
Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650-1790, Cambridge Studies in 
North American Indian History (Cambridge!; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); 
Blackhawk, Violence Over the Land; Pekka Hämäläinen and William P. Clements Center for 
Southwest Studies, The Comanche Empire, The Lamar Series in Western History (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2008); Audra Simpson, “Captivating Eunice: Membership, Colonialism, 
and Gendered Citizenships of Grief,” Wicazo Sa Review 24, no. 2 (2009): 105–29, 
doi:10.1353/wic.0.0031; Scott Lauria Morgensen, Spaces Between Us: Queer Settler 
Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization, First Peoples!: New Directions in Indigenous 
Studies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). 
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for comparative studies of the United States in an effort to demonstrate which local factors 
contributed to the different forms of American imperialism. Just as importantly, examinations of 
the United States as a settler colony reveal how similar American imperial power structures and 
institutions were to others.31 
Despite the growth of this field of inquiry, however, most studies spend little, if any, time 
analyzing the initial formation of the United States’ empire in a comparative perspective, instead 
choosing to focus on the mid-to late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries.32 Studies of early United 
States’ imperial land and Native policies have been examined in isolation, without reference to 
the formation of other empires. The lack of transnational and trans-imperial context makes it 
difficult to determine what was truly unique about the United States case and what it held in 
common with the experiences of other imperial powers in the establishment of colonial policies 
and structures.33 Paul Kramer explains that using a framework, such as settler colonialism, makes 
comparison both possible and fruitful:  
                                                
31 Ford, Settler Sovereignty; Jacobs, White Mother to a Dark Race; Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of 
American Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
32 Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late-
Industrializing World since 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Darby, Three 
Faces of Imperialism; Go, Patterns of Empire; Porter, Empire and Superempire; Patrick Karl 
O’Brien and Armand Cleese, eds., Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 
1941-2001 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Paul A. Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial 
Histories of the United States in the World,” AHR 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1348–91, 
doi:10.1086/ahr.116.5.1348. 
33 Israel Ward Andrews, “The Beginnings of the Colonial System of the United States,” in Ohio 
Archæological and Historical Quarterly, vol. 1 (Columbus: Lutheran Book Concern for The 
Ohio State Archæological and Historical Society, 1893), 1–9; Jay Gitlin, Barbara Berglund, and 
Adam Arenson, eds., Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Craig Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early 
American Political Theory, 1675-1775 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Tim 
Alan Garrison, The Legal Ideology of Removal: The Southern Judiciary and the Sovereignty of 
Native American Nations (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Frederick Hoxie, 
“Retrieving the Red Continent: Settler Colonialism and the History of American Indians in the 
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Understanding the U. S. West as the setting for a particular (that is, a unique but 
unexceptional) instance of settler colonialism raises comparative questions that were not 
easy to ask about Turner’s frontier … Placed in this context, the U. S. West appears as a 
variation on a global theme, alongside Australia, Argentina, and Algeria.34 
Such an approach allows us to understand the nature of the early United States government, the 
ability or inability to exercise its power, and to question the national narrative at an intellectual 
distance that is difficult to obtain without engaging in a comparative study.  
Like the United States, Algeria has also received some attention in comparative studies; 
however, sustained comparisons between French Algeria and other colonies have not been 
undertaken. Existing comparative studies have not yet examined French Algeria within the 
framework of settler colonialism.35  However, the number of references to it in larger studies, 
such as Lorenzo Veracini’s Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Aziz Rana’s The Two 
Faces of American Freedom, and contributions to edited studies of colonialism, such as Lynette 
Russell’s Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies, suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                       
US,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 6 (2008): 1153–67; Banner, How the Indians Lost Their 
Land. 
34 Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1361. 
35 John Damis, “The Free-School Phenomenon: The Cases of Tunisia and Algeria,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 5, no. 4 (1974): 434–49; Allan Christelow, “The Muslim Judge 
and Municipal Politics in Colonial Algeria and Senegal,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 24, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 3–24; Steven A. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing the 
Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007); Mohanalakshmi. Rajakumar, Haram in the Harem: Domestic 
Narratives in India and Algeria, vol. 8, Postcolonial Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 2009); 
Sharon Meilahn. Bartlett, Foundering Men, Thriving Women: Gender, Politics, and the Crisis of 
Masculinity in Haiti and Algeria, 2009; Patricia M. E. Lorcin, Historicizing Colonial Nostalgia: 
European Women’s Narratives of Algeria and Kenya 1900-Present (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012). 
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a sustained comparison would be useful in an analysis of the formation of settler colonial 
structures.36 
Scholars have formed a working definition of what settler colonialism was and is and its 
effects on Native populations through studies of various forms of dispossession. Certain policies 
and characteristics of settler colonies have been examined in detail – land policies, issues of 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, the role that myths played in legitimizing settler colonialism and 
creating a settler identity, and how metropolitan administrators sought to control both settler and 
indigenous populations, even in the most intimate aspects of their lives – sexual partnerships and 
rearing children. Nevertheless, scholars still have not explained the early phases of development: 
the motivating forces and actors that initiated settlement and how the power that was exerted in 
relationships between all four of the invested parties - officials in the ‘home’ country, civil and 
military administrators on the ground, Indigenous peoples and settlers – determined the form of 
settler government and its achievement.37 Scholars of settler colonialism assert that land was the 
                                                
36 Daiva K. Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of 
Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class, Sage Series on Race and Ethnic Relations, v. 11 (London: 
Sage, 1995), 6; Dolores Janiewski, “Gendering, Racializing & Classifying: Settler Colonialism 
in the United States, 1590-1990,” in Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, 
Ethnicity and Class, ed. Daiva K. Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis (London: Sage, 1995), 132–60; 
Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 1–2, 44; Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 2010, 10, 18, 36, 56, 63, 65–69, 72, 74, 
79, 87; Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom, 10–11. 
37 Donald Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern 
Hemisphere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, Unsettling 
Settler Societies; Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: 
The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, Writing Past Colonialism Series (New York: 
Cassell, 1999); Lynette Russell, ed., Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in 
Settler Societies, Studies in Imperialism (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001); Settler 
Colonialism in the Twentieth Century; Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination 
of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409; Annie E. Coombes, ed., 
Rethinking Settler Colonialism: History and Memory in Australia, Canada, Aotearoa New 
Zealand and South Africa, Studies in Imperialism (Manchester!; New York!: New York: 
Manchester University Press!; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2006); Veracini, 
 18 
single most important factor that drew settlers and that policies focused on dispossessing the 
Native population, but what drove the planting of such colonies?  If it was the movement of 
settlers to regions, was land, indeed, the motivating factor or are there other explanations? 
In an examination of colonial and state founding moments, the processes and the 
motivations are inseparable, as Patrick Wolfe has argued for settler colonialism as a whole.38 
Through an analysis of the political debates in congress/parliament and settler councils, this 
study intends to shed light on the nature of metropolitan and settler political motivations and 
their effects on legislation. Was settler colonialism merely a political and/or economic 
expedient? The reasons for the establishment and development of the settler colony affected the 
types of relationships between the métropole, settlers, colonial officials and Native peoples; the 
types of policies formed; the role of the military; whether or not and how the métropole 
supported settlement; and the goals of each interested party.  
Early social science studies of Algeria often consciously or unconsciously bolstered 
French notions of European superiority and ideas about the “scientific” differences of the 
“races,” thereby justifying French colonial rule.  Imperial/colonial histories often ignored the 
presence and role of Algerians of all ethnicities in the shaping of events and focused on the 
exploits of elite European men during the conquest, colonization, and settlement processes.39 In 
reaction, particularly in post-colonial Algeria, many histories have been written from an Algerian 
                                                                                                                                                       
Settler Colonialism, 2010; Kramer, “Power and Connection”; Fiona Bateman and Lionel 
Pilkington, eds., Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Joshua Simon, “Review Essay: The United States as Settler 
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38 Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, 3. 
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Nationalist perspective, which also skews the narrative by dismissing the European colonial 
population from the nation’s history.40 
The most prominent issue to be addressed, however, is the lack of an Algerian voice in 
the secondary literature. Sources do exist, but many are in Arabic or are not yet available to the 
public.41 It appears that the field is slowly moving towards such analyses, as James McDougall 
and Julia Clancy-Smith’s works demonstrate, but there is much more work to do and many more 
questions to explore, especially in the period prior to 1871, to which almost no attention has been 
given.42 Similarly, little attention has been paid to the French conquest and construction of 
imperial institutions between 1830 and 1871 since the foundational works of Charles Ageron, 
Jacques Berque, and John Ruedy’s recent synthesis that covers this period in a scant few 
chapters.43 The interactions between Indigenous populations, settlers, and colonial administrators 
                                                
40 For more on past historiographical trends, see Edmund Burke III, “Theorizing the Histories of 
Colonialism and Nationalism in the Arab Maghrib,” Arab Studies Quarterly 20 no. 2 (Spring 
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on multiple levels, including military personnel have not been examined in this crucial founding 
era. 
Studies of the American Midwest are flourishing right now, but most concentrate on the 
Ohio Valley and regions of Western New York and Pennsylvania.  My study will shift this focus 
farther west to the frontier regions of Illinois and Indiana and yet not so far as Bethel Saler’s 
recent exploration of settler colonialism in the present-day Wisconsin.44 I chose this particular 
region because of the crucial role it played in the American Revolution in the western 
backcountry. Thus, this selection highlights the significance of this territory in the formation of 
the United States as an independent nation and the development of American settler colonial 
structures that became the pattern for future territorial acquisitions.  While historians of the Early 
National Era of the United States have examined the role of the military, Indian agents, 
statesmen, legislation, and have begun to detail the roles of Native Americans, there has been 
little analysis of the interplay amongst all of the stakeholders.45 
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On the other hand, more American historians are beginning to use insights from 
postcolonial studies to re-examine the formation of American political ideas and institutions in 
the Early Republican era, as well as the relationship between these developments and 
frontier/Indian policies.46 However, these studies have been conducted in isolation with little 
reference to other colonies, settler or otherwise, and those that have analyzed Native American 
policy, particularly in the Jacksonian era have focused almost exclusively on the removal 
policies associated with the Cherokee, Creek, and Choctaw nations.47 One notable exception to 
the lack of comparison is Aziz Rana’s study The Two Faces of American Freedom, an exception 
that proves the rule. Rana argues that “most of the American experience is best understood as a 
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constitutional and political experiment in … settler empire.”48  He embeds comparisons in his 
examination of the formation of American ideas about freedom, identity, and politics, but does 
not sustain the comparative framework throughout. Thus, my study will build on this insight, his 
use of comparative methodology, and his examination of the United States as a settler empire but 
will take it further through an in-depth comparative history of the formation of French Algeria 
and the United States settler colonial empire. 
In the American academy, few scholars have examined United States history within the 
framework of settler colonialism. This approach has received more attention in recent years with 
the publication of Margaret Jacobs’ White Mother to a Dark Race (2009), Lisa Ford’s Settler 
Sovereignty (2010), and Aziz Rana’s The Two Faces of American Freedom (2010).49 These 
scholars explore the policies that grew out of settler colonization in areas that had already 
achieved statehood. Jacobs shows that settler colonialism was about more than taking land and 
that in the post-borderlands stage of colonization, the settler state had a vested interested in the 
structural reordering of Indigenous societies. Both the United States and Australia attempted 
imposed social changes among Indigenous peoples through policies that focused on women and 
children and made room for white women in the colonizing project in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  Ford, on the other hand, focuses on how the United States and Australian 
governments redefined sovereignty from the late eighteenth through mid-nineteenth centuries.  
She argues that the Anglophone world sought to define sovereignty as “the ordering of 
indigenous people in space.”50  Through the courts, Ford contends, Anglo states aligned 
sovereignty, territory, and jurisdiction together in a new way that allowed settlers to govern 
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indigenous people and land. Rana opposes Gordon Wood’s portrayal of American 
exceptionalism and contends that the United States, like many other states, has succeeded 
because its imperial policies favor the elite, dispossess Indigenous inhabitants, profit from the 
expropriated land, and benefit from the labor of marginalized people, including slaves.51 
However, settler colonialism also produced an ideology of freedom, self-government, and 
meaningful labor.52 
By studying the processes of settler colonial formation, I intend to uncover the nature and 
limits of power on multiple levels.  This analysis interrogates the role that the métropole played 
in founding and governing settler colonies and will reveal the ways in which various actors 
previously ignored by political history shaped policy formation and implementation.  
Additionally, this study will open up new avenues for research by establishing a base on which 
to build. Once the stimuli and means of settlement are understood, the role of ideology and 
which ideologies carried the most weight should become evident.  With the establishment of this 
foundation, the interplay between race, class, and gender can be examined in context. 
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Defining Settler Colonialism 
The mid-nineteenth century debate between the French eyewitnesses to conquest stands 
as an invitation to research and study.  The differences between the two men are bridged by 
fundamental and shared assumptions about the nature of colonial expansion in the tumultuous 
era through which they lived.  French Algeria (1830-1848) and the American Midwest (1778-
1795) were settler colonies where, despite significant and deep differences in method, 
environment, and outcome, the planting and subsequent development of colonies was shaped by 
the demands, experiences, and culture of the settlers themselves.  Empires proudly documented 
their conquests; the voluminous surviving records of Indigenous populations, colonists, colonial 
administrators, the military, and the métropole reveal the similar paths both colonies took from 
conquest through the establishment of stable settler governments.53 Settler colonies in the 
American Midwest and Algeria resulted from a bottom-up process in which settler desires for 
land and greater economic opportunities compelled them to migrate and stake their claim to these 
territories by dispossessing Indigenous communities. This movement then served as a catalyst 
for makeshift metropolitan policies that only became systematized and institutionalized at the 
end of the first decade of colonization.  
In both the past and present, colonies have been loci of exploitation and experimentation 
that colonizers have used as points of reference in their own self-definition. Exploited for their 
land, labor, resources, and commodities, colonized populations also faced more personal forms 
of colonial imposition, particularly sexual conquest as well as the regulation of social 
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interactions and family formation. Issues of gender, sexuality, child-rearing, and race have been 
central to imperial policies of exclusion and the maintenance of social hierarchies necessary for 
the preservation of colonies.54  
In contrast to the exploitative nature of colonialism, metropolitan administrators have 
repeatedly pointed to its productive capacity in the form of “civilizing missions” or “laboratories 
of modernity.”55 Through education initiatives, particularly boarding schools, colonial 
administrators sought to “kill the [Native] in [each student] and save the man.”56 While colonial 
school administrators sought to civilize and assimilate the Indigenous population, colonial 
architects and urban planners experimented with novel designs to dominate and regulate the land 
to make it productive, progressive, and easier to govern and control.57 In the same way, 
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metropolitan administrators tested new bureaucratic structures and forms of social, economic, 
and political control.58 Notwithstanding colonial publicists’ spin, colonies were formed to 
augment the mother country’s wealth and prestige.  
In addition to extending their political and commercial reach, settler colonies offered 
nations another advantage. They were spaces in which to offload their surplus or troublesome 
populations. Settler colonialism was (and is) a process in which settlers emigrate(d) with the 
express purposes of territorial occupation and the formation of a new community rather than the 
extraction of labor or resources, although these may have been or become secondary 
objectives.59 Settlers believed that it was necessary to remove the Indigenous population from the 
land they claimed.  Indeed, the elimination of Indigenous peoples itself became the organizing 
principle of settler colonial society and territoriality became its “irreducible element.”60   
Land acquisition, as well as the wealth and opportunities it brought, were among the 
principal factors that motivated settlement and necessitated the interminable process of 
eliminating the Indigenous population and the legitimation of settler sovereignty over land and 
people.  Both dispossession and attempts to establish legitimacy were motives and means to gain 
access to Native land, resources, homes, and other physical structures in order to profit from the 
built and rebuilt environment. Thus, capitalist impulses, in part, motivated métropoles to 
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establish institutions to maintain, govern, defend, and exert control in settler colonies. While 
colonial administrators sought to secure settler political, cultural, and economic hegemony, many 
individual settlers simply sought a “competency” for themselves and their families.61 Many 
impoverished settlers arrived in the colonies, looking for a better life – either on their own farm 
with enough land to pass on to their children or, in Algeria, in the cities as artisans or small 
business owners. Unlike the dyadic relationship formed between métropole and colony in 
extractive colonialism, settler colonialism generated a web of relations between four key sets of 
actors: metropolitan officials, colonial administrators (both military and civil), Indigenous 
peoples, and the settlers.62 
Despite geographic, demographic, political, and cultural variations, settler societies share 
a number of characteristics.  Their common objective is to establish themselves on lands 
appropriated from Indigenous inhabitants and create a stable, semi-autonomous government with 
metropolitan support.  To maintain control of the colony and generate a sense of belonging, 
settlers also seek to establish their legitimacy and in doing so, often develop a more egalitarian 
society amongst themselves than is found in the métropole. This, in turn, creates the perception 
of a dichotomous society (“us” versus “them”), and settlers feel increasingly threatened by the 
Indigenous population. Finally, the struggle to set up civil settler governments requires the 
“pacification” and/or “removal” of the original inhabitants, thereby eliminating the justification 
for military governance.   
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In settler societies, colonists commonly articulate two contradictory desires – one for 
autonomous settler government in which they handle their own affairs as they see fit and the 
other for metropolitan resources and military support, especially for the purpose of managing 
settler-Indigenous relations and as a means of dispossessing Native people.63 The United States 
and France developed similar solutions to the dilemma colonists posed – solutions that were 
unique among other mother countries with settler colonies.  The American federal system 
incorporated colonized territories into the union as states, and France annexed Algeria to satisfy 
settler desires and enrich the métropole.  Each granted settlers representation both locally and in 
metropolitan government, provided for their military defense, and revenues raised through 
taxation and land sales went into metropolitan coffers.   
Settlers occupy the tenuous position of exogenous others who claim rights to land and 
sovereignty over the Indigenous populations in the colonies. They therefore need to establish 
their legitimacy in the eyes of those they seek to rule, in their own, and in those of the 
metropolitan administrators.64 As immigrants and as colonists attempting to assert their right to 
autonomous government, they need to craft a new identity that (1) sets them apart from indigènes 
and the metropolitan population and (2) bridges differences amongst themselves based on class, 
ethnicity, and nationality. Consequently, settlers often attach their identity to the land itself, to 
the mythologized common experience of settlement, and often to the idealized shared goal of 
self-government.65 In settler societies, metropolitan society and politics have often been 
perceived as decadent and corrupt, so settlers generally seek to distance themselves from 
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metropolitan customs while at the same time using their relationship to the mother country to 
establish their authority.66 In their quest for legitimacy, settlers also appropriate Indigenous 
symbols, a process that frequently occurs simultaneously with the promulgation of one or several 
myths about “vanishing” indigènes, terra nullius (barren lands), and/or assertions of manifest 
destiny.67 These myths allow settlers to rationalize the appropriation of Indigenous land and 
symbols and to declare the legitimacy of their sovereignty.  All of these discursive moves unify 
settlers, a necessary step toward self-government.  
In most historic settler colonies, greater equality among the colons, or settlers, emerged 
than was experienced among metropolitan inhabitants.68 Immigrants to the United States who 
moved west to take advantage of inexpensive frontier lands were quickly granted American 
citizenship rights and considered equals among their peers, especially in matters of local 
government.  Transforming European settlers into French citizens was imperative in Algeria 
because the French were actually a minority of the settler population in some locations, such as 
colonial Bône (Annaba) in the province of Constantine.69 Many settlers believed that their civil 
rights and the security of their own democratic institutions rested on the subordination of 
Indigenous people and required their dispossession.70 The American settler empire, “for all its 
brutality … was the servant of a unique and robust view of self-rule seen by many as crucial to 
                                                
66 Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 2010, 54–65. 
67 Ibid., 82; Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom, 8–10; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 
Unsettling Settler Societies, 11; Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, Mapping the Language 
of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1992), 124–125; White, The Middle Ground, 469–517. In both locations I have chosen, 
these claims could not be supported but (at least in the United States) were made anyway.  The 
Indigenous population was clearly not dying out in Algeria, and Richard White suggests that 
population in the American Midwest had recovered from the shocks of the late 17th and early 18th 
c. and was actually increasing. 
68 Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom, 11. 
69 Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 85–92, 135–179. 
70 Rana, 3. 
 30 
the fulfillment of emancipatory ambitions.”71  Republican governments and democratic 
principles in the métropole often went hand-in-hand with repressive settler colonial policies that 
targeted and excluded the Indigenous population. Settler colonialism, then, was a productive 
engine that promoted an ideology of freedom, self-government, and meaningful labor while at 
the same time suppressing the rights and liberty of the Indigenous population it sought to 
supersede and replace. 
In settler colonial systems, métropoles and settlers also tend to share concerns about 
perceived and actual Indigenous threats to colonists’ safety and therefore exhibit a preoccupation 
with militarism.  This took different forms in the American territories and French Algeria.  In the 
American Midwest, militias were initially largely responsible for securing settlers’ safety, and 
the military was only sent when the militias were incapable of suppressing Native attacks. 
However, the United States always made it clear to settlers and Indigenous populations alike that 
military power backed legislation, as well as the agents responsible for carrying it out in 
territories over which the United States claimed jurisdiction, which came to include “Indian 
Country.”72 In Algeria, the military was responsible for the administration of the colony, 
ensuring settler safety, and opening up additional lands to settlement. Whether conducted by 
militias, organized armies, or individual settlers, colonizers in both regions often resorted to 
coercion, force, and violence in response to Indigenous resistance. 
After the period of conquest, occupation, and initial settlement, when the region was 
considered “pacified,” settlers were able to elect their own representatives and leaders to govern 
local affairs and thereby establish relatively stable settler governments.  Settler leadership was 
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not appointed by the métropole at this stage, nor did active military personnel working in a 
military capacity fill the positions.  These governments were civil, self-governing, integrated 
with the civil metropolitan administration, meaning that settlers had voting rights and 
representation in Parliament/Congress, and they had subdued, or “pacified," the region under 
their administration by subjugating, silencing, removing, killing, and/or assimilating (in a limited 
way) the Indigenous population. While this is an important aspect in the history of these two 
settler colonies, this study focuses on the first two decades of occupation and settlement, leaving 
the story of the establishment of civil settler governments for a subsequent study. 
Methodology 
This study charts a new course for histories of the American occupation of the Wabash 
Valley, the colonization of Algeria, and settler colonial studies by putting American and French 
colonization efforts in conversation with each other. This comparison uncovers the strikingly 
similar motives and means of establishing settler colonies in Indiana/Illinois and Constantine, 
Algeria. Instead of focusing exclusively on colonial officials and metropolitan legislation, it also 
highlights Indigenous and settler agency in shaping settler colonial social and political structures. 
Instead of taking for granted that land was the single most important factor that drew settlers and 
compelled officials to dispossess the Native population, it asks what drove the establishment of 
these two colonies.  It explores how the interactions between, and among, the métropole, settlers, 
colonial and military administrators, and the Indigenous populations shaped settler colonial 
governments in the American Wabash Valley and Constantine, Algeria. 
The purpose in juxtaposing the United States and Algeria is to uncover similarities, as 
well as differences, that teach us about the nature of settler colonialism. The comparison between 
these two contexts reveals the contingent nature of imperial policies (context-dependent), their 
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implementation, and implications. This methodology also uncovers “points of congruence and 
similarities … in seemingly disparate [geographic and temporal] sites.”73 According to William 
Sewell, in his analysis of Marc Bloch’s use of comparison, there are three primary uses for 
comparative history: (1) to test theories of causation, (2) to determine the distinctiveness of 
societies, and (3) to “formulate problems for historical research.”74 Underlying these three 
purposes is a common logic: the “logic of hypothesis testing.”75  This approach is indispensable 
in the analysis of causal questions and will clarify the most significant agents, relationships, 
events, and ideas that led to the creation of settler colonies.76 I will conduct this comparison 
using two methods of analysis: “parallel demonstration” and a “contrast of contexts.”77 Through 
parallel demonstration, the most significant factors in the development of the colonies will 
emerge as similar events, and stages of development in each location are analyzed side by side.  
However, this does not tell the whole story.  Therefore, I will also use a “contrast of 
contexts” approach to highlight the ways in which various actors, including Indigenous men and 
women, settlers, and colonial officials, responded to and influenced colonial policies.  In this 
way, the commonalities between the two settler societies and the phenomena that are particular 
to each become distinguishable, breaking down preconceived notions of exceptionalism, and 
contributing to the development of settler colonial theory.78 The comparison between the United 
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States and French colonial development is conducted by pairing phases of development rather 
than following an exact chronology.  The period of initial conquest, occupation and 
“pacification” in the American Midwest (1778-1795) is paired with the same phase in Algeria 
(1830-1848). By comparing the stages of development, it becomes possible to examine the 
variables present in each and determine which factors were most influential in determining the 
course of events. In both cases each state was in the process of developing methods to deal with 
Indigenous and settler populations and establishing means of governance that shaped later 
events. Additionally, the offset in time allows us to see how America’s example may have 
influenced French colonialism and perceptions of its “progress.”  
For all that it reveals, the comparative method can also obscure. It can easily lead one to 
overlook significant details that do not fit neatly into the comparative framework. Without 
careful attention to the contingent events and voices of the actors, as well as contemporary 
witnesses, a researcher can easily fall into the trap of painting both case studies as more similar 
than they actually were. While the present study highlights similarities between the Wabash 
Valley and Algeria to understand what the two contexts teach us about settler colonialism more 
generally, the local specificities become more, not less, important. The distinctions are as 
revealing as the commonalities. 
Sources 
A variety of source materials provide insight into the actors’ attitudes, objectives, and 
perceptions of events. To begin with, I examined American and French military reports and 
correspondence, American Congressional and French Parliamentary records, newspaper 
accounts, and laws to trace the goals, interests and decisions of political officials and military 
officers. Additionally, to understand settlers’ motivations, interests, and experiences, I consulted 
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settler journals, correspondence, and petitions. For outside perspectives to balance against those 
of colonial officials, settlers, and Indigenous leaders, I examined the records of British military 
officers, Indian agents and translators for the American study, and British and American travel 
narratives, correspondence, and accounts of events in Algeria to counterbalance French sources. 
I also translated Ahmed Bey’s memoir and reviewed both American and Algerian treaty 
negotiations, as well as British correspondence in America to get a sense of Indigenous leaders’ 
viewpoints, concerns, and decisions. These sources also shed light on how decisions were 
reached and how the power balance shifted within Native and settler communities during the 
time period under examination.79  
One of the greatest research challenges of this study was the dearth of direct Indigenous 
voices in the source materials.  Researching Native Americans in the eighteenth century is 
particularly difficult because few left any written records.80 The most comprehensive archive of 
materials related to Native Americans in this region is the Ohio Valley-Great Lakes Ethnohistory 
Archive at the University of Indiana, Bloomington. During my tenure there, I systematically read 
through the records for the Delaware, Kickapoo, Miami, Mascouten, and Illinois communities 
between 1776 and 1795.  I drilled down into British-French-American-Indigenous interactions in 
southern Indiana and Illinois between 1776 and 1795 to understand how and why the Americans 
formed settler colonies in these areas and how these various actors shaped the process. My basic 
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workflow was to study the events and relations among these communities each year from 1776 
through 1795. I worked through the records in chronological order and from east to west in 
geographical focus. Beginning with the copious records on the Delaware, who lived on the 
eastern edge of the territory in which I was most interested, I established a context in which to 
understand American-Indigenous, as well as intertribal, relations. Once I had a sense of the 
socio-political landscape through these records, I moved on to examine the Miami, Kaskaskia, 
Mascouten, and Illinois records, in turn. In this way, I developed a nuanced understanding of the 
interests and motivations of the British, French, American, and Native communities that shaped 
events in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys. These materials also revealed the complex and extensive 
communication networks between these villages, as well as Native communities throughout 
North America east of the Mississippi River. While they are imperfect representations of Native 
voices, they are the only written records historians have to work with.  
Similarly, uncovering Algerian voices is equally difficult in the French colonial archives. 
For this reason, Ahmed Bey’s memoir of the events between the conquest of 1830 and his 
capitulation in 1848 proved invaluable, as French military reports and secondary sources 
corroborated his account. As an Ottoman governor and one of the two most important resistance 
leaders in Algeria during the first two decades of conquest, Ahmed Bey’s memoir provides the 
historian with an inside view of Algerian politics and resistance during colonization, the various 
options Algerian leaders faced, as well as the relationship between Algeria and the Ottoman 
Empire. Future research will take me into the Algerian National Archive to examine his 
correspondence between 1830 and his final surrender in 1848. I also plan to look for other 
Algerian narratives of events between 1830 and 1848, in addition to Tunisian and Ottoman 
correspondence with Ahmed Bey and commentary on the French conquest of Algeria to enhance 
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our understanding of the process of colonization from the perspective of the colonized, as well as 
the former imperial power and neighboring territories. 
Since the American Northwest Territory and French Algeria became exemplars for other 
nations that sought to create similar colonies, their formation is especially important to 
understand. North America was one of the first early-modern settler colonies. Its evolution from 
a European settler colony into a modern American settler empire became an important model for 
modern settler colonialism and Indigenous policy.81 Likewise, Algeria has long been considered 
a settler colonial model, so the comparison of these two archetypes yields powerful insights into 
the motivations and processes that led to the establishment and development of settler colonies 
across time and space.82 
Even though France and the United States underwent different political transformations 
during this time, both were in transitory states and the process of making or remaking 
themselves. The colonies in the Midwest and in Algeria were an important part of these changes. 
Additionally, these two regions possessed similar geographic characteristics and were 
strategically significant in the colonization process.  Finally, the process of colonization 
proceeded through similar stages in both regions and similar colonial structures emerged, despite 
the differences in demographics and metropolitan governments. 
Both France and the United States underwent substantial political transformations 
through the period of conquest, occupation, and initial settlement in the colonies.  The United 
States metamorphosed from a colony into an independent nation whose political character 
changed appreciably between the Revolution and the 1830s. France, a monarchy in 1830 under 
the Restoration government of King Charles X, was soon overthrown by the July Monarchy of 
                                                
81 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, 20–21; Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom, 8–12. 
82 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 51. 
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Louis Philippe d’Orleans (1830-1848).  The transformations that took place in both the 
métropoles and the colonies affected each other to varying degrees and in different ways in each 
location, but the relationship proved important in the development of the settler colonies, the 
establishment of settler governments, and the shape each assumed.  
Chapter Outline 
Chapter one delves into each metropole’s political life and describes the geo-political 
context of the Ohio and Wabash River Valleys in what is now the United States and Algeria on 
the precipice of colonization to provide a framework with which to understand and interpret 
subsequent events.83 The Algerian province of Constantine and Illinois/Indiana in the United 
States provide an interesting and useful comparison because of their importance to each colonial 
endeavor.  Geographically, both were fertile inland regions that, at the time of occupation and 
colonization, bordered other imperial territories and were important sites of agriculture and trade. 
They were strategically significant for military purposes and to gain access to lucrative 
commercial networks.  The Indigenous populations in both areas practiced extensive agriculture, 
were already diverse culturally, linguistically, and religiously, and had long-established relations 
with the colonizers through trade. Through an examination of each region’s geography, 
demography, and pre-existing socio-political context, this chapter sets the stage for the 
competition that ensued between the colonizing settlers and the Indigenous populations during 
the founding moments this dissertation explores.  
                                                
83 The region northwest of the Ohio River – what is now known as the states of Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin – was known as the “Northwest Territory” during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in North America/the United States. Frequently, the 
region under examination in this dissertation extends beyond the Wabash Valley to the Ohio 
Valley and incorporates the stories of Indigenous peoples throughout the wider region. While it 
is problematic to refer to the land by its colonial name, it offers the advantage of consistency 
with the documents cited, and avoids the alternative problem of the plurality of Indigenous 
names that refer to various and overlapping sections within the larger territory. 
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Chapters two through four examine “moments,” or stages, in the process of establishing 
settler colonies and compare what these moments looked like in two different contexts. Rather 
than fitting events to theories, this work is grounded in the historical context of each setting. I 
examine the similar processes and structures of settler colonization in comparison across time, 
space, and cultures for what they reveal about settler colonialism more generally. The differences 
that emerge reveal how individual geographic locations, peoples, and historical contexts shaped 
the ways in which settler colonies were created and developed. As a work of historical inquiry, it 
reminds us that it is important to remain sensitive to chronology, the contingent nature of events, 
and the variety of actors who shaped those events.  
Chapter two compares the initial military incursions into the lands Americans desired in 
the Northwest Territory in 1778-9 and the French conquest of Algiers in 1830. It uncovers the 
primary colonizing and Indigenous actors, what was at stake for each, and the methods used to 
achieve their objectives. Both the French conquest of Algeria and the expansion of the United 
States into the Northwest Territory, the present-day Midwest, marked the beginning of new 
colonial eras for both métropoles.  For France, the conquest and subsequent settlement of Algiers 
inaugurated its “second colonial empire.” As the United States fought for its own independence 
from England, Americans began an assault on Native American tribes, their land, and the British 
who claimed the territory.  As in Algeria, settlers moved in on the heels of the military, and the 
young United States government became the head of a nation but also a nascent settler empire. 
Thus, the conquests of these regions marked the commencement of two settler colonies, as well 
as significant periods of metropolitan change.  In recognition of the importance of founding 
moments, this study compares the origins of these settler colonies with the understanding that 
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they were also highly significant for the métropoles, even if recognized as such only in 
retrospect.  
Chapter three examines the extension of the conquest beyond the initial villages/cities 
occupied and the simultaneous processes of land surveying, dispossession, and settlement. 
Throughout the first two decades of colonization, both Constantine and the American Northwest 
Territory became important sites of Indigenous resistance as well. A number of powerful 
competing Native groups resided in both places, some of which saw advantages in siding with 
the colonizers against neighboring Indigenous communities. The colonizers sought to capitalize 
on these divisions to achieve their objectives, which were also similar in both locations, as were 
some of their methods. The American and French métropoles, for instance, both sought to 
populate the territory with small freeholders as quickly as possible by legal (treaties) or extra-
legal means (forceful appropriation).  However, France never achieved a colony of freeholders 
like the United States did, which provides an interesting point of contrast between the two.  
The nature of initial settlement, the settlers themselves, and the circumstances 
surrounding conquest and occupation suggest that the founding moments were important to the 
development of each settler colony. Colonists migrated to the American Northwest Territory to 
farm, but many settlers in Algeria took advantage of the extensive trade networks and established 
themselves in urban communities. Both sought to abolish Native communities’ communal land 
rights by instituting various measures to force the division of land into individual holdings and 
developed reservation systems for Indigenous societies (in Algeria, called cantonnement).84 One 
                                                
84 Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2005). The American treaties of the 1780s 
began to limit Native Americans to particular territories rather than bounding American lands, 
thus changing the conceptualization of Native lands to that which was reserved to them on ever 
smaller and smaller parcels. 
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important contrast between the two colonies was the significance of land to individual settlers.  
While a small number of Europeans bought large tracts of Algerian land, a majority of 
individuals and families settled in towns, as opposed to the American territories in the Wabash 
and Ohio Valleys, where the majority of the settlers bought land to farm.85  The obvious reason 
for this difference was the availability of houses in extant cities in Algeria, which did not exist in 
America in the same way.86  Only sections of a relatively narrow band of land about 200 miles 
wide along the coast of Algeria was available for farming. Once the military launched total war 
on the land and its people in the 1840s, hundreds of acres of trees and crops were destroyed, 
making it less appealing for those who sought quick returns on their investment.  There were also 
fewer barriers to European entry into Algerian commercial networks than those Americans faced 
in “Indian Country.” Europeans flocked to Algerian cities to establish their shops and provide 
services and commodities other settlers desired in their new homeland. This calls into question 
scholars’ assumption that land was the primary motivating factor in settler colonialism.  
Colonization began in both regions before the métropole gave its official assent and was 
therefore left to acknowledge the colonies and craft legislation ex post facto, which suggests that 
these settler colonies began from bottom-up impulses and processes, making the actions of the 
settlers, Indigenous people, and the military even more significant. Chapter four looks at the final 
moment of the initial phase of settler colonization when metropolitan policies began to catch up 
                                                
85 More than 60 percent of settlers in Algeria lived in urban areas. (David Prochaska, Making 
Algeria French, 11).  For this reason, Constantine is especially important because it was one of 
the largest cities in Algeria, and as Prochaska notes, “whoever controlled the urban centers, 
especially the major cities of the littoral, controlled to a large extent what went on in the colony 
itself” (Ibid). 
86 Although some American frontier homes resembled Indigenous structures, settlers would not 
have lived in Indian homes, even if they had had the opportunity. However, there were few 
occasions in which they would have been able to make the choice, as many Indigenous structures 
were portable and thus migrated with the Indian communities or were destroyed during frontier 
warfare. 
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to the reality on the ground and when the military and métropole began to work in greater 
harmony. In America, it traces Indigenous resistance movements and American counterattacks 
through the Native Confederacy's defeat at the Battle of Fallen Timbers against American 
General Anthony Wayne's forces in 1794.  It places particular emphasis on the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, which established a template for integrating colonized lands into the United 
States as territories under the administration of the US government and, eventually, as states. It 
then uncovers similar French land policies in Algeria, the role of Indigenous leaders in fighting, 
fleeing, or accommodating the French, as well as the discursive moves the French government 
made to justify their acquisition of Indigenous lands. Finally, chapter five summarizes the stages, 
or moments, in the development of these two settler colonies and limns the significant 
interventions this comparative study makes in settler colonial theory and analytical frameworks.  
Significance 
I am not the first to make the remarkable comparison between the colonization of French 
Algeria and that of United States’ territories. Rather, mid-nineteenth century French statesmen 
conscientiously used the United States as a benchmark of progress in their Algerian endeavor. 
This may account for at least some of the similarities in the colonies’ trajectories. However, it 
does not explain all of them, particularly those in the initial phases of conquest. The congruency 
between the stages of settler colonial development in the Northwest Territory and French Algeria 
indicates the existence of commonalities in the formation of settler colonies more broadly.  
MacMahon’s characterization of the colonization of North American and Algeria sets up 
a stark contrast between the two locales that is not representative of actual historical events. The 
colonization of the two regions shared far more in common than MacMahon’s description would 
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lead one to believe. They must have to have warranted a useful comparison for French officials 
to employ the United States as a point of reference.  
Virginia Governor and future United States President Thomas Jefferson, among other 
Americans, did not view the Native American population as “insignificant.” Quite the opposite 
was true. In the American Declaration of Independence, Jefferson cited as one of the grievances 
against the King of England, "[King George III] has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, 
and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, 
whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and 
conditions.”87 This sentiment was echoed in the Kentucky settlers’ plea to Virginia for aid in 
defending their homes from Indian raids in 1776.88 Similarly, the Algerian resistance presented 
no small challenge to the French military, which topped 100,000 troops before the first stage of 
conquest ended in 1848.  
Native American leaders’ own testimony also belies the notion that they melted 
peaceably into the forests and “continue[d] to live by hunting as they had in the past.” Rather, 
they fought for their land and agricultural/semi-nomadic life ways, of which hunting was only a 
part. 
We have no objections to carry on Trade with your Traders, provided they do not attempt 
to settle in our Country, but it is too clear to us your design is to take our Country from us 
-- we remind you that you will find all the people of our Colour in this Island strong, 
unanimous, and determined to act as one man in Defence of it, therefore be strong and 
                                                
87 Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Robert Livingston, and Roger Sherman, 
Declaration of Independence, 1776.  
88 “Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky, 15 June 1776,” in James Alton James, ed., George 
Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781, vol. 8, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, 
Virginia Series (Springfield, IL: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), 11–12. 
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keep your people within Bounds, or we shall take up a Rod and whip them back to your 
side of the Ohio.89 
 
Native communities in both regions adopted similar approaches to resist, accommodate, 
negotiate, or avoid the colonizers. Recognizing the variety of options available and Indigenous 
leaders’ choices in their interactions with Europeans and Americans moves us beyond the 
resistance/accommodation dichotomy scholars have drawn in the past.90 Through their 
leadership, Indigenous actors also shaped the form the settler colonies took. Their armed 
resistance forced the métropoles to govern through the military and required vast expenditures in 
money, men, and arms to hold the conquered territory. Cultural and religious norms pushed 
colonial administrators into accommodations, such as treaty negotiations, gifts, acknowledging 
and respecting Indigenous juridical practices – for their own people at the very least. In many 
cases, military leaders were forced to work with Indigenous leaders to achieve their aims through 
active support, alliances, negotiating neutrality, or relying on their services as translators, guides, 
and scouts in unknown territory. Neither the French nor the Americans were ever able to fully 
eradicate Indigenous inhabitants from their desired lands, either in the period under consideration 
here or in subsequent years.  
                                                
89 Captain Wolf, of the Mingo, speaking at an Indian Council Held at Wakitunikee, 18 May 
1785, in Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, 25: 692.  See also: Major (5th Reg) John 
Smith to Capt. Le Maistre, 20 October 1790, in Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections 
(Lansing, MI: Robert Smith & Co., State Printers and Binding, 1895) 24: 107-8. -- The Miami 
burned their own town to prevent settlers from doing so or benefitting from their crops.  
90 For a small sample of this literature, see: Peter von Sivers, “Insurrection and Accommodation: 
Indigenous Leadership in Eastern Algeria, 1840-1900,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 6, no. 3 (July 1, 1975): 259–75; Chaudhuri and Strobel, Western Women and 
Imperialism; Edmund Jefferson Danziger, Great Lakes Indian Accommodation and Resistance 
during the Early Reservation Years, 1850-1900 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2009). 
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Settlers and the military in both locations took the conquest and occupation farther than 
most metropolitan leaders originally intended, leaving the administration to recognize the fact of 
colonization after it had already begun on the ground. Officials were then left with the choice of 
accepting the colonies, such as they were, and continuing the work of the military and settlers or 
face international embarrassment by pulling out and risk the perception of weakness. Internal 
political pressures also compelled metropolitan politicians to send armed forces to these regions 
to maintain and eventually extend the occupation, but finding a way to pay for their services was 
a vexing problem for both métropoles.  
Lack of adequate financial resources motivated metropolitan officials to promote and 
publicize settlement in the colonies. In both France and the United States, colonial administrators 
saw settlers as roots that could be planted and grow in the colonial soil to prevent its erosion 
from metropolitan control. Land in the colonies also served as payment for services rendered in 
securing it (for the soldiers and militiamen), circumventing the need to pay them in specie. This 
also supplied more settlers as bastions of colonial sovereignty and defenses against Indigenous 
land claims and armed reprisals. 
In summary, settler colonies in the American Wabash Valley and Algeria resulted from a 
bottom-up process in which settler desires for land and greater economic opportunities 
compelled them to migrate (or emigrate) and stake their claim to these territories. This 
movement then served as a catalyst for initially makeshift colonial policies that only became 
systematized over time. The relationship between settlers and the Indigenous populations in both 
locations, as well as administrators’ responses to prevailing circumstances on the ground shaped 
the establishment of settler governments.  
Settler colonialism’s legacy continues to influence geopolitics, national policy decisions, 
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and people’s daily lives. Hence, the formation and structures of settler colonialism are germane 
to understanding not only a widespread phenomenon foundational to many contemporary 
societies, but also to uncover a holistic knowledge of empire, settler roles, and Indigenous 
actions within colonial contexts.  This knowledge is especially important in modern settler 
societies where settler colonialism is no longer visible but perceived as “normal.” To deconstruct 
settler epistemologies, this study exposes the processes and institutions of settler colonialism in 
the American Wabash Valley and Constantine, Algeria, as well as Indigenous and settler 
influences on their forms and limits. 
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Chapter 1: Context 
On arrival in America, the Europeans found a territory of immense expanse, inhabited by 
a population, which by comparison, was insignificant. … It is not the same in Algeria, 
where the Europeans found a limited territory, inhabited by a population of 2,500,000 
inhabitants of a proud, energetic, [and] militant race, who in every case had the 
enjoyment of all of the country's land…1 
 
Thus we behold Kentucke, lately an howling wilderness, the habitation of savages and 
wild beasts, become a fruitful field; this region, so favorably distinguished by nature, now 
become the habitation of civilization, at a period unparalleled in history, in the midst of a 
raging war, and under all the disadvantages of emigration to a country so remote from 
the inhabited parts of the continent. Here, where the hand of violence shed the blood of 
the innocent; where the horrid yells of savages, and the groans of the distressed, sounded 
in our ears, we now hear the praises and adorations of our Creator; where wretched 
wigwams stood, the miserable abodes of savages, we behold the foundations of cities 
laid, that, in all probability, will rival the glory of the greatest upon earth. And we view 
Kentucke situated on the fertile banks of the great Ohio, rising from obscurity to shine 
with splendor, equal to any other of the stars of the American hemisphere. The settling of 
this region well deserves a place in history.2 
 
                                                
1 Patrice de Mac Mahon, duc de Magenta, “Discours au Sénat du duc de Magenta sur une 
pétition relative à la constitution de l'Algérie” (Paris, 1870), 4-5. Centre des Archives d’outre-
mer (CAOM), Aix-en-Provence, France. File: F/ 80/ 1681. Author Translation. 
2 Daniel Boone, “The Adventures of Col. Daniel Boon; Containing a Narrative of the Wars of 
Kentucke,” in John Filson, The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke, 1st ed. 
(Wilmington: John Adams, 1784), 40, http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/3. 
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For the historian, Daniel Boone and General Patrice de MacMahon’s remarks about the 
comparative colonization of North America and Algeria raise important questions about the 
context into which the colonizers entered both regions. In the foundational myth-making 
narrative of explorer and settler Daniel Boone, Kentucky, a “howling wilderness, the habitation 
of savages and wild beasts” was transformed into “a fruitful field” through the efforts of brave 
settlers in the midst of a “raging war.” Despite dangerous “savages,” these adventurers replaced 
“wretched wigwams, … the miserable abodes of savages” with “the foundations of cities … 
that… will rival the glory of the greatest upon earth.” How different this characterization of 
Boone’s lived experience is from MacMahon’s retrospective portrayal! And yet both accounts 
elide the complexity of the world into which the settlers entered and the violence employed to 
replace the “wigwams” with settler cities. 
 In both descriptions, Boone and MacMahon portrayed the settlers as facing nearly 
insurmountable odds against inveterate foes from whom they sought to wrest valuable lands. At 
the high cost of many human lives on both sides of the conflict, both the American and French 
colonizers were eventually successful in establishing dominance in their respective territories 
due to their determination and grit, at least according to the stories they told themselves. These 
myths were largely successful; their legacy is still observable in recent, even present, perceptions 
of the American territories and French Algeria.3  
                                                
3 Cf. James Joseph Buss, Winning the West with Words: Language and Conquest in the Lower 
Great Lakes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011); Todd Shepard, The Invention of 
Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press, 2006); Mihesuah, Indigenous American Women; Thomas Peace, “Decolonization and 
Resilience in North American Indigenous History,” Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 
14, no. 3 (2013), doi:10.1353/cch.2013.0043; Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies; James D. Le 
Sueur, “Decolonising ‘French Universalism’: Reconsidering the Impact of the Algerian War on 
French Intellectuals,” The Journal of North African Studies 6, no. 1 (2001): 167, 
doi:10.1080/13629380108718427.  
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 The process of “othering” the Indigenous inhabitants greatly contributed to the 
colonizers’ perceptions of themselves and portrayals of conquest and colonization. Edward Said 
termed this practice “Orientalism.” This phenomenon describes how Western Europe defined 
itself in contrast to stereotypes of its eastern neighbors as politically, socially, culturally, and 
intellectually “backward” and stuck in a previous stage of civilization.4 Similar comparisons also 
took place in North America when Euro-Americans limned distinctions between the Indigenous 
peoples and themselves to craft their own identity as “Americans” – separate from both 
Europeans in the mother countries and from the Indigenous peoples.5 Orientalism and its 
American equivalent were built on structures of knowledge, material investment, and the power 
that came along with, and supported, each.6 However, Orientalism only developed when 
capitalism and the industrial revolution placed European states in more powerful positions vis-à-
vis states and empires to the east, and the Enlightenment elevated the pursuit of self-awareness, 
as well as definitions of both self and “others.” Economic power then made it possible to use 
racial and ethnic stereotypes and Europeans’ perceived elevated position within a hierarchy of 
“civilization” as justifications to rule over the “others.”7  
                                                
4 Said, Orientalism. According to Lorenzo Veracini, settlers often embody European culture as 
well as indigenous traits in their lives in the borderlands. He observes that the tensions between 
the two cultures can exist within a single representative person, such as Daniel Boone. Smith 
writes that Boone’s character signified both ‘the harbinger of civilization and refinement’ and the 
escape from it. (Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 24) 
5 Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 2010, 20–24. 
6 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979). 
7 Alexander Lyon Macfie, Orientalism (Routledge, 2014), 94; Denoon, Settler Capitalism; For 
motivations and justifications of the European colonization of the Americas, see Pagden, Lords 
of All the World; Robert A Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The 
Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Brian Tierney, The Idea of 
Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625 (Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 255–288; Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World. 
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 Economic power, theories of enlightenment, and social progressivism became essential 
foundations for the rationalization of colonization, particularly in the nineteenth century. At the 
same time, imperialism came to characterize European understandings of modernity, progress, 
and upward mobility in the hierarchy of nascent nation-states in Western Europe. While 
historians have taken either one stance or the other: either capitalism or orientalist ideology as 
the defining feature that motivated European nations to colonize others, the two went hand-in-
hand.8 Both capitalism and orientalism developed concomitantly, and the combination of the two 
propelled European ships across the Mediterranean to the Levant and Maghrib. However, in the 
cases of North America and Algeria, the physical movement of people - settlers - as well as the 
desire for property and upward socio-economic mobility were the determinant factors in the 
creation of colonies in these locations. Nevertheless, the broader social and economic structures 
and ideologies in America and Europe set the stage for the migration of settlers and provided the 
discursive framework necessary to justify their actions.9 Contingent events then shaped the 
specific circumstances and processes by which settler colonies were established and governed. 
                                                
8 Phillip Chiviges Naylor, North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present, 1st ed (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2009), 137–139; Charles André Julien, Histoire De l’Algérie 
Contemporaine, 1.éd. ed. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 320–321; Abdallah 
Laroui, The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, Princeton Studies on the Near East 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 262–287; Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 1–44; Mahfoud 
Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-
Independence Development, Cambridge Middle East Library (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 1–31; Ageron, Modern Algeria, 1–8; Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: 
North Africa Before the French Conquest (New York: Africana Pub. Co, 1977); Juan Cole, 
“Mad Sufis and Civic Courtesans: The French Republic Construction and Eighteenth-Century 
Egypt,” in Irene A. Bierman, ed., Napoleon in Egypt, 1st ed (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2003), 
47–62; Jennifer E. Sessions, By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011). 
9 For “structuring structures,” see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge 
Studies in Social Anthropology, no. 16 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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This chapter outlines both the larger structures extant in the societies that produced settlers, as 
well as the sociopolitical contexts they entered in the lands they colonized.  
In the years prior to the American Revolution, the Ohio and Wabash Valleys, along with 
the Illinois Country, was a world of interconnected villages characterized by face-to-face 
interactions. In the eighteenth century, this territory was home to semi-nomadic and agricultural 
Native communities, including (from east to west) Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandot, Kickapoo, 
Wea, Piankeshaw, Potawatomi, and Illinois, as well as French-Indigenous families, British 
soldiers, and a small Spanish garrison in St. Louis. Each of these communities lived in similar 
ways and in close proximity to each other.10 Rather than being a land filled with Indigenous 
“nations,” it was a “world of bands, clans, villages, and peoples.” In this world, the Indigenous 
peoples understood land as a shared resource and “use rights were claimed, negotiated, and 
exercised as part of the lived relationships that people forged with one another.”11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 White, The Middle Ground; Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men; Daniel K Richter, 
Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 168–9; Heidi Bohaker, “‘Nindoodemag’: The Significance of 
Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 63, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 23–52, doi:10.2307/3491724; Witgen, 
An Infinity of Nations. 
11 Witgen, 19. 
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North America: The Wabash and Ohio Valleys 
 
Figure 1: Map of Wabash Valley12 
 In 1778 the first civil geographer of the United States, Thomas Hutchins, detailed the 
Wabash Valley region and recounted his exploration of the lands west of the settled British 
colonies. Hutchins’ account signifies his belief that this land would eventually become subject to 
American settlement, and his book, A Topographical Description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, and North Carolina, played no small part in advertising this promised land to an 
eager population of colonial adventurers and families seeking greater opportunities in the west. 
He began his narrative by placing the reader next to him, observing the easily navigable rivers 
that were so numerous and interconnected that they acted like highways throughout the area: 
“The Wabash is a beautiful River, with high and upright banks, less subject to overflow, than any 
other River (the Ohio excepted) in this part of America. It discharges itself into the Ohio, one 
                                                
12 Kmusser, “Map of the Wabash River Watershed” (Wikimedia Commons, June 3, 2008), Based 
on USGS data, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wabashrivermap.png. 
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thousand and twenty-two miles below Fort Pitt in to Ouiatanon.”13 Hutchins then outlined the 
advantages of the land - its “remarkable fertility,” the wealth to be found in the recently 
discovered silver mine, and the promise of “others [that] may be found hereafter.”14 Hutchins 
extolled the beauty and abundant resources in this territory, even though it still lay in “Indian 
Country." Cataloging its advantages, he described numerous salt springs along the river, the 
wealth of coal found in nearby hills, along with lime, free stone, and blue, yellow, and white clay 
for glass works and pottery. The region also received enough rain to swell the rivers and grow an 
abundant supply of crops, including corn, wheat, tobacco, hemp, grapes, hops, apples, peaches, 
pears, cherries, currants, gooseberries, melons, and even rice.15  
In addition to describing the prosperity of the country, Hutchins also provided details 
about the extant communities. He outlined the distances between the two French settlements, 
common means of transportation and the navigation routs that were already established.  He 
briefly mentioned the Native communities who lived in the region: the Kickapoo, Mascouten, 
Piankeshaw, and Wea but offered few observations about their culture or ways of life other than 
to note that many of the French inhabitants at Vincennes and Ouiatanon traded with them for furs 
and deer skins and that this economy was worth about 8000£ annually at Ouiatenon.16 What was 
                                                
13 Thomas Hutchins, A Topographical Description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 
North Carolina (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company, [reprinted from original 1778 
edition], 1904), 98. 
14 Hutchins, 98. 
15 Hutchins, 98-100. 
16 To contextualize this economy, the average American colonial family’s income was about 
$345 or 77.53£ per annum in 1774. (Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "American 
Incomes before and After the Revolution." The Journal of Economic History 73, no. 3 
(September 2013), 757. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050713000594.) On 12 February 
1778 the Council of Safety New Haven conventions in Connecticut capped the price of “good 
merchantable wheat, peas, and beans” at 9 shillings and 9 pence per bushel and oats at 3 shillings 
per bushel. (Forrest Morgan, Journal of the Council of Safety [Connecticut conventions] 
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more important, apparently, than the settlers’ soon-to-be neighbors was the wealth that their 
economy generated.17  
Prior to the escalation of violence in the years following Hutchin’s description, this was a 
world of permeable cultural boundaries and fluid identities where a person could grow up in one 
society and be transformed completely upon acceptance into another.18 A Chickasaw from the 
southeast could become a Kickapoo; a Euro-American could become a Wea; but it is worth 
noting that rarely did Indigenous peoples assimilate willingly or completely into Euro-American 
communities.  They did not have to. Throughout the eighteenth century, Native communities 
were still the dominant powers in the region. Furthermore, few Euro-Americans had established 
customs of acculturating captives or anyone unlike themselves into their families, customs many 
Indigenous communities held previously or adopted in the wake of devastating small pox 
plagues and wartime losses over the previous two centuries. Among Euro-Americans, however, 
there seems to have been an unwillingness to even consider the possibility of adopting anyone 
outside of their western European-American cultures.19  
                                                                                                                                                       
[Originally published New Haven, 12 February 1778, Press of the Case, Lockwood & Brainard 
Company, 1894]). 
17 Hutchins, 101. Following Michael Witgin’s reading of the subtext of such “discovery” 
narratives, we can see Hutchins’ account as a discursive possession of the territory he mapped 
and described. 
18 Witgen, 116-165; White, The Middle Ground; Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men. 
19 White, The Middle Ground; Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian 
Nations & the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Eric 
Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Hinderaker and Mancall, At the Edge of Empire; 
Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); Colin G. Calloway, One Vast Winter Count the 
Native American West Before Lewis and Clark, History of the American West (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2003); W. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760, Rev. ed, 
Histories of the American Frontier (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983); 
Witgen, An Infinity of Nations. 
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Euro-American colonists in the mid-eighteenth century did not have a single, cohesive 
identity, but neither did the Indigenous inhabitants. The colonists made distinctions between 
themselves based on religion, ethnic heritage, language, and point of origin. Similarly, Native 
communities held different spiritual/religious beliefs, wore different dress, and spoke different 
languages from each other. However, the backcountry settlers formed communities in ways 
similar to their Native neighbors. They moved with co-religionists, family members, and co-
ethnics (primarily Scots-Irish in the beginning) but lived near other groups who had done the 
same. Similarly, due to the dislocations caused by constant warfare and European settlement 
along the eastern seaboard, tribes and smaller clan groups began moving west, often establishing 
villages very close to communities from other larger nations.20  
This land and the interactions between different people groups, including Indigenous 
communities, the French, British, and backcountry settlers has variously been described as a 
“middle ground,” as an “infinity of villages,” and as “native ground."21 Contemporaries wrote 
about Kentucky, just to the south of the region this study examines, as the “dark and bloody 
ground.” Which is correct? One? All – perhaps at different times? None? The time we select for 
the characterization is immensely important. Prior to the commencement of the American 
Revolution, Richard White’s depiction of the “middle ground” and the more recent nuanced 
modifications of it seem to come closest to describing the nature of relationships scholars have 
                                                
20 Hinderaker and Mancall, At the Edge of Empire; McConnell, A Country Between; Witgen, An 
Infinity of Nations; White, The Middle Ground; Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground Indians, 
Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution, 1st ed (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2006); Taylor, American Colonies; Calloway, New Worlds for All. 
21 Farther to the east, in New York, Alan Taylor has written about the “Divided Ground.” (Alan 
Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American 
Revolution [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006].) 
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thus far teased out of the extant sources.  What happened later will be the focus of subsequent 
chapters.  
From the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries French inhabitants and Natives 
formed a literal and metaphorical “middle ground,” in which each society adopted some of the 
customs of the other and established a set of principles for interaction that were neither wholly 
French nor Indian.  This middle ground was the product of everyday life, as well as formal 
diplomatic relations.22  It was the “realm of constant invention,” in which each community 
explained its own self-interested actions or objectives in terms they believed the other would 
understand in order to legitimate their conduct or achieve their goal.   
Distinct villages dotted the landscape and formed a complex web of trade and kinship 
connections. However, when the Americans launched a series of raids against their Indigenous 
neighbors in the early 1780s to achieve a modicum of relief from Native raids on their own 
backcountry settlements, they transformed a contest of villages into a “contest of empires.”23 
Until that time, boundaries remained at least relatively permeable, especially from an Indigenous 
perspective. Indigenous peoples’ belief in the possibility, as well as the reality, of an individual’s 
transformation from one identity to another profoundly shaped their relations with one another 
and with the newcomers.  
The communities that peopled this region were both agricultural and mobile, but their 
mobility was “seasonally expected [and] politically negotiated” and not merely a response to 
inter-tribal conflict and wars.24 Spiritual progenitors who took the form of animals were the basis 
                                                
22 White, 53. 
23 White, 368. 
24 Bohaker, “Nindoodemag,” 39. Bohaker’s argument here directly contradicts White’s assertion 
in The Middle Ground that it formed a cohesive unity in the region out of refugee populations 
who settled there after fleeing from Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) violence in eastern regions. 
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for clans and kinship networks that mediated and influenced both movements and relationships 
within the community and between villages. In this region, spiritual connections were just as 
important as blood relationships in the formation of binding ties.25 Indigenous political history 
here cannot be understood without knowing which peoples had access to “which land and to 
which resources and who could pass freely through a given space, and who was subject to taxes 
or tolls.” Those answers were found in the “complex nexus of kinship connections and 
alliances.”26 Collective identities were not organized around land possession but rather the 
spiritual progenitors of each group - the nindoodemag.27 The middle ground was not defined by 
“a unity of Algonquian-speaking peoples,” but rather an amalgamation of nindoodemag held 
loosely together through intermarriage ties but each with its own leaders. While villages and 
smaller groups often established alliances, even with other culturally and linguistically distinct 
peoples, confrontation, warfare, and slavery determined the limits of such cooperative 
relationships.28 
As French power declined in their North American Empire in the mid-eighteenth century, 
the power of the Anishinaabe peoples, in contrast, grew.29 The transfer of European claims to 
power in the region from France to Great Britain following the French and Indian War (or the 
                                                
25 Bohaker, 38. 
26 Bohaker, 42. 
27 Bohaker, 43. Bohaker argues that while the middle ground may still be “a suitable metaphor 
for explicating the narratives of intercultural accommodation, it does not sufficiently explain 
Anishinaabe cultural continuity and adaptation. To understand that process, scholars must turn to 
the Anishinaabe category of nindoodemag and Anishinaabe expressions of their own collective 
identity. When faced with crisis and change, Anishinaabe peoples used glue from their own 
institutions, not French mediators to regroup in the wake of crisis.” (Bohaker, 51) 
28 Brett Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Third Series, 63, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 53–80, doi:10.2307/3491725 quote from 
Rushforth, 80; Bohaker, “Nindoodemag,” 23–52. 
29 Witgen, 217. For population growth, see Jeanne Kay, “The Fur Trade and Native American 
Population Growth,” Ethnohistory 31, no. 4 (October 1, 1984): 265–87, doi:10.2307/482713. 
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Seven Years’ War, as it was known in Europe) in 1763 changed very little about power 
structures on the ground in the Great Lakes region. Moreover, the end of the eighteenth century 
was not the “twilight” of Anishinaabe history. On the contrary,  
the Anishinaaebeg and Dakota had survived over a century of encounter with European 
empires without being colonized. They had absorbed the people, material goods, and 
cultural and political influence of the Atlantic World and either rejected these things or 
made them a part of their own autonomous, post-contact, Native social world.30  
Some scholars contend that the middle ground never existed in the Ohio Valley, and 
while that may be true, the region that is the primary focus of this study – the Wabash Valley and 
Illinois Country – saw the creation and later, the fall, of a diplomatic middle ground.31 In the late 
eighteenth century, the push of Anglo-American settlers into the Wabash Valley broke down 
what remained of the middle ground. The contest for the Ohio Valley, and by extension, the 
Wabash Valley, was not only fought between Euro-Americans and Native inhabitants, but also 
                                                
30 Witgen, 217. Witgen contends that Adelman, Aron, White, Taylor, Havard, Brandao and 
Starna “struggle to understand how the relationship between Native peoples and the European 
empires of the Atlantic World shaped North American history” (Witgen, 216). The problem with 
their perspective, he argues, is that it places to great a weight on imperial etymologies and 
perception of this region, which is problematic “given the demographic dominance of Native 
peoples” there (Witgen, 216). The present study attempts to balance the perspectives Witgen has 
set at opposition to one another by examining the development of settler colonies through both 
imperial administrators’ and Indigenous eyes and seeks to complicate this dichotomy by also 
exploring the roles of settlers and the military as stakeholders with sometimes complementary, 
sometimes competing, objectives. Cf. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to 
Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” The 
American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814-841; White, The Middle Ground; 
Taylor, The Divided Ground; Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal o f 1701: French-
Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2001); José Brandão and William Starna, “The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois 
Diplomacy,” Ethnohistory 43, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 209-244.  
31 It is important to note that the composition of communities and the character of their relations 
in Wabash Valley and Illinois Country differed from that which existed in the Ohio Valley. The 
variations in each region’s political history had important implications for the ways in which 
their power structures intersected, interacted, and influenced one another. 
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between Indigenous accommodationists and “Nativists,” who formed the first ‘pan-tribal’ 
military resistance movement to both the negotiations of the middle ground and American settler 
colonization.32   
The Nativists’ military resistance ultimately failed to end American settler colonialism in 
the backcountry, but 
the upper Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi valley, remained demographically, 
culturally, and politically Indigenous long after the ink had dried on the Treaty of 
Greenville [1795]. … The United States would have to work hard to colonize this space. 
It would have to work at being a colonial power if it wanted to truly end the autonomy 
and self-determination of Native peoples in this part of North America. American 
authorities quickly realized that any hope they had of colonizing the country they thought 
of as the Northwest Territory depended on their ability to co-opt the peoples of the 
middle ground.33 
While the middle ground framework is specific to this region, historians have grappled 
with other conceptual paradigms to understand contested territories, such as “frontiers," 
“borderlands," and “backcountry,” to name a few. Throughout much of the eighteenth century, 
Native Americans governed processes of intercultural interaction in most of the land that the 
British government claimed.  In these “backcountry” regions, or the spaces between colonial 
cores and areas beyond the reach of the relatively weak colonial government, few Englishmen 
                                                
32 Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance. In his first book, Dowd, one of the few Native 
American scholars to engage with postcolonial studies, draws on this literature to frame the Ohio 
River Valley as part of a larger imperial context with its center in London and views Indians as 
“subalterns” who attempted to shape and challenge imperial policies and the outcomes of 
imperial struggles. In his 2002 study, War Under Heaven, he argues that “Pontiac’s War” marks 
the moment in which Americans began to develop a vision of the West without Indians and the 
point at which whiteness defined subjecthood in the British Empire. 
33 Witgen, 220. 
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traveled and even fewer settled, and those who did were often traders who wanted and needed to 
establish good relations with the Native population.34 Backcountry regions in which imperial and 
Indigenous peoples intersected, cooperated, and competed for lands have been characterized as  
“frontiers,” “borders,” “borderlands,” and “zones of contact” of European-Indigenous interaction 
in a variety of colonial settings in North America and abroad.35 Historians have critiqued the 
frontiers and borderlands frameworks as areas contested by two or more imperial powers 
                                                
34 Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall, At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North 
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). The definition of “backcountry” 
seems to stem from the “core and periphery” model, which historian Jack Greene, among others, 
have applied to studies of American colonies. (Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center 
Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 
1607-1788 [New York: Norton, 1990].) Hinderaker and Mancall’s work builds on the growing 
body of literature that employs “frontiers,” “borders,” “borderlands,” and “zones of contact” as 
frameworks to understand European-Indigenous interaction in North America. Cf. Adelman and 
Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders”; for “zones of contact,” see Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial 
Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992).  
35 This differs from earlier constructions of the concept of “frontier,” which Frederick Jackson 
Turner characterized as the point at which “civilization” overcame “savagery.” At the World's 
Fair (Columbian Exposition) in Chicago, 1893, historian Frederick Jackson Turner delivered one 
of the most important American Historical Association presidential speeches (it is still cited in 
almost every major work on the colonial era or Western history) in which he argued that 
America's "frontier" was the defining element in shaping a unique American character.  He saw 
the frontier as the line at which "civilization" defeated "savagery" in a continual march from the 
eastern seaboard to the West, and in 1893, he declared the frontier to be closed since the western 
states had been settled and incorporated into the United States.  Historians have since contested 
most of these ideas, noting that there were multiple "frontiers" in which Europeans and Indians 
competed for control over geographical territory (Spanish frontiers in New Mexico, Texas, and 
California; French frontiers in the Great Lakes, Canada, and over a wide territory along the 
length of the Mississippi River Valley). One aspect of these frontier regions is that they were 
"borderless" - it was not clear where Indians dominance ended and European began - and even 
portraying it in such a black and white way does disservice to the concept. To subsequent 
historians, “frontiers” became areas of European territorial conflict and ignored the presence of 
Indians. Since Turner's "Frontiers Thesis," historians have moved away from this highly fraught 
term and defined "borderlands" as regions in which land was contested by imperial rivals as 
much as between Europeans and Indians.   A more recent generation of scholars, Hinderaker and 
Mancall included, have begun to highlight borders/borderlands as regions of contestation and 
accommodation between European imperial interests and Indigenous inhabitants.  However, 
scholars like Hinderaker and Mancall are often guilty of simplifying the complex nature of 
interactions in these areas. 
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because they overlook the agency of Native Americans who were often the demographic, 
political, and military powers with which to be reckoned.36 Pretensions to imperial power in 
North America through the eighteenth century were often just that – only an illusion, regardless 
of whose flag flew over the forts there, a point that Indigenous leaders made repeatedly 
throughout the eighteenth century. Thus, these contested regions may more accurately be 
denoted as “zones of contact.” 
The precedents that Anglo-Americans, British administrators and Indigenous leaders set 
in the interwar years (roughly between 1763 and 1775) are essential to understanding the course 
of events in the Wabash Valley in the subsequent two decades. They lay the groundwork for the 
formation of settler colonies in the “Northwest Territory,” whose very name implied American 
conceptions of the region as their own even when it was firmly held by its Indigenous 
inhabitants. From their participation in the Seven Years’ War on, a number of prominent 
American colonists viewed the western lands as theirs for the taking. Even when British colonial 
officials tried to create boundaries between their colonists and the Native communities following 
the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War and Pontiac’s Rebellion in 1763, Anglo-Americans 
continued to trek over the Appalachian Mountains into Native territory in hopes of creating a 
better life for themselves and their children.  
The British Proclamation of 1763 marked the first attempt to create an imperial boundary 
between the colonists along the eastern seaboard and Indigenous communities. In 1768, the 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix fixed the location of this boundary, one that Native leaders abided by and 
to which they held the colonists accountable. As increasing numbers of colonists moved into the 
western regions of Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, they encroached on 
                                                
36 Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders." 
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Indigenous territories. Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774 then served as the opening salvo to a heated 
battle for lands in the Ohio and Wabash River Valleys. Simultaneously, surveyors moved into 
the Kentucky borderlands and began demarcating properties that could be sold to the incoming 
settlers, regardless of the fact that they had little, if any, justifiable claim to these lands.  
 
Figure 2: The British Colonies in North America, 1763-177537 
The year 1763 marked the end of the costly French and Indian War (or the Seven Years’ War). It 
was also the year of what has become known as Pontiac’s Rebellion. This war marked the first 
time that Anglo-American colonists began to use racial markers to define subjecthood in the 
British Empire and envisage a trans-Appalachian west without Native Americans.38  
                                                
37 Map of the British colonies in North America, 1763 to 1775. This was first published in: 
Shepherd, William Robert (1911) "The British Colonies in North America, 1763–1765" in 
Historical Atlas, New York, United States: Henry Holt and Company, p. 194 Retrieved on 27 
October 2010. Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150318150913/http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:British_co
lonies_1763-76_shepherd1923.PNG (18 March 2015). 
38 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 174–275, see also endnotes 1-3 on pages 325-326. Hinderaker, 
Elusive Empires, 156–162. 
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The seeds for Pontiac’s Rebellion were planted in the soil of Montreal with the French 
governor’s capitulation to the British there on September 8, 1760. In the wake of the capitulation, 
British officers began taking possession of previously French occupied forts. In an attempt to 
recover from wartime financial losses, the Crown pressured British commanders to keep 
expenses down by reducing diplomatic gifts to Native leaders in America, increasing tensions 
between them. Compounding the problem, British traders were no longer allowed to travel out to 
Native communities. Rather, Native families were expected to journey to the forts to trade and 
meet with British officials. Some of the British commanders then added insult to injury and 
verbally abused many of the esteemed Indigenous leaders who traveled great distances to 
conduct political, economic, and social business with them.39  
Native Chiefs complained frequently about the lack of British respect and the very real 
consequences that the new British policies had on Native communities between 1760 and 1763. 
Following the famine of 1758 and 1759 toward the end of the Seven Years War in North 
America, many Native communities were forced to over-hunt or face starvation. Then followed a 
significant decline in the number of deer available for hunting and the fur trade. When that was 
combined with British reluctance to supply guns, ammunition and blacksmiths to Native 
communities, many men worried about how to feed their families and about their greatly 
diminished ability to hunt and distribute gifts – both necessary to maintain status in their villages. 
Women’s status suffered as well because the British required the return of captives, whose fate 
had previously rested on the decisions of the village women. Similarly, women shouldered great 
responsibility in the care and cultivation of crops and created significant trade linkages through 
intermarriage and god-parenting networks – all of which suffered under the new British policies 
                                                
39 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 54–113; White, The Middle Ground, 269–314; Dowd, War Under 
Heaven, 86–89. 
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to keep traders in the forts rather than living with Native peoples and requiring both Native men 
and women to leave their villages to negotiate with the British.40 
What was more, the Native communities west of the Appalachian and Allegheny 
Mountains sensed the threat against their lands. Anglo-Americans continued to push eastern 
Native groups to cede more property and move ever closer to the Wabash Valley, often through 
violent means.41  Many Native warriors from multiple tribes and villages chose to follow Ottawa 
chief Pontiac in armed resistance to address the loss or potential loss of hunting grounds due to 
settler encroachment and the necessity of overhunting during certain seasons. They also sought 
to improve their status after a significant decline in relation to the imperial power with which 
they had to negotiate. Between May and August 1763, the allied Native warriors attacked British 
forts, communication and supply lines, as well as the settlements that supported them, not only to 
push both the British troops and colonists out of their territory and back across the Allegheny 
Mountains, but also to garner the attention of the French king and win his support once again. 
                                                
40 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 55–89; Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men, 54–64; 
Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 
1745-1815, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 109th ser., 
4 (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 32–45; White, The Middle Ground, 
256–314. 
41 Some of these bands include the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo. 
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Figure 3: Pontiac’s War, 176342 
At the end of the war with Pontiac in 1764, the British finally took formal possession of 
the Illinois Country, to which they had previously only pretended. After their victory, the British 
also received the captives who had been living among the Native communities – some for many 
years — and returned them to their settlements. However, the British had also been forced to 
treat with Native Americans, not as subjects of the Crown, but as separate “nations," as 
associates, as equals. Despite their military loss, the Indigenous leaders under Pontiac succeeded 
in preserving most of their lands, reduced the British occupancy in the west, and upheld their 
dignity as peoples whom the British government could neither dismiss nor dominate.43  
Great Britain expended enormous sums of money to remove the French influence in 
North America and received Canada, all of the territory east of the Mississippi River, and 
                                                
42 Kevin Myers, "Pontiac's war region," English Wikipedia - Transferred from en.wikipedia to 
Commons. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 via Wikimedia 
Commons - 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pontiac%27s_war_region.png#mediaviewer/File:Pontia
c%27s_war_region.png (9 September 2014).  
43 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 174–212, 274–275; Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 91. 
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Spanish Florida for its trouble. However, the Crown then had to pay for the expensive defense of 
its colonies and sought measures to ameliorate future costs, which included the need for troops in 
North America. By the end of the war in 1763, continued skirmishes between Native Americans 
and colonists were the primary threat to reducing the Crown’s expenditures. Pontiac’s Rebellion 
demonstrated to the British government that the Indigenous population would not tolerate 
continued illegal incursions into their lands and that an inviolable boundary line must be created 
between them. Such a boundary also held the promise of diminishing military expenditures.44 
Thus, the Crown established the Proclamation Line of 1763, marking an important 
turning point in English land policy on the frontiers. No longer could an individual colonist 
purchase land from Indigenous peoples. Rather, the colonial government, alone, in the name of 
the English Crown, had the right to purchase Native property.45 Consequently, the process 
underwent a transformation from contract formation between individuals to treaty negotiations 
and agreements between sovereigns.46 The English government, therefore, expressly 
acknowledged not only that the Native Americans had ownership rights to their lands, but also 
that they maintained legal authority over said lands, or sovereignty. The proclamation expressly 
forbade colonists from settling on or surveying Indigenous lands and from attempting to take any 
form of possession of Native territory. The lands that had not been ceded or purchased by the 
                                                
44 Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier, 1st pbk. ed 
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British government were “reserved to the said Indians. … For the present, and until Our further 
Pleasure be known.”47 Moreover, anyone who had settled on lands declared still to be Native 
property were to remove themselves immediately. Yet, the wording of the proclamation signaled 
to settlers that transactions of Native lands then viewed as illegal, might be looked upon more 
favorably in the future. The perception of the prohibition’s temporality fed land speculation and 
further settlement.48 
The royal proclamation set several significant precedents and attempted to address the 
difficulty of governing the enormous amount of North American territory that Great Britain had 
acquired from France. It created governments for these new territories, “authorized colonial 
governors to grant free land to all the soldiers who had fought in the [Seven Years’] war,” and it 
“set up a uniform system of licensing for the Indian trade.”49 Finally, because the Proclamation 
promulgated the imperial government’s preemptive rights – it was the only legal purchaser of 
Native lands – it not only limited what individual colonists could do, but it also restricted what 
Indigenous leaders could do as well. It “marked the first time the imperial government treated 
Indian and English landowners in such a systematically disparate fashion.”50  
While the Proclamation of 1763 created an abstract boundary, the 1768 Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix sought to fix an actual line on which both Native communities and colonists could 
agree. Participants in this treaty viewed the negotiations, agreements reached, and promises 
made as momentous, as did the generation of Indigenous leaders who followed in their footsteps. 
                                                
47 “The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763.” Available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150302013445/http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/Englis
h/PreConfederation/rp_1763.html  (Accessed 9 September 2014) 
48 Banner, 92 
49 “The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763.” It should be noted that the British trade 
licensing system was never truly effective in the region under study here. 
50 Banner, 94. 
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In the years leading up to and including the American Revolution, Native American ambassadors 
and chiefs were divided in their response to the treaty, but only because they respected and 
honored agreements made in this manner. Signatories to the treaty, primarily of the Six Nations 
upheld its terms. Representatives from the Cherokee, Delaware, and Shawnee protested the 
cession of their lands, lands to which the Six Nations had no claim, and compelled Anglo-
American colonists to survey and reassess the boundary drawn up in the treaty. They trusted that 
once an agreeable border had been achieved that it would protect their land, provide for the 
colonists’ needs, and therefore prevent further encroachments and violence. This also assumed 
that the colonists would abide by the decision reached. Throughout the following decade, Native 
leaders acted on this belief in good faith. 
In his opening remarks to the 1768 treaty council with the Six Nations, Shawnee, and 
Delaware at Fort Stanwix (New York), Sir William Johnson, British Superintendent for Northern 
Indian Affairs, acknowledged the greatest concern of the gathered Indigenous leaders - colonists’ 
incursion into their lands and the violence that resulted therefrom: 
The encroachments upon your Lands have been always one of your principal subjects of 
complaint, and that so far as it could be done endeavors have not been wanting for your 
obtaining Redress. But it was a difficult Task, and generally unsuccessfull — for altho' 
the Provinces have bounds between each other, there are no certain Bounds between them 
& you, And thereby not only several of our people ignorant in Indian Affairs have 
advanced too far into your country, but also many of your own people through the want 
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of such a Line have been deceived in the Sales they have made or in the limits they have 
set to our respective claims51  
He argued that to prevent further invasions and conflict, a boundary line between the colonists 
and Native communities must be fixed.  However, the tribal leaders reminded Sir William of the 
white settlers’ poor track record in upholding treaty agreements and respecting the borders of 
Indigenous lands: 
We have been for some time deliberating on what you said concerning a Line between 
the English and us, & we are sensible it would be for our mutual advantage if it were not 
transgressed, but dayly [sic] experience teaches us that we cannot have any great 
dependance on the white People, and that they will forget their agreements for the sake of 
our Lands — However you have said so much to us upon it that we are willing to beleive 
[sic] more favorably in this case52 
Repeatedly, Native leaders mentioned the intrusion of Euro-Americans and their English 
administrators on their lands and in their business.53 Nevertheless, they were optimistic and 
willing to be persuaded as long as their “reasonable demands” were met. These included three 
specific provisions:  
1) that “none of the Provinces or their People shall attempt to invade it under color of any 
old Deeds, or other pretences [sic] what soever;”54   
2) that “all our Warriors shall have the liberty of hunting throughout the Country as they 
have no other means of subsistance [sic] and as your people have not the same occasions 
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or inclinations — That the White people be restricted from hunting on our side of the 
Line to prevent contensions [sic] between us;”55 and 
3) that “His Majesty will give [Sir William] help & strength to do us justice and to manage 
our affairs in a proper manner.”56 
The last, they noted was considerably important to them because they had found it very difficult 
to “get justice or make [their] complaints known.”57  
Through appeals to past grievances, present concerns, and their love and respect for the 
King of England, Johnson cajoled and inveigled tribal leaders to cede a large portion of their 
lands to the Crown to be distributed to the colonists. He argued that the line would be so well 
“defended” by laws that settlers would not be tempted to cross it and that if the Natives agreed 
quickly and readily to the line, it “would tend to the better observance of the Line hereafter.”58 
After giving them a map of the proposed land cession, Sir William assured them that “they 
should be particularly rewarded for their services [and] endeavours [sic]” in order “to shew [sic] 
the Indians the reasonableness of the requisition.”59 Finally, he suggested “That they should not 
stop at what was but a Trifle to them, tho' so advantageous & necessary to the English and that 
he wished they would so act as to shew their love and respect for the King & friendship for his 
Subjects.”60 In so saying, he trivialized the enormous cession he requested and asserted that the 
land was “necessary” for the English and to keep the peace between them. His statement also 
recalled the metaphorical covenant chain that linked the Six Nations and English through mutual 
respect - a chain that required constant attention and polishing to maintain its luster.  
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In the end, tribal leaders agreed to the land cession, stating that they hoped the English 
(Euro-Americans) would view the boundary as inviolable as they did. They expected that “no 
further attempts shall be made on our Lands but that this Line, be considered as final.”61 In his 
closing statement at the treaty council, Sir William attempted to bolster Native faith in the treaty 
they had just signed: 
Brothers, 
I am glad the Boundary is at length agreed upon, & as I have great reason to think it will 
be duly observed by the English. I recommend it to you to preserve it carefully in 
remembrance to explain it fully to those that are absent and to teach it to your children. 
This Boundary is intended to be lasting but should it be found necessary by His Majesty 
or yourselves to make any future additions or alterations he will treat with you by those 
who have the management of your affairs. And never permit any private application this I 
have received in command to tell you.62  
The tribes’ firm belief in the sanctity of the border established at Fort Stanwix in 1768 resurfaced 
later in debates over the validity of a series of three treaties in the mid-1780s.   
While the Treaty of Fort Stanwix sought to settle disputes between northern tribes with 
northern colonies over the Proclamation of 1763 line, it created new tensions and conflicts. Most 
significantly, Johnson purposely did not invite the Cherokee, who had legitimate claims to the 
land the Six Nations purportedly sold to the English government.63 According to British General 
Thomas Gage, this tribe was “‘exasperated to a great Degree’ when they heard the news.”64 
Following the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, the Cherokee protested the illegality of the Six 
                                                
61 Ibid, 127. 
62 Ibid, 130. 
63 Banner, 97. 
64 Banner, 97. 
 71 
Nations’ supposed sale of their lands. Their response indicates the heterogeneity of Native 
American tribes in contrast to contemporary Americans’ habit of homogenizing all Indigenous 
peoples under the misnomer, “Indian."  
Over the subsequent six years, Native leaders remained powerful enough to compel the 
colonists to revisit and redraw the line in accordance with their preexisting property claims to the 
disputed land, claims that superseded those of the Six Nations’. The dissension also reveals the 
divisive and competitive nature of land cessions among Native communities as each jostled for 
greater protections for their own homelands at the expense of others’ through the early 1770s. As 
we shall see, when the threat became more widespread and it became apparent that none was 
safe from avaricious American speculators and militant settlers, Indigenous leaders began to seek 
a united Native front during and after the American Revolution.  
Heedless of the significance of Indigenous protestations, Anglo-American colonists 
continued to move into Native lands between 1768 and 1774 using the Treaty of Fort Stanwix as 
a legal justification for their claims. Believing the treaty affirmed their sovereignty over the 
region south of the Ohio River and backed by Lord Dunmore, American militias formed to 
protect their claims against Native efforts to defend and re-possess their own lands. Over the 
course of these six years, Euro-American colonists became settlers through the process of 
dispossessing the Native communities of Kentucky and the Ohio River Valley territory.65 
Through this transformation, they acquired a distinct identity that scholars today can 
retrospectively define as “settlers,” but also one they, themselves, defined at the time.    
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The American exploration of Kentucky (which contemporaries also referred to as 
Kentucke) began in 1767 when John Finley, a trader from North Carolina, and others traveled 
through the territory. Two decades later, contemporary historian John Filson, described 
Kentucky as the “Dark and Bloody Ground" due to the violence that erupted over its 
possession.66 After conflict arose between the Anglo-American traders and their Native trading 
partners, the American colonists were forced to return home.  Upon arriving at his homestead in 
North Carolina, Finley relayed his discovery of the Kentucky territory to Daniel Boone, a veteran 
of the French and Indian War (1754-1763), militiaman, frontiersman, and explorer. Boone later 
set out with other adventurers to explore the Kentucky territory in 1769. Despite the deaths of his 
companions due to illness and Native American attacks, Boone remained in the region until 
1771. Filson observed that at about the same time: 
Kentucke had drawn the attention of several gentlemen. Doctor Walker of Virginia, with 
a number more, made a tour westward for discoveries, endeavoring to find the Ohio river; 
and afterwards he and General Lewis, at Fort Stanwix, purchased from the Five Nations 
of Indians, the lands lying on the north side of [the] Kentucke [River]. Col. Donaldson, of 
Virginia, being employed by the State to run a line from six miles above the Long Island, 
on Holstein, to the mouth of the great Kenhawa [River], and finding thereby that an 
extensive tract of excellent country would be cut off to the Indians, was solicited, by the 
inhabitants of Clench and Holstein, to purchase the lands lying on the north side of the 
Kentucke river from the Five Nations.  
While the language of "purchasing" lands from the Native inhabitants seems to imply a 
recognition of Indigenous land rights and sovereignty, the purchases were no more than a gloss 
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of legitimacy to cover the questionable means used to secure Native land for American 
settlement. Often, Americans treated with Native leaders who had no claim to the lands they sold 
to speculators. In the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, for example, the Six Nations and unsanctioned 
representatives from the Shawnee and Delaware sold their lands along with Cherokee territory to 
the Anglo-Americans without the consent of these tribes. Consequently, these communities were 
outraged when Americans began settling on their hunting grounds, claiming they had a right to 
be there. The appearance of a legitimate sale was enough justification for the settlers who moved 
onto Shawnee and Delaware lands. Not only did the sale validate their claim to land rights, but it 
also affirmed (in settlers' eyes, at least) their sovereignty. Settlers encroaching on Indigenous 
lands viewed their reprisals as grounds for attacks on Native communities. Settler counter-
attacks were often unsanctioned by the government but conveniently presented opportunities to 
compel greater land cessions, as happened in Lord Dunmore's War in 1774 and the subsequent 
expropriation of Shawnee territories. 
In January 1773, Virginia surveyor George Rogers Clark wrote to his brother to inform 
him of the land he had claimed in the region southwest of Fort Pitt and its prospects. The country 
“setels very fast” and people had already claimed lands down to the Scioto River 366 miles 
below Fort Pitt, Clark reported. As his survey partner, Roy observed, the land was valuable, and 
Clark had already received “an offer of a very considerable sum” for his place. Even his 
surveying endeavors in the region were lucrative.67 Americans could not wait to get their hands 
on the fertile bottomlands along the Ohio River and its valley.  
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Increasing settlement in the western regions of Pennsylvania and Virginia colonies 
brought more Americans into contact with Native inhabitants. Tensions grew as settlers 
continued encroaching on Native lands, initiating violence out of fear and growing racialized 
hostility.68 When Virginia surveyors began moving into Kentucky in 1773 and 1774, the 
Shawnee chiefs admonished the British that they could not be held responsible for what their 
young men might do when they met the white surveyors on their hunting grounds. Despite the 
warnings, the surveyors continued their exploration and their plans for settlement, even as 
settlers and their unwilling Native neighbors conducted raids against each other. One such 
incident claimed the lives of Mingo Chief Logan’s family members and provoked a 
counterattack.69 The subsequent machinations of John Connolly escalated the conflict to a full-
blown pitched battle that the English won only by forfeit. When the Indigenous warriors chose 
not to continue armed hostilities and left the battlefield in the middle of the night, the Anglo-
Americans declared victory.70 
Within a week of the battle at the inaptly named Point Pleasant, Virginia’s colonial 
governor, Lord Dunmore reported that he had concluded a treaty with the Shawnee chief 
Cornstalk. With the combined might of his own and Captain Lewis’ forces, Dunmore marched to 
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the Shawnee villages on the Scioto.71 Through the clever maneuvering of British Superintendent, 
Sir William Johnson, the Native confederacy that the Shawnee had orchestrated broke apart, 
leaving them isolated and outnumbered. Faced with few alternatives, the Shawnee agreed to 
Dunmore’s peace terms and ceded their territory southeast of the Ohio River.72 
According to messages exchanged between Indigenous leaders in the Wabash Valley just 
four years later, in 1778, it is clear that they recognized that many Americans perceived the 
region as future American territory. At the outset of the American Revolution, contemporary 
Americans viewed the land west of the Appalachian Mountains as temporarily in the possession 
of Native Americans. A number of prominent statesmen, including George Washington and 
Thomas Jefferson, believed that it would eventually be incorporated into the United States, even 
though the outcome of the Revolutionary War remained uncertain at the time. The Americans’ 
objective to acquire it from its Indigenous inhabitants signaled to Native leaders that the United 
States had embarked on a path toward becoming a settler empire, even as the confederated states 
fought to free themselves from their own colonial status within the British Empire.  
Settler colonial ideology grew and co-evolved with the nascent “American” identity. 
From the beginning the two were deeply interrelated and will be examined as coeval processes of 
definition. American colonists became settlers by invoking their perceived sovereignty to 
dispossess the Indigenous population and claim rights to land in Kentucky and the Ohio River 
Valley. In the North American British colonies, colonists moving west across the Proclamation 
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Line of 1763 onto Native American lands necessitated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1768 (as 
well as subsequent treaties) and increased tensions between Euro-American settlers, Indigenous 
communities, and the British imperial administration. Anglo-American desires for land both 
prompted rebellion from their own sovereign and motivated the newly forming United States to 
become a settler colonial state in its own right.73  
 American colonists understood that crossing the Cumberland Gap and making homes in 
the backcountry distinguished them from their peers who remained on the eastern side of the 
Appalachian Mountains. They were “frontiersmen” (and women) and “adventurers” who 
embraced a simpler life and established democratic forms of local government, policing, and 
justice as an expression of political ideals and as models for their eastern cousins. They were 
willing to risk everything, even their lives, and confront any obstacle, including competing 
Indigenous claims for the material wealth and security that the western lands promised. Daniel 
Boone, one of Kentucky’s first explorers and settlers, described Americans’ fortitude and 
persistent defense of these lands in the face of Native American resistance: 
[The Indians] evidently saw the approaching hour when the Long Knife would dispossess 
them of their desirable habitations; and anxiously concerned for futurity, determined to 
utterly extirpate the whites out of Kentucke. We were not intimidated by their 
movements, but frequently gave them proofs of our courage. … 
…The Indian army arrived, being four hundred forty-four in number, commanded by 
Capt. Duquesne, eleven other Frenchmen, and some of their own chiefs, and marched up 
within view of our fort, with British and French colors flying … It was now a critical 
period for us. —We were a small number in the garrison:—A powerful army before our 
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walls, whose appearance proclaimed inevitable death, fearfully painted, and marking 
their footsteps with desolation. Death was preferable to captivity; and if taken by storm 
we must inevitably be devoted to destruction. In this situation we concluded to maintain 
our garrison74  
In spite of the odds, the settlers held the fort at Boonesborough in August 1778 and continued to 
persevere through numerous hardships, being, according to Boone, “a hardy race of people, and 
accustomed to difficulties and necessities.”75 
Settlers believed that their labor to build homes, break ground, cultivate fields, and 
defend their homesteads against Indian counter-attacks entitled them to the lands they claimed. 
The land they acquired was already carefully managed and therefore value-added.76 Ignoring the 
evidence of Native land management, settlers maintained that their improvements to the 
“wilderness” lands validated their sovereignty.77 Their armed confrontations with Indigenous 
inhabitants proved their mettle, their worthiness to “settle” the land, from which grew the myths 
about the hardy, independent backwoodsmen whose interactions with the Native population 
transformed them into Americans, according to nineteenth-century historian Frederick Jackson 
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Turner.78 However much or little these colonists resembled their Native neighbors, as Turner 
contended, it was the act of continual dispossession that resulted in the transformation from 
British colonists to American settlers.79 
Settlers used the Treaty of Fort Stanwix as a legal pretext to support their right to 
expropriate lands from Indigenous communities. With little else to base their decision on apart 
from desire and the belief that the treaty gave them the right, adventurers, land speculators, and 
families in search of economic advancement set out for the western territories to stake and 
defend their land claims. The Battle of Point Pleasant did not end the contest for the Ohio and, 
later, the Wabash River Valleys; it was the opening salvo. The Shawnee land cessions in 1774 
allowed more settlers into Kentucky, enriched Virginia land speculators, and provided the British 
with an excuse to encourage their Native allies to attack the American frontiers during the 
Revolution.80 
Thus, the “Indian” agents of the British Empire and Indigenous leaders, with the best of 
intentions, established what became the legal foundation for later settlement. The Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix provided the discursive groundwork for the settlers. At the same time, it paradoxically 
became the reference point for Native leaders to preserve their lands because it clearly delineated 
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a boundary between the American and Native communities. Between the signing of this treaty in 
1768 and the attacks the Americans launched on the British outposts in Wabash River Valley in 
1778, Americans established both the ideological framework and the economic system that 
propelled people west near or into Native lands, setting the stage for the development of settler 
colonies. The particular events that led to the French conquest of Algeria were notably different 
from those that produced the American settler colonies. However, the intellectual ferment of the 
Enlightenment, coupled with the political and economic destabilization French citizens 
experienced yielded a similar impetus to migrate and establish a new colony.  On the eve of 
conquest, Algeria, like the Wabash Valley, had been repeatedly struck by plagues and faced 
political upheavals that created power vacuums the colonizers sought to exploit.  
Algeria: An Ottoman Regency 
Like the American Wabash Valley, Algeria's economy and culture faced significant 
challenges from the collision of empires, the effects of disease, and changing market relations 
that transformed local societies.  On the eve of colonization, Algeria's thriving cosmopolitan 
cities seem to provide a significant contrast to the overwhelmingly rural, parochial, and 
apparently scattered conditions of North American Indigenous communities. And yet, a web of 
trade and kinship ties connected disparate Indigenous cities, villages, and political units in both 
regions. These routes also linked local Wabash and Algerian towns with much wider, and more 
lucrative, trade networks. Access to these networks inspired outside American and European 
interest in these regions. 
The industrial revolution and growth of capitalism, as well as the subsequent 
centralization of political power in Europe, “stirred an incipient and subtle imperialism that also 
aimed to incorporate peripheral economies into the growing world (European-dominated) 
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economy.”81  Western Europe’s greater economic power then led to a shift in European 
perceptions of non-Europeans, which is traceable through the transition from (relatively) more 
objective, academic descriptions of North Africa and her peoples in the eighteenth century and 
the growing judgmental and demeaning portrayals of the early nineteenth century.82  
Over the course of the eighteenth century, European economic interventions in the 
Maghrib and the decline of Maghribian piracy weakened local North African economies and 
made them more dependent on foreign interests.83 Algeria’s necessary reliance on foreign 
economic interventions and increasingly heavier taxes levied against their own farmers in the 
interior further destabilized power relations. Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 then radically 
altered the power dynamics throughout the Mediterranean and the Maghrib vis-à-vis Europe. The 
French invasion, and the inability of the Ottoman and Egyptian forces to repel it, demonstrated 
the weakness of the once powerful and feared Ottoman Empire.  
At the same time, the Napoleonic Wars in Europe caused economic disruptions in both 
Europe and North Africa, wreaking havoc on Algerian international markets. When the 
continental blockade and the British counter-blockade in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century cut off Algerian interactions with its Italian, French, and Spanish trading partners, 
Europe found other suppliers, particularly from Russia, who could provide the desired grains. 
Algeria’s inability to profit from grain exports further upset its delicate political system.84 While 
Algeria was unable to export grain to Europe, Napoleon still needed to feed his troops and took 
out loans from two Livorno Jewish families living in Algeria – Bakri and Bushnaq, whose 
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interests were later represented by the dey (Ottoman governor of Algeria).85 By then, the 
Algerian government had already lent France 1.25 million francs at no interest, in addition to 
shipments of horses and grain prior to the Napoleonic Wars. Following Napoleon’s defeat at 
Waterloo in 1815, the French Restoration Monarchy refused to honor the debts he incurred.86  
Napoleon’s exploits in Egypt held greater long-term significance for the relationship 
between France and Algeria than even the fiscal situation outlined above suggests. Napoleon’s 
recognition of the Ottoman Empire’s declining power, the correlation he saw between the Roman 
Empire and France as its seeming inheritor, and the allure of North Africa germinated and grew 
into the idea that a conquest of Algiers might be advisable in the near future.87  
Since the year 1808 Emperor Napoleon had the conquest in mind and already in his 
ardent imagination the new African expedition recalled the glorious memories of the 
Egyptian campaign. After the peace of Tilsitt, the [military] engineer Boutin went to the 
Barbary coast on [Napoleon’s] order to conduct reconnaissance there in case of a future 
war with the dey, who for that matter had not observed/respected the rigorous 
prohibitions of the continental system with enough deference.88  
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le colonel du génie Boutin se rendit par son ordre sur les côtes de la Barbarie, pour y faire des 
travaux de reconnaissance, dans la prévision d’une guerre prochaine avec le dey, qui d’ailleurs 
n’observait pas avec assez de déférence les rigoureuses prohibitions du système continental.” 
The continental system was Napoleon I’s foreign policy meant to paralyze Great Britain. Philip 
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These plans were largely forgotten until the diplomatic breakdown between Algiers and France 
in 1827 presented an opportunity to resurrect them and the French political situation made such 
an action appear advantageous.  
Napoleon’s influence reverberated through North Africa throughout the first three 
decades of the nineteenth century. The disruptions of the Napoleonic Wars and the end of 
privateering in 1816 created enormous upheaval in Algerian power structures.  Even after the 
Napoleonic Wars ended and the 1815 Congress of Vienna reopened trading opportunities for 
Algeria, Europe continued to buy its grain from its newfound suppliers rather than from across 
the Mediterranean. Profits acquired through privateering and international trade provided the 
financial backing that bolstered and stabilized the Algerian political system.89 In the years 
leading up to the French invasion in 1830, European interventions in Algerian piracy, which the 
northern Mediterranean countries had helped to create centuries before, and the turmoil into 
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centuries, as European navies focused more attention on shutting down Mediterranean piracy. 
(Laroui, 268). 
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which international business fell during the Napoleonic Wars eroded the revenue streams on 
which Algerian political stability relied. 
Historians debate whether or not Algeria was in the process of developing a distinct and 
unified national identity on the eve of French invasion.90 While Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria 
did not identify themselves as nation-states, each began to develop discrete and recognizable 
characteristics and systems of government over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.91 By creating more defined geographic boundaries and through their unique socio-
political milieus, each acquired greater self-awareness of its separate identity.92  However, 
Algeria was not yet a fully formed, self-defined nation-state at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Then again, a number of European countries were still in the process of nation-state 
formation themselves.93  
Prior to that fateful day when a flyswatter set in motion events that would eventually lead 
to the French conquest of Algiers, Algeria existed as an Ottoman Regency with a highly 
structured society, government, fiscal, judicial, and police institutions. Thus, arguments for 
Algeria as a nascent state, albeit a provincial one, begin to make greater sense.  Established as an 
Ottoman province in the early sixteenth century, an Ottoman ruler (dey) governed Algeria. The 
Sultan in Constantinople initially chose the man to fill this position, but within a century, the 
divan, a council comprised of leading members of the Ojaq, or the janissary military corps, took 
                                                
90 Mahfoud Bennone; John Ruedy, Modern Algeria; Laroui. 
91 Even earlier, in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Sultan-appointed Beylerbeys began to 
create distinct borders between Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia where only ambiguous frontiers 
had previously existed. However, the names “Algeria” and “Tunisia” date only back to the 
French July Monarchy (1830-1848) and arose out of the French conquest and colonization of 
Algeria. (See Julien, 293). 
92 Laroui, 287. 
93 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
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over this function.94 The janissaries were recruited from the impoverished Anatolia province to 
become elite soldiers for the Ottoman Empire. Their democratically elected leaders governed 
according to the egalitarian set of rules the janissaries, themselves, drafted. Their council, or 
divan, was “responsible for defending its corporate interests [and] soon ceased to distinguish 
between these and those of the state.”95 The divan was also responsible for debating and advising 
on matters of governance and the administration of justice. The dey selected his own officers to 
fill the following positions that comprised his inner circle or high officers within the divan: the 
treasury officer (khaznaji), the commander-in-chief of the army, the minister of the marine, his 
majordomo, the trustee of vacant successions, and the receiver of tribute, known as the ‘secretary 
of the horse’. His personal treasurer, secretaries, and bailiffs assisted the divan with daily 
administrative tasks.96  The dey administered justice and directly governed the province of 
Algiers (dar al-sultan) through the aghas (military commanders) and cavalries. Within the city,  
Each ethnic group, except that of the Kabyles, and each trade guild was answerable to a 
headman (amin) with police powers and legal jurisdiction but under the control of a 
major (shaikh al-balad). Special officials looked after fountains, markets, streets, baths 
and brothels. The town was extremely well policed.97  
The rest of Algeria was divided into three provinces, known as beyliks: Oran in the west, 
whose capital city was Mazouna until 1710, then Mascara until the Spanish finally vacated Oran 
in 1792; Titteri in the center, with its seat at Médéa; and Constantine, with its capital city of the 
                                                
94 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 1–44; Naylor, North Africa, 89–152; Laroui, The History of the 
Maghrib, 234–305; Charles André Julien, History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, 
from the Arab Conquest to 1830 (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970), 273–335; Ageron, 
Modern Algeria, 1–8; Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism. 
95 Julien, 285. 
96 Julien, 321-322. 
97 Julien, 324. 
 85 
same name, in the east. The head of each beylik, the bey, was an Ottoman Turk appointed by the 
dey, who generally made his decision based on which of the candidates was most generous. Each 
bey was largely autonomous, and the dey in Algiers often viewed the power the beys wielded 
with suspicion. Every three years, as a reminder of the dey’s allegiance, he compelled the beys to 
bring taxes and customs duties to Algiers in person. These were dangerous and expensive trips, 
costing them wealth, perhaps their posts, and sometimes their very lives.98   
The three beyliks were comprised of many watans, or districts, that generally 
encompassed several tribes. Bey-appointed commissioners (qaids) were granted civil, military, 
and judicial powers to administer each watan and oversee the tribal chiefs (shaikhs), their 
assistants, and local headmen.99 The qaids’ primary responsibility was the supervision of land 
divisions and ensuring that upon distribution, the land was cultivated. Both tasks were essential 
to accurately and appropriately assess, and then collect, taxes with the shaikhs’ assistance. The 
bey also relied on mahkzan tribes, who were designated to assist with tax collection as well as 
policing the province and were themselves exempt from non-canonical taxes in return for their 
services.100  
                                                
98 Julien, 324. 
99 The shaikhs were often chosen from the most important tribe in the watan, while the qaids 
were Turkish officers who were nominated by military commanders (aghas) or other high 
officials for the bey’s consideration and approval. Upon appointment, they received a seal and a 
red burnous to mark their position. (Julien, 325) 
100 Julien, 325. 
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Figure 4: “Afrique française – Algérie”101 
While Algeria may have had a “pre-capitalist” economy prior to 1830, the Regency was 
not as backward as the French painted it. When profits from exports and privateering declined at 
the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the organization of the makhzen tribes to 
collect taxes, the creation of local military forces, and foreign investments became increasingly 
important to the stability of the Regency.102 Not only did they provide a firm foundation for the 
                                                
101 Alexandre Vuillemin, “Afrique française – Algérie,” 1877. Public Domain. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150302184137/http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Alg%C3
%A9rie_fr.jpg (6 April 2013).  
102 “In the eighteenth century Algiers lost its former prosperity. The treaties with the [European] 
powers, the enemy expeditions and the growing scarcity of good corsair crews impaired the 
effectiveness of privateering attacks. In nine years out of a quarter of a century, between 1765 
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regency, but they also contributed to a slow revival of Algeria’s urban centers, reconstituting 
“organic ties between the state and society.”103   
Nevertheless, the disparity between the French and Algerian economies can hardly be 
disputed. Between the French Revolution and the French conquest of Algiers, the economies of 
the two governments experienced dramatically divergent trends: 
In 1822, the United States General Consul in Algiers, William Shaler, evaluated Algerian 
external commerce at only 8 million francs, while at the same time, the total volume of 
French trade reached 950 million francs. During the period 1818 to 1828, French 
production of cast iron doubled; that of processed cotton tripled between 1812 and 1827; 
in less than fifteen years the silk industry of Lyon grew by 400 percent. Between 1825 
and 1830, the quantity of money minted by France increased by 82 percent and that of 
gold by 156 percent. The Algerian state remained basically a military-theocratic pre-
capitalist state whose organizational and institutional features were characterized by 
certain ‘archaic’ traits, which appear to have prevented the further development of the 
productive forces of the civil society.104  
Even though international trade and profits from privateering declined in the first three 
decades of the nineteenth century, internal trade remained constant. “Algiers had active local 
industries which distributed their products in the provinces and were still in operation in 1830. 
Commerce and industry diminished as the population declined in numbers and wealth 
                                                                                                                                                       
and 1792, the value of booty was less than 100,000 francs. The fleet, which in 1724 comprised 
twenty-four vessels, declined in the course of sixty years to eight barques and two galliots in 
1788. The raïs Hamidu, who held the sea until 1815, restored the fleet again to thirty ships, 
owing to the European wars that followed the French Revolution. … In total the Algiers trade 
came to about 5,000,000 francs in 1830 – a rather undistinguished figure.” (Julien, 320, 321). 
103 Laroui, 284. 
104 Bennoune, 16-17. 
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[though].”105 Hard hit by plagues, pestilence, and the paucity of food, particularly wheat, the 
population of Algeria declined sharply between 1780 and 1830.   
Plagues, droughts, poor harvests, and famines wrought havoc on the population, 
prosperity, and political economy of Algeria. In 1787, for example, nearly 17,000 people died of 
the plague in Algiers. Twenty years later, in 1805, the grain harvest was insufficient to feed the 
population, and inhabitants of Constantine staged a massive revolt.106  Ten years later, when 
Algeria might have begun exporting wheat to Europe following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, 
locusts devastated the harvest. Wheat was in such short supply that in an attempt to prevent a 
repeat of the grain revolts of 1805, the dey prohibited Oran and Constantine from exporting it. 
The dey was then forced to import wheat into the capital and opened state storehouses to the 
populace to prevent social unrest as famine spread and shortages continued through 1816.107 A 
series of poor harvests throughout the Maghrib caused widespread suffering due to malnutrition 
in these years. The following year, in 1817, the death toll rose to 500 people per day. By 1830, 
the population of Algiers was reduced to a mere 30,000 inhabitants, from a height of upwards of 
100,000 people prior to 1780.108  
Political upheaval and near anarchy ensued. Notables began competing with each other 
over the meager resources rather than cooperating to find a mutually beneficial solution to their 
financial problems. At the same time, the beys in the eastern and western provinces grew more 
powerful and controlled greater wealth relative to the dey than they ever had before. Growing 
jealous of both the financial and political capital of the beys, the dey threw eight out of office and 
executed sixteen between 1790 and 1825. However, the position of the dey was equally unsafe, 
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resulting in numerous coups between 1790 and 1816. From Mustafa Dey’s violent death in 1805, 
Algeria had six deys before Ali Khodja became dey in 1816.109  
Given the influence peddling, subversion, and bloody overthrows of the previous two 
decades, the new dey, Ali Khodja Dey, sought to remove himself from the divan’s influence and 
potential overthrow. Upon his nomination to the position in 1816, he secretly moved his entire 
treasury and personal entourage away from the Janina Palace to the safety of the Casbah. 
Unfortunately, his reign was also a short one, as the plague carried him away just two years later. 
Before his death, he appointed his treasurer, Hussein Dey, to be his successor. Before the French 
conquest, Hussein Dey was able to reestablish much of the authority of the central government 
and made great strides toward stabilizing Algeria’s flagging economy in his twelve years of 
leadership.110  
At the same time, European intervention also repeatedly challenged the stability of 
Algerian society, finally launching a successful assault on Algiers led by Lord Exmouth (Edward 
Pellew) of Great Britain in August 1816.  Under a flag of truce, a 50-ship fleet comprised of both 
Dutch and English vessels sailed into the harbor and proceeded to launch a brutal bombardment 
on the ramparts.111 American consul to Algiers, William Shaler described Lord Exmouth’s 
bombardment of Algiers:112 
                                                
109 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 40. 
110 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 40–44. 
111 The rivalry between Great Britain and France was particularly significant to the decision-
making processes of each government. Consequently, France refused to participate in Lord 
Exmouth’s campaign because the French preferred that Algerian privateering continued to check 
British naval power in the Mediterranean. 
112 William Shaler was the American Consul-General and chief commissioner to Algiers in 1815 
after the Treaty of Ghent ended the War of 1812. At that time, the United States was able to 
finally turn its attention to negotiating an end to the predations on American shipping and sailors 
on the Mediterranean and the high tribute payments the Algerian dey. Shaler and the American 
squadron arrived June 28, 1815 and concluded a treaty 30 days later. Shaler’s notes, 
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The loss on the part of the Algerines is very great, certainly not less than 2000. Much has 
been done to suppress Algiers as a piratical power; all their ships are destroyed except the 
brig formerly an American prize, and a schooner, which was in the late war, the James 
Madison privateer. The ruin of the batteries is very extensive. They cannot yet know the 
greatness of their misfortune, but time will discover it to them. At present they are very 
anxious to appear undismayed, and they are actually fitting their two remaining vessels 
for sea with great activity.113 
On August 28 after 2 days of intense shelling, the dey at last agreed to free all 1,642 currently 
enslaved Europeans and Americans, signing a truce, conceding, 
in the event of future wars with any European power none of the prisoners should be 
consigned to slavery, but treated with all humanity as prisoners of war, until regularly 
exchanged, according to European practice in like cases, and that at the termination of 
hostilities they should be restored to their respective countries without ransom114 
The agreement also terminated all Algerian privateering activities on the Mediterranean once and 
for all, striking a keenly felt blow to economic stability in the Maghribian territory.115  
                                                                                                                                                       
observations, and letters did not go unnoticed by French colonial officials, and in his 1839 
publication, De la Colonisation du nord de l’Afrique, nécessité d'une association nationale pour 
l'exploitation agricole et industrielle, Aristide Guilbert opens his work with a lengthy discussion 
of Shaler’s travels both in America and Europe and his complimentary observations about 
Algeria’s geography and potential. 
113 William Shaler to James Monroe, 13 September 1816, The Scourge of Christendom; annals of 
British relations with Algiers prior to the French conquest, ed. Sir R. Lambert Playfair (London: 
Smith, Elder & Co, 1884), 272. 
114 Shaler to Monroe, 13 September 1816 in Playfair, 274. 
115 It is easy to take European statements about their Maghribian policies at face value and 
believe that this (and previous) assault(s) were outraged reactions to Barbary piracy. However, as 
noted historian of North Africa, Charles-André Julien has observed, commercial interest and 
power politics carried far more weight in the decision-making of European governments.  It 
should be noted, however, that the United States could legitimately claim to have acted in 
response to Algerian piracy, which cost the government and American merchants small fortunes 
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Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing its own problems as several 
significant fissures in the Sublime Porte’s authority began to appear throughout the empire. In 
1821, a nationalist uprising in Greece threatened to break off portions of the Balkans from the 
Ottoman Empire. Sultan Mahmud II’s troops were sent in but neither they nor the Greeks were 
able to win a convincing victory to settle the conflict.116  Desperate and with few options, the 
sultan called on the fractious, rebellious, and increasingly powerful governor of Egypt, 
Muhammad Ali, to send in his recently restructured military. The reconstituted Egyptian military 
had been drilled and disciplined in a style more closely resembling European, rather than 
Ottoman, armies, making it a highly effective fighting force. While the sultan offered 
Muhammad Ali governorship of the island of Crete in return for his military aid in Greece, Ali 
only agreed when the sultan granted Ali’s son and commander of the Egyptian forces, Ibrahim 
Ali, governorship over the Balkans.117   
Ibrahim’s efforts in Greece were successful and helped the Ottoman forces recapture 
Athens in 1827, but his victory brought unwanted European attention and intervention. Despite 
their squabbles over influence in the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, and Russia came together 
and negotiated with Sultan Mahmud II for two years. The sultan’s refusal of their proposed 
armistice led to a united Western European and Russian blockade of the Balkans and a naval 
                                                                                                                                                       
in the Mediterranean, where the privateers preyed on American vessels in particular, so as not to 
offend European trading partners. 
116 Sending troops to deal with the Qajar invasions from Iran into the Ottomans’ eastern 
provinces inhibited their ability to respond to the Greek uprising. With fewer troops available, it 
was necessary to call in auxiliaries, in this case, from Egypt. (Caroline Finkel, Osman's Dream: 
The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923 [New York: Basic Books, 2006], 432.) 
117 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 432; William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the 
Modern Middle East, 4th Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), 71-73. 
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battle at Pylos that destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in 1827, drastically reducing their 
ability to defend Algeria in 1830.118   
In 1831, Ibrahim Ali launched a land and naval attack on Syria to acquire raw materials 
essential to Egyptian industry, development, and shipbuilding. After successfully taking Lebanon 
and Syria, Ibrahim marched his army across the Taurus Mountains and into Anatolia, defeating 
the Ottoman forces there and pushed on to Konya. There he met the Ottoman army, led by Grand 
Vezir Resid Pasha, defeated them and pressed on, reaching Kuhtaya by January 1833. With the 
Egyptian army just 150 miles from Istanbul and within striking distance of Bursa, Sultan 
Mahmud II sought assistance from Britain and France, neither of which offered definite 
assurance of aid. He then turned to Russian Tsar Nicholas, whose forces “established a 
bridgehead up the Bosporus from Istanbul” and prevented Ibrahim’s forces from conquering the 
Ottoman capital. The military assistance Russia offered provided more leverage to extract 
concessions and further weakened the Ottoman Empire at the very moment its strength was 
needed to defend its North African possessions.119  
While the Sublime Porte was preoccupied with both interior and exterior threats, France 
inaugurated first a naval blockade and then a military campaign on Algiers between 1827 and 
1830.120 At that Algeria represented the farthest reaches of the Ottoman Empire. Maps of its 
topography reveal a land of extremes – with a brow lined with mountain ranges leading into the 
Sahel, or high plains, sandwiched between two seas – the Mediterranean to the north and a sea of 
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sand, the Sahara desert, to the south. The region that parallels the Mediterranean for 100-200 
miles inland is known as the Tell and is the most inhabitable part of Algeria. However, oases dot 
the forbidding desert and provide a home for date-growers and a shelter for the nomadic tribes 
that crisscross the dunes.  
Sailing toward the shore, the city of Algiers rises gracefully from the port and coastline 
up a mountainside. One newcomer’s description is representative of many others’ first 
impressions: “The houses rise gradually from the sea-shore up the ascent, in the form of an 
amphitheatre. The town appears beautiful at a distance when approaching from the water. The 
mosques, castles, and other public buildings have a striking effect.”121 Crowned with the Casbah, 
a densely populated citadel, constructed during the first century of Ottoman rule, the buildings 
are almost all white.122  Thus, the city has variously been described as resembling the head of a 
white-veiled woman or even as a “ship’s topsail, spread out upon a green field.”123 American 
consul-general William Shaler observed in 1816, “with its surrounding hilly and well cultivated 
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territory, thickly studded with white buildings, several of which are magnificent edifices, 
develops, on approach, one of the most agreeable views on the shores of the Mediterranean.”124  
The city’s massive defenses struck nineteenth-century visitors approaching from the sea. 
The port received greater attention in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, and 
construction projects were undertaken to ensure a (mostly) safe harbor, particularly for the 
privateers who called it home.125  As a target of many bombardments, especially during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, dozens of cannons bristle from the fortifications. Shaler 
observed, “All the approaches by sea to Algiers are defended by such formidable works, 
mounted with heavy cannon, as to render any direct attack by ships a desperate undertaking, if 
they were defended with ordinary skill and spirit.”126  
Algiers was a busy port city prior to colonization. Dozens of ships docked in the harbor 
daily, and a flurry of activity enveloped disembarking travelers. Laborers – Arab and sub-
Saharan Africans – hauled wheat and cotton for export to Italy and France. Dockworkers, mostly 
Biskris from oases in the eastern province of Constantine, joined their songs to the nearly 
deafening tumult. “Along the quays of the port of Algiers,” another traveler commented, “the 
beehive of the Biskris buzzes with activity. You should see these Auvergants of Algeria, an 
energetic and hard-working race, carrying the heaviest of loads… running from port to city.”127 
                                                
124 Shaler, 47-48. 
125 The harbor provided protection from all but the northerly winter winds. 
126 Shaler, 46. 
127 Antoine Rozet, Algérie (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1850), 38 in Julia Clancy-Smith, “Exoticism, 
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To organize and monitor the activity of the port, the Ottomans established “customs houses, a 
state port authority, and European consular offices to verify ship manifests, as well as passports 
and merchandise.”128   
The city is merely a mile and half in circumference at this time, but navigating the streets 
was a challenging enterprise.  
The streets are very narrow, the tops of the houses closing so near together as to entirely 
shade them from the rays of the sun, so that, by means of its flat-terraced roofs, there 
might probably be established a communication throughout its different quarters. [The 
city] is surrounded by high walls, with bastions and a dry ditch, has no suburbs, and is 
entered by four gates. … its narrow summit is crowned by the Casauba, or citadel, which 
effectually commands the city, and the marine batteries.129   
In the hierarchical structure of Algerian society, most of the city’s inhabitants were identifiable 
by their clothing, trade and/or living quarters. 
I have never seen anything like it. A prodigious mix of races, costumes, Arab, Kabyle, 
Moor, Negro, Mahonais… Each of these races, tossed together in a space much too tight 
to contain them, speaks its language, wears its attire, display different mores. The whole 
world moves about with an activity that seems feverish.130  
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In Ottoman territories, Jews were not allowed to wear particular colors or specific 
garments, so as to set them apart from their Arab and Moorish neighbors.131 A Jewish man might 
wear a piece of cloth fashioned into a turban around his head, the tail of which extends down his 
neck and under the short collar of his embroidered jacket. Under his coat, a loose fitting shirt can 
be seen, which he tucked into voluminous pants that end in a gather at the knee above his 
slipper-covered toes.132 A distinguished-looking man, a well-heeled Koulougli, the son of a 
Turkish administrator and Algerian woman, might wear a multi-colored turban with a deep blue 
habit; blue stockings cover over his calves and sharply contrasting red slippers, and an off-white 
bournous slung over his shoulder.133  
More than any other Mediterranean port, Algiers surprised and astonished. It was 
crowded with all manner of people and with social and ethnic groups distinguishable 
from each other through dress, language, physical characteristics, and even hairstyle. … 
The population was often swamped and enlarged by waves of new arrivals. … Authors 
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and witnesses couldn’t help being dazzled and confused by the diversity which pervaded 
every street, alley or stairway; they emerged charmed but a little breathless.134  
Between this description of seventeenth-century Algiers and the end of the eighteenth century, 
the city grew in population and diversity until plagues took a toll on the citizens and natural 
disasters struck Algerian crops and the human population that depended on them. 
The dramatic decline in the city’s population was in evidence by 1827, however. Not 
long before, it boasted more than 100,000 inhabitants.135  The Bubonic Plague ravaged the 
population for more than four decades, taking a frightening toll. Despite advances in medicine, 
there was a great deal of mistrust of the European methods in Algeria, and many people 
struggled to alter what they saw as the will of God. As a result, thousands suffered and died. The 
scourge hit Algeria particularly hard. In 1784, travelers brought it from Alexandria. The outbreak 
lasted for seven long years before it ran its course. By then, one out of every six people had died. 
There was only a two-year respite before it returned again, this time lasting six years – more in 
the west. Then again, it appeared in 1817, when famine had already weakened people and a 
strange disease struck the cattle. Annaba [Bône] saw two out of every three houses boarded up, 
and in 1822, the plague visited yet again.136   
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In the decades leading up to the French invasion of Algiers, the Ottoman Regency 
experienced great social, economic, and political upheaval. Dating back to the sixteenth century, 
the Ottoman governance of Algeria organized political, as well as social, structures and 
hierarchies. Apart from the imposition of Ottoman governors – provincial beys and the dey who 
oversaw them from Algiers – and Janissaries to maintain order, Ottoman imperial governance 
placed few burdens on the Algerian people. The taxes were not onerous, and unlike Egypt, 
Algerians were never conscripted through the corvée system of forced labor.137 However, as 
European nations were more easily able to exert power in the Mediterranean, Algerians endured 
greater economic hardship and political instability through the erosion of their revenue streams. 
At the same time that European navies successfully undermined Barbary privateering operations 
that stabilized Algerian politics, the Napoleonic Wars disrupted international trade. Moreover, 
the Bubonic Plague swept across North Africa every few years, decimating the population, even 
as it faced poor harvests and famine. By the time the French invaded in 1827, Algeria had lost 
much of its citizenry to disease and starvation. 
Comparing North America and Algeria on the Eve of Conquest 
Even before colonization began, significant similarities existed between the Wabash 
Valley and Constantine, Algeria. Algerian Governor General Patrice de MacMahon portrayed a 
heavily populated North Africa, particularly Algeria, in contrast to his perception of a lightly 
settled Indigenous North America that Europeans entered. However, accounts of the vast 
expanse of Algeria described it as containing no more than 3 million people in 1830.138 Like the 
Indigenous population of North America, the Algerian population suffered great losses due to 
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disease, especially the cyclical bombardment of epidemics of fatal illness.139 However, unlike 
Algeria, the Native communities in the Wabash Valley were experiencing a resurgence in their 
numbers as they developed immunity to the smallpox virus in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century.140 Indigenous Americans were therefore a formidable force with which the Euro-
American settlers had to contend.  
The fertile easternmost province of Algeria, Constantine, was as demographically diverse 
as the rest of Algeria. It contained one of the largest Berber populations – the Kabyles – who 
lived (and continue to live) in Grand Kabylia in the Aurès Mountains. There, they maintained 
individually owned plots of land as sedentary farmers and arboriculturists. Close to homes, 
women planted enclosed gardens with a variety of fruits and vegetables. Farther away families 
maintained olive groves, fig orchards, and grew wheat, barley and vegetables on the carefully 
terraced, irrigated, and fertilized slopes of the mountains. Households often maintained a few 
animals for their own consumption, which were allowed to graze on the steep rocky slopes that 
were unfit for agriculture. The lifestyle in the mountainous region of Kabylia differed from that 
of Arab settlements on the plains.141 Many of the Arabs in this province held vast open lands on 
the plains and were either sheep or camel herders. Rather than individual ownership, as in 
Kabylia, tribes held the lands communally, while individual families maintained usufruct (usage) 
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rights.142  The areas each tribe held were large enough to allow the rotation of crops and maintain 
the soil’s fertility through this careful husbandry.143  
The Algerian landscape contrasted sharply with that of America’s Northwest Territory. 
The American lands, particularly southern Indiana and Illinois were and are lush, green places 
with huge rolling hills approaching the foothills of the mountains, traversed by deep, fast rivers, 
and gentler streams, most of which were easily navigable, albeit dangerously so during the rainy 
season. In the late seventeenth century, the French, the first European travelers to that territory, 
wrote of traveling, sometimes more than twenty miles in a day on horseback, and not reaching 
the end of the cornfields that women of the Kickapoo, Piankeshaw, Wea, and others had 
planted.144  
Algeria, particularly Constantine, on the other hand was a veritable sea of golden wheat 
and barley in the fertile areas of the plains. Farther south, flocks of sheep and herds of goats take 
over the landscape. The terraced mountainsides of greater Kabylia in the northeastern corner of 
Algeria were surprisingly green - golden green in the late summer - with olive groves, fig 
orchards, vegetables, and shimmering sand-colored cereals waving in the breezes. Much of the 
country was an array of gold, tans, browns, and reds, dotted here and there with verdant green 
orchards, herds of sheep, goats, and camels, interspersed in patchworks of grain fields. With so 
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little annual rainfall, the land required careful cultivation and management to bring forth a yield 
abundant enough to provide a living for the inhabitants.145 
Despite the differences in language, religion, modes of dress and social structures among 
the Indigenous Americans and Algerians, both the Americans and French entered complex and 
diverse social landscapes for which they were unprepared. Neither the Americans nor the French 
had the intellectual schemas, language skills, or useful anthropological knowledge required to 
understand the people with whom they interacted upon their arrival in the Wabash Valley and 
Algeria. Consequently, kinship structures, political institutions and practices, judicial procedures, 
land claims nor land management techniques made sense to the colonizers.  
Nevertheless, both the Wabash Valley and Constantine province were highly desirable 
lands to acquire. Both were important communication and trade hubs that would provide the 
colonizers’ access to the information and commercial networks they desired. These locations 
could also serve as significant strategic military acquisitions and bases from which to launch new 
campaigns. Additionally, both were (and are) fertile regions that could provide food for the 
troops stationed there.  In contrast to settler myths about territories peopled with “roaming 
nomads” who had little or no “rightful” claim to property because they did nothing to improve it, 
local Indigenous inhabitants already practiced extensive agriculture in both Constantine and the 
Wabash Valley.  In spite of all of the evidence to the contrary, these myths would persist in both 
French and American propaganda and literature about these regions.146 While Indigenous 
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communities practiced farming and careful land management in both regions, herding (in 
Algeria) and hunting (in America) provided sources of protein and supplemented agricultural 
yields. Thus, the population that confronted the colonizers in each place was well-fed, well-
connected, and well-informed - a daunting prospect for any would-be settler - militia-man, 
soldier, and farmer alike. 
According to the settler narrative, with much effort and bloodshed, civilization, peace, 
and prosperity replaced violence and want. Boone asserts that he and others bought the land with 
their blood and toil so other Americans may enjoy the fruits of their suffering and perseverance. 
It was a vision familiar to many Americans by 1784 when his account was published alongside 
that of John Filson’s in a promotional tract for Kentucky settlement. A decade before, however, 
early settlers had to make a strong case for the preservation and protection of their exposed 
position on the frontier. Similarly, French leaders in Algeria and merchants in Marseille fought 
for continued French presence in the North African region.147 Both resorted to high-flying prose 
about the fertility, beauty, and quality of the land, the profits to be gained, and the honor that 
would accrue to the mother countries. With hope and not a small amount of desire, soldier-
settlers and speculators set their sights on the American and Algerian promised lands. 
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Chapter 2: Conquest 
 What thanks, what ardent and ceaseless thanks are due to that all-superintending 
Providence which has turned a cruel war into peace, brought order out of confusion, made 
the fierce savages placid, and turned away their hostile weapons from our country! May 
the same Almighty Goodness banish the accursed monster, war, from all lands, with her 
hatred associates, rapine and insatiable ambition. Let peace, descending from her native 
heaven, bid her olives spring amidst the joyful nations; and plenty, in league with 
commerce, scatter blessings from her copious hand. 
This account of my adventures will inform the reader of the most remarkable events 
of this country. — I now live in peace and safety, enjoying the sweets of liberty, and the 
bounties of Providence, with my once fellow-sufferers, in this delightful country, which I 
have seen purchased with a vast expense of blood and treasure, delighting in the prospect 
of its being, in a short time, one of the most opulent and powerful states on the continent of 
North America; which, with the love and gratitude of my country-men, I esteem a sufficient 
reward for all my toil and dangers.1 
 
Two republics. Two military occupations. Two settler colonies. Separated by time and 
space, the conquest and occupations of the American Wabash Valley and French Algeria were, 
nevertheless, grounded in similar motivations and ideologies. International competition with 
Great Britain and domestic political tensions formed ties that bound metropolitan American and 
French interest to the fates of their territories. While the initial invasion of the Wabash Valley 
was sponsored and carried out by the American settlers themselves, the French occupation of 
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Algeria was undertaken for monarchical political gains and legitimacy and carried out by 
professional soldiers. However, each region became a settler colony as a result of contingent 
decisions made by military leaders and the settlers who followed them rather than premeditated 
metropolitan intentions to expropriate land from the Indigenous inhabitants and establish settler 
colonies. The military conquests of the lands around the Wabash River in North America and in 
Algeria reveal the confluence of military, political, commercial, financial, and proprietary 
interests.  
At the time of the American occupation, the United States had just been organized as 
loosely affiliated confederate states joined together to fight for independence from Great Britain. 
If the new government did not succeed in its revolution, its leaders could be hanged, drawn and 
quartered for treason. If American militia commander George Rogers Clark’s mission failed in 
what was then “the west," the backcountry settlers could endure additional Indigenous warriors’ 
raids and be forced to relinquish lands back to the Natives. The British military could execute the 
planned pincer move to cut off the northern from the southern states with the hope of breaking 
the rebellion. Much was at stake.  
King Charles X of France believed his situation no less dire than that of the earlier 
Americans. Aware of increasing social unrest and dissatisfaction with his government, he and his 
cabinet understood the grave and growing threat to his political power. Timing the Algerian 
campaign to coincide with upcoming elections, Charles hoped to bolster domestic political 
support, distract French citizens from their unhappiness, inspire national pride, and prevent the 
British from the rumored acquisition of Algiers, the jewel of the Mediterranean.2  
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Each conquest was predicated on the stated intention to prevent further Indigenous 
aggressions against citizens of the metropolitan states. In the case of North America, the United 
States declared its objective to be the preservation of the backcountry settlers’ lives and 
livelihoods through the cessation of Native American attacks.3 In Algeria, France proclaimed 
itself the savior of European interests in the Mediterranean by breaking the stronghold of the 
Barbary pirates.4 The threats posed by Native Americans and the Barbary pirates supplied 
compelling justifications for military intervention.  
United States: Conquest of the Wabash Valley 
Political ambitions and desperation launched both military campaigns, but it was not that 
simple. The newly formed United States was fighting for its life against Great Britain while at 
the same time settlers advanced into the frontier west and north, inciting Indian opposition and 
occasional reprisals as squatters encroached on Native lands. In 1777, George Rogers Clark, a 
surveyor and militaristic settler leader proposed an invasion of the Wabash River Valley to 
cripple the British forts there, cut ties between the British and their Native allies, and end 
American Indian raids on the backcountry.5 Patrick Henry, the governor of Virginia, along with 
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several prominent political leaders and landholders agreed to fund Clark’s plan and reward him 
and his militiamen with 300 acres each in the territory if they were successful.6 
The Wabash and Ohio Valleys were valuable territories and highly desirable as both 
strategic military sites and locations for American settlements.  In the fall of 1777, Clark wrote to 
Patrick Henry to describe the French town of Kaskaskia, its location in the Wabash Valley, 
inhabitants, defenses, the threat it posed to the American backcountry settlements while under 
British control, as well as its strategic value as a military acquisition. Clark accused the British-
appointed governor of the village, Philippe-François de Rastel de Rocheblave, of inciting the 
“Waubash Indians to invade the frontiers of Kentucky” and “daily [treated] with other Nations, 
giving large presents and offering great rewards for scalps.”7 Because of its location on the 
Kaskaskia River, near the Spanish town Ste. Genevieve [Misère] and close to the Mississippi 
River, it was an important trade and diplomatic hub with Native, Spanish, and French 
communities that Americans hoped to recruit for the revolutionary war effort. Since Kaskaskia 
was situated near the mouth of the Ohio River, Clark observed that the British would  
be able to interrupt any communication that we should want to hold up and down the 
Mississippi without a strong guard; having plenty of swivels they might, and I don’t 
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doubt but would keep armed boats for the purpose of taking our property. On the 
contrary, if it was in our possession it would distress the garrison at Detroit for 
provisions, it would fling the command of the two great rivers into our hands, which 
would enable us to get supplies of goods from the Spaniards, and to carry on a trade with 
the Indians.8 
If the Americans were able to take the town, Clark maintained, they would have access to 
some of the most important trade routes on the continent, made even more so during the British 
blockade and trade embargoes. The extensive river systems of the region would provide access 
to French and Spanish towns for supplies, information, and, potentially, military support. 
Controlling the Wabash River Valley would also place the Americans in a position to prevent 
further raids on the American backcountry settlements. After taking this town and advancing on 
Vincennes and Cahokia, two other strategic military acquisitions, Clark also planned to launch 
an attack on the British stronghold at Detroit.  
Between December 1777 and early 1778, Clark, laid out and lobbied for his military 
objectives in the Wabash Valley. By demonstrating the strategic value of the region - militarily, 
commercially, and financially - Clark won over Virginia's leaders. Together, the Virginians 
hoped to take and hold the British forts west of Detroit to stage a later attack on this British 
bulwark, prevent additional Native raids on American backcountry settlers, and open new lands 
for settlement. In December 1778, Governor Henry reminded Clark how intertwined these 
objectives were with the “honor and interest of the State."9 If Clark was successful, Virginia 
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would greatly expand its own boundaries, wealthy Virginians stood to profit from land sales to 
new settlers, and the state would acquire access to lucrative trade routes along the Mississippi 
and Ohio River systems.  
The connection between the military conquest, prevention of Native American raids on 
the settlements, and opening territory for additional American settlement in the choice fertile 
lands of the Ohio and Wabash Valleys was not coincidental. These three objectives were and are 
common among settler colonizers. Individual aspirations for upward socioeconomic mobility 
through land acquisition, investment and sales, metropolitan concerns about power and 
international relations, and military goals were closely intertwined in the settler colonial 
project.10  Indeed, Virginia’s leading politicians knew Clark’s true designs and stood poised to 
profit handily from the conquest, should Clark succeed. Consequently, they did not hesitate to 
promise 300 acres to each of the militiamen who took part, following their service. By granting 
land contingent on their success rather than payment in specie, the Virginia Assembly provided 
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both an incentive to the men involved in the campaign and relief from the financial pressures 
facing the overburdened new government.  
The intricacies of forest diplomacy and strategy greatly complicated the maneuvering of 
Natives, French, British, and settlers in the campaign to control this region.  Alliances were 
critical to all sides, but increased the leverage of Indigenous inhabitants with both Clark and 
British Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton.  Each knew he could not hold any territory in the 
region without the acquiescence of the local Native communities and the augmentation of French 
militia to their small contingents. Although Clark was already aware of this, Patrick Henry and 
the Virginia Assembly reiterated how crucial it was to win friends among the Wabash Valley 
inhabitants: 
I consider your further Successes as depending upon the goodwill & friendship of the 
Frenchmen & Indians who inhabit your part of the Commonwealth. With their 
concurrence, great Things may be accomplished. But their Animosity will spoil the fair 
prospect which your past Successes have opened. You will therefore spare no pains to 
conciliate the Affections of the French & Indians. Let them see & feel the Advantages of 
being fellow-citizens & free men. Guard most carefully against every Infringement of 
their property, particularly with Respect to Land, as our Enemies have alarmed them as to 
that. … The Honor and Interest of the State are deeply concerned in this & the attachment 
of the French & Indians depends upon a due observance of it.11 
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By December 1778, the Americans were willing to accept French aid and even that of 
their Indian neighbors to expel the British from the newly minted Virginia county of Illinois.12 
While Clark was instructed to treat for peace and welcome offers of assistance, he was to say 
nothing on the subject of land and (for the time being at least) prevent incursions into Native 
territories. Clark, Henry, and the Virginia Assembly recognized that American settlers’ penchant 
for encroaching on Native territory weakened their position in dealing with the Native 
Americans. This had not escaped British commanders’ notice either, and they used this fact as a 
powerful prod to encourage Indian support. The warriors most effective for the British fought to 
deny the Ohio River and Wabash valleys to the land-hungry Americans, and not out of love for a 
British “father."13 
In the contest for this fertile and prosperous region, British colonial officials took 
advantage of American acquisitiveness to ally with local Native communities to “clear all the 
Illinois of these invaders,” and force the Big Knives (Virginians) into retreat. The British also 
hoped to cut off American communication from the French, Spanish, and Native leaders in the 
Wabash Valley. To do so, British commanders needed to employ American Indians as their 
primary military force against the revolting Americans, which required unity among Native 
leaders.  This task proved more difficult than the British imagined.  
Native American leaders used the British military’s need for their assistance to protect 
and preserve their own lands and people, a common theme in settler colonialism. Indigenous 
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civil and military leaders also worked to maintain access to necessary trade goods, including 
guns, powder, and ammunition through alliances with the British, Americans, French, and 
Spanish. Each tribal and community leader approached these objectives differently. So much was 
at stake that important decisions divided chiefs, even those from the same tribe. Some, like the 
Piankeshaw, sought to preserve the peace by selling land to the Americans or providing 
intelligence and assistance to American rebels, as did White Eyes, a Delaware chief. Others 
sought out the war hatchet and allied themselves with the British against all American intruders, 
like the Munsee community from the Delaware tribe. 
While Clark prepared for his march on Kaskaskia, British Governor of Detroit Henry 
Hamilton conducted councils with numerous tribal leaders in Detroit to court their affection and 
ensure continued alliance in the battle for the frontier. In a large conference that began on June 
14, 1778, nearly 1700 Native American men and women from the Ottawa, Chippewa, Huron, 
Potawatomi, Delaware, Shawnee, Miami, Mingo, Mohawk, Wea, Saginaw Chippewa, and 
Seneca gathered to hear what Hamilton had to say and to pledge their support to the British.14 
Hamilton opened the conference promising to “never forget the manner in which you have acted 
… nor the good will with which you took up your Father’s axe, striking as one man his Enemies 
and yours, the Rebels.”15 As was customary in these meetings, Hamilton reminded those 
gathered of their chain of friendship and acknowledged their accomplishments: 
You may remember when you received a large belt of alliance here last year, the number 
of nations who took hold of it, you know the consequences have been good, as you have 
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the British. 
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succeeded in almost all your enterprises, having taken a number of prisoners and a far 
greater number of scalps. You have driven the Rebels to a great distance from your 
hunting ground & far from suffering them to take possession of your lands, you have 
forced them from the Frontiers to the Coast where they have fallen into the hands of the 
King’s Troops, as I had foretold you would be the case, for which good service I thank 
you in the name of the King my master.16 
The council minutes reveal what Hamilton later denied – that he had specifically encouraged and 
sent warriors to attack the settlers on the frontier. More importantly, those warriors brought back 
many more scalps than prisoners. 
Governor Hamilton then held a smaller council with the Wea, Kickapoo, and Mascouten 
of the Wabash Valley on June 29, 1778.  Their leaders were more reluctant to side with the 
British and therefore required greater convincing. Hamilton pulled out his strongest argument, 
which found evidence in numerous grievances that other Native leaders had previously brought 
before the British Indian agents and colonial officials: 
The rebels not contented to act against their sovereign have also acted against the Indian 
nations and want to dispossess them of their Lands, the King always attentive to his 
dutyfull children ordered the axe to be put into the hands of his Indian children in order to 
drive the Rebels from their Land, while his ships of war & armys clear’d them from the 
sea. Children! These strings are to remind you that the King never tried to take any of 
your Lands, but that it was the rebels.17 
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As the 1778 Chickasaw message to the Kickapoo makes clear, many Native leaders 
understood American colonists’ aspiration for greater access to their lands.18 Lacking the desire 
or intent to stay in their colonies, British military commanders could disavow any interest in 
Native lands. Rather, according to Hamilton, the avaricious American colonists were to blame as 
they crossed the Allegheny Mountains and became settlers, encroaching on hunting grounds and 
pressuring Native leaders to cede ever larger territories. 
Many of the Indigenous civil and military leaders gathered at Detroit in June recognized 
that, for them, the American Revolution was a battle for their homelands. For the Seneca, 
Mohawk, and Delaware who had already been forced to move west before the tide of American 
settlement, and the Wea, Kickapoo, Mascouten and others in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys who 
were soon to be on the front lines of this battle, there was only one choice - to ally themselves 
with the British who did not seek to acquire any of their land and provided greater trade 
opportunities than the impoverished Americans.19 A few, however, like the Piankeshaw and 
some among the Delaware, realized that the Americans might win their war, and, for that reason, 
it might be better to placate them by either remaining neutral or offering assistance in their 
efforts.  
                                                
18 “… The words of the Chicasaws addressing all the people of the Ouabach as well as the 
Miamis: My Beloved brothers!  We have long desired to see you but the Virginians have 
occupied us, & we know that they intend to go to you.  We pray you not to receive them but tell 
them to withdraw from your lands, &c. If you would defend yourselves we will help you -- we 
are worthy of pity, we are not in the enjoyment of an inch of ground fur hunting, and if you give 
them your hand you will be also like us obliged to work the land for a living We tell you in the 
name of all the nations our neighbors, You know that for a long time we have worked, that all 
the brown skins should act as a single man to preserve our lands.  We have made peace with all 
the nations; you are the only ones who will be deaf, you see now, however, that we only work for 
a good thing; we hope my brothers that you will listen to us.” (Speeches Brought to Detroit by 
Mr. Beaubien, 27 September 1778, in MPHC, 10: 297-298.) 
19 Richard White, The Middle Ground, 367. 
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While tribal leaders conferred with Hamilton and amongst themselves, the American Big 
Knives began to move. After a hard eight-day journey, traveling by river and over land, Clark 
and his small band surrounded and took the fort at Kaskaskia under cover of darkness on the 
night of July 4, 1778 without firing a shot. The militia secured Governor Rocheblave and sent 
runners through the town, ordering people to stay indoors or near their homes “on pane of 
Death.”20 The inhabitants of Kaskaskia did not require much convincing, having heard 
whisperings of the savagery of the Big Knives, and they immediately complied with the orders.  
Clark decided it would be best to win the affection of the Kaskaskians rather than to 
continue terrorizing them. He had few men and realized that he would need the support of the 
Wabash Valley inhabitants to take Cahokia and Vincennes. Moreover, he needed the backing of 
the French habitants to influence the “numerous Tribes of Indians attached to [them]” to remain 
neutral.21 Consequently, he called the townspeople together, informed them that France had 
signed a treaty of alliance with the Americans and that he had come to grant them their freedom 
from the English. If they were willing to take an oath of fidelity to the United States, they would 
be welcomed into the enjoyment of American democratic governance, which would respect their 
religious practices and property. According to Clark, both his message and his men were warmly 
received. He reported that the French inhabitants of Kaskaskia appeared overjoyed that France 
had sided with the American cause. However, their expressions of joy may have had more to do 
with the fact that the Big Knives had decided not to kill or enslave them, as they had previously 
supposed.22 
                                                
20 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, IHC 8: 118-123. 
21 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, IHC 8: 120. 
22 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, IHC 8: 118-123. 
 115 
After sending Captain Joseph Bowman to Cahokia and Captain Leonard Helm to 
Vincennes with detachments, Clark turned to negotiations with neighboring Native leaders. He 
described them as confused by the warm reception that the French and Spanish offered the Big 
Knives, with whom the Ohio Valley and Southern tribes were at war.23 Describing his approach 
to Indian affairs, Clark wrote,  
[I] always thought we took the wrong method of treating with Indians, and strove as soon 
as possible to make myself acquainted with the French and Spanish mode which must be 
prefferable [sic] to ours, otherwise they could not possibly have such great influence 
among them; when thoroughly acquainted with it exactly Coin[c]ided with my own idea, 
and Resolved to follow that same Rule as near as Circumstances would permit.24 
However, his subsequent actions demonstrated that he did not truly understand French or 
Spanish diplomacy with the Illinois and Wabash Valley Native communities. His unwillingness 
to observe various Nations’ manners and customs and to practice them, as had the French and the 
Spanish in this region, would cost him and the frontier dearly.25 
Since the British had retaken Vincennes in mid-December 1778, Clark launched another 
campaign in February 1779 to carry out his orders to maintain the ground he had won the 
previous year.  He knew he must reclaim the post for the Americans if he was to have any 
influence over the Native leaders in the Wabash Valley and Illinois Country. It was also an 
essential step toward capturing Detroit, which was strategically important for the Revolutionary 
                                                
23 The Wabash tribes did not declare themselves definitively in the British camp until June 1778 
at a council held at Detroit about the same time that Clark ‘conquered’ the Illinois Country. 
However, it was a common misperception among Kentucky settlers that the attacks they suffered 
came from the Illinois and Wabash Indians. 
24 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, IHC 8: 124. 
25 Richard White likened Clark to a war chief and substantiated the claim by pointing to Clark’s 
leadership style, his inability to communicate effectively with village or civil chiefs, and his 
narrow focus on military concerns. He was a blunt hammer even when delicacy was required. 
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effort as well as for the prevention of further raids on the frontiers. Clark wrote in retrospect that 
he expected to “be able to fulfill [his] threats with a Body of Troops sufficient to penetrate into 
any part of their Country: and by Reducing Detroit bring [the Native Americans] to [his] feet.”26  
In his letter to George Mason, Clark explained that his desire to take Detroit did not proceed 
from vainglory but from an eagerness to establish a “Profound Peace on the Fronteers.”27 Clark 
set off on February 4, 1779 with about 200 men to retake Vincennes and avenge the deaths of 
fellow backcountry settlers. 
Across the flooded plains of the Wabash Valley, Clark led his small band of militia 
through freezing chest-high waters. Their only protection was their daily bane. No one would 
suspect an attack in February nor look for them to cross 240 miles of inundated prairies.  
According to all accounts, the march was treacherous and miserable. Encouraged by Clark’s 
doggedness and leadership, the men continued on, and although it rained incessantly they “never 
halted for it.”28 To make matters worse, the boat laden with provisions did not catch up to the 
men as they waded through the icy waters, and there were few places dry enough to stop and 
sleep.  
By February 20, Captain Bowman reported that their “camp [was] very quiet but hungry 
some almost in despair[.] Many of the Creol Volunteers talking of returning.”29 The next day 
they hoped to reach Vincennes by nightfall, so they “plunged into the Water sometimes to the 
Neck for more than one league when [they] stop’d on the second hill … there being no dry land 
near [them] on one side for many leagues … [It rained] all … day [and still there were] no 
                                                
26 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in IHC 8: 148. 
27 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in IHC 8: 150. 
28 Journal of Joseph Bowman, 29 January - 20 March 1779, in IHC 8: 158. 
29 Journal of Joseph Bowman, 158. 
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Provisions.”30 Clark rallied his men the next day and led them charging into the waters again 
with war whoops. Weak with cold and hunger, having survived four days sans sustenance, the 
promise of wreaking vengeance on the “Hair Buyer,” British General Henry Hamilton, urged 
them on.31 The following day, they set off across the flooded four-mile-wide Horseshoe Plain. 
Firing commenced on the fort that night as Clark continued to carefully conceal his true 
numbers and give the impression of a much greater force.  At about nine in the morning on 
February 24, Clark sent a notice to Hamilton threatening him to surrender immediately or incur 
the wrath of Clark’s men, who would treat everyone in the fort as the murderers they were. 
Knowing he could not rely on the French to hold out much longer and after losing more men in 
the heated battle, Hamilton sent a messenger to Clark, proposing a three-day cessation of 
hostilities to negotiate terms of peace.32  
Shortly after a meeting between Clark and Hamilton, Hamilton capitulated and offered 
unconditional surrender to the Americans. There were too few militiamen to guard the prisoners, 
so Clark sent the British volunteers back to Detroit after they took an Oath of Neutrality. 
Hamilton was sent off to a prison in Williamsburg with several of Clark’s men to guard him on 
the journey. It was well they went because the backcountry settlers were so incensed with 
Hamilton for sending Indian raiding parties against them that they frequently threatened his life 
and fired shots at him whenever possible.33 
                                                
30 Bowman’s Journal, 21 February 1779, in IHC 8: 158-9. 
31 Bowman’s Journal, 23 February 1779, in IHC 8: 159. 
32 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in IHC 8: 150; Henry Hamilton, “Report by Lieutenant 
Governor Henry Hamilton on his Proceedings from November, 1776 to June, 1781,” in IHC 8: 
174-207. 
33 Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in IHC 8: 150; Henry Hamilton, “Report by Lieutenant 
Governor Henry Hamilton on his Proceedings from November, 1776 to June, 1781,” in IHC 8: 
174-207. 
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In the aftermath of the battle, Clark turned once again to negotiating (as he described it) 
with Native leaders, but his message to them ended ominously:  
…you may be Assured that no peace for the future will be granted to those that do not lay 
down their Arms immediately. Its as you will[.] I don’t care whether you are for Peace or 
War; as I Glory in War and want Enemies to fight us … this is the last Speech you may 
ever expect from the big knives, the next thing will be the Tomahawk. And You may 
expect in four Moons to see Your Women & Children given to the Dogs to eat, while 
those Nations that have kept their words with me will Flourish and grow like the Willow 
Trees on the River Banks under the care and nourishment of their father the Big Knives34 
Shortly thereafter, Captain Helm, the American commander at Vincennes reported to Clark that 
by April 1779 numerous nations were conspiring to avenge the deaths of their allies and kinsmen 
whom Clark killed in front of the fort gates. 
…there are belts sent to all nations by the Chippewa, Ottawa, Huron, &c. to join them, to 
come down and cut off the village St. Vincent [Vincennes] for revenge of the murdering 
their friends in the street. They declared they would not spare a French man no more than 
American as they looked on them as one. They also sent several belts of black wampum 
to the Wabash and Kickapoo to join them when called on or they would strike them 
first.35 
Thus, Clark’s intention - to demonstrate that the British would not intervene to save their Native 
allies - had the unintended consequence of provoking further attacks, the opposite result of that 
he was instructed to achieve. On the other hand, some of the Wabash Indians, including the 
                                                
34 Clark to Mason, 148-9. 
35 [Captain] Leonard Helm to Clark, Vincennes, April 10, 1779, Missouri Historical Society, 
Clark Papers. Miami 1779 Records, OVGLEA. 
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Kickapoo had decided to support the Americans and determined to meet Captain Helm at 
Vincennes to keep the way between them clear.36 Nevertheless, a month later, Helm wrote to 
Clark again that discipline must be enforced among the Americans who did not distinguish 
between friend and foe when they met Indians, killing them indiscriminately. He warned, “if 
[there] is not a stop put to killing Indian friends we must expect to have all foes."37  
This was a mere foreshadowing of the bloodshed that would follow. Unable to control 
Indian-hating militiamen and backcountry settlers, American commanders watched in frustration 
as they killed Native men, women, and children without distinction. Ironically and tragically, it 
was often those most skilled at, and amenable to, negotiations with the Americans who were 
murdered.38 Frontiersmen declared their own Indian policy, one that neither their commanders 
nor metropolitan officials could alter or restrain. The situation was made worse when leaders, 
like Clark, either gave their consent or even instigated the attacks. By the fall of 1781, Clark’s 
gains had vanished, and American influence among the French and Indians had declined sharply. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 “The Delaware chief has come since your departure with [a] number of belts and many 
speeches, also one Chickasaw with a very large white belt. Likewise, Capt Bull from the 
Chocktaws, Cherokee, Shawnees and Creek nations, which speeches I shall send you shortly as 
there is people going to Illinois soon. The inhabitants of this place is much terrified at the news 
of the Lake Indians. I think highly necessary for Mr. Kennedy to be continued at this post, as he 
is well acquainted with the people and no person better fit to deal with them.” (Helm to Clark, 
Vincennes, 10 April 1779. Missouri Historical Society. Clark Papers, Miami 1779 Records, 
OVGLEA.) 
37 Helm to Clark, Vincennes, IN, 9 May 1779 in IHC 8: 316-317. 
38 White, The Middle Ground, 384. 
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The French Conquest of Algiers 
The seizure of Algiers begins a new era for world civilization. If we are able to exploit it, 
part of Africa in a few years will be blessed with a hard-working population, like 
America, and the Mediterranean will no longer be a mere lake.39 
The conquest of Algiers was undertaken for a myriad of reasons, but the formation of a settler 
colony was not among them.40  The desire to establish the legitimacy of the French government 
under Charles X for both domestic and international audiences provided the impetus for the 
campaign. “The expedition of Algiers was not connected with the colonial policy of the 
Restoration Bourbon monarchy, [but] a makeshift expedient for internal political consumption, 
carried out by a government in difficulty seeking the prestige of a military victory.”41 Like the 
American military campaign, foreign and domestic political and commercial interests prompted 
the French invasion of Algeria. 
In 1827, a fly swatter lit the fire that enflamed French passions and launched a series of 
events that culminated in the assault on Algiers. To understand why, we must first return to 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. To feed his troops, Napoleon bought grain from two 
Jewish merchants in Algeria but never repaid them. Following Napoleon's downfall, the next 
French government under Louis XVIII ignored the previous regime's debts, as did the successive 
regime under Charles X. Hussein Dey, the Ottoman governor of Algiers, finally called in the 
loans of these two Jewish merchants in 1827, but they claimed that they could not meet their 
obligations to the dey until they themselves were repaid by the French. While trying to resolve 
                                                
39 Le Constitutionnel, 11 July 1830, translation by Lahouari Addi in “Colonial Mythologies: 
Algeria in the French Imagination,” Franco Arab Encounters, edited by L. Carl Brown and 
Matthew S. Gordon (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1996), 94. 
40 Wright, France in Modern Times, 192–193; Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 1. 
41 Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present, trans. and ed. Michael Brett 
(Trenton, 1991), 5. 
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the issue, the dey met with French consul Pierre Deval. However, Deval refused to discuss the 
matter, remarking that His Most Christian Majesty would not deign to correspond with the dey. 
Finally losing his temper, Hussein Dey struck Deval with his flywhisk.42  
News of the mutual insults flew around the Mediterranean, causing international 
embarrassment for the French government. The dey repeatedly explained that he had only 
responded to the aggravating individual responsible for continued tensions between France and 
Algiers and that he meant no disrespect to King Charles or the French government in general. In 
retaliation for the perceived slight, France broke off diplomatic communication with Algiers and 
blockaded her port. The dey then ordered several important French trading posts destroyed at 
Bône (Annaba) and La Calle on the Algerian coast.43  
As tensions rose between France and Algeria, so, too, did social unrest within France. 
King Charles X supported both the nobility and clergy and had kept or appointed like-minded 
ministers whose views ran counter to the rising nationalist sentiments of the politically-engaged 
populace.44 At the same time, the prosperity of the early- to mid-1820s quickly vanished as poor 
grain harvests led to rising costs for staple foods, bankruptcies, a banking crisis, and an economic 
                                                
42 Ageron, Modern Algeria, 5–6; Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 40–47; Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 
19–28; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, The Restoration and the July Monarchy, 155–156; Addi, 
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depression.45 This, in part, was also a consequence of the French blockade of Algiers. French 
shipping companies were forced to transport products in convoys that included armed 
merchantmen to protect the goods from Algerian retaliation. Consequently, shipping costs rose to 
extraordinary levels, as did the price of the transported goods.46 
Under pressure from political opposition Charles X appointed a moderate prime minister, 
Jean-Baptiste Sylvère Gay, Vicomte de Martignac, in 1827.47 Two years later, Martignac sent a 
plenipotentiary to Algiers to negotiate a settlement with the dey. After delivering his offer of 
peace, the French plenipotentiary and his staff alighted the waiting ships and began to sail for 
home. Shortly after their departure, Algerian batteries fired parting shots over the bow of the 
French flagship, infuriating the French once again. Irritated by this failure, Charles fired 
Martignac and appointed Prince Jules de Polignac in his place on August 8, 1829.48 
Following the insult at the court of Algiers, War Minister Clermont Tonerre’s first 
proposal for an invasion indicated that it would be politically advantageous to distract the French 
populace from domestic political problems. “It could be useful to Your Majesty to have a pretext 
for organizing an army … to remind France… that military glory survived the Revolution and 
that the legitimate Monarchy not only guarantees the country against foreign invasion, but that it 
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can also carry our standards into distant countries.”49 Tonnerre declared in this initial suggestion 
of war for political purposes that its primary objective would be “the glory that [would] be 
reflected onto the KING [and] the force that such an expedition [would] give to his 
government.”50  
Subsequent Minister of War Count Louis de Bourmont lent his support to Tonnerre’s 
original recommendations, explaining in December 1829 that an “expedition against Algiers 
would capture the national imagination; it would give new vigor to the army, stoke the hopes of 
trade, and reunite all opinions by uniting all interests.”51 As in the American campaign in the 
Wabash Valley, individual ambitions were intricately linked to metropolitan political 
maneuverings, as well as military and commercial interests. Newly appointed Prime Minister 
Polignac agreed that an invasion provided the perfect distraction to take the French electorate’s 
mind off rising socio-political tensions. As de Bourmont made preparations for the campaign, 
Polignac planned the next elections to coincide with the anticipated conquest of Algiers. “It will 
never be said that the King of France bore the insult of a pirate chief with impunity,” War 
Minister de Bourmont declared.52 
Propping up the Restoration Monarchy and avenging the dey’s insult were not the only 
motivating factors. Competition with Great Britain also prompted the French government to 
initiate the campaign. After losing its position of imperial influence in Egypt to Great Britain in 
                                                
49 Service Historique de la Défense, Chateau de Vincennes (SHD) 1H 1, Ministre de la Guerre 
(Clermont-Tonnerre), “Rapport au Roi sur Alger,” 14 October 1827, in Sessions, 27. 
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1801, France had suffered another devastating blow when the British navy handily defeated the 
allied French and Spanish fleets in the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. These two losses and the 
continued expansion of British imperial power around the globe in the early nineteenth century 
concerned a French government highly conscious of its slipping prestige on the international 
stage. Hints of Britain’s intentions on Algiers may have been the final straw for the French king. 
With its influence in Egypt, control over Algiers would have given Great Britain authority over 
much of the North African coast and with it, access to profitable trade routes across the Sahara 
and throughout the Mediterranean. Unwilling to lose further ground economically or politically, 
it was clear that the French really only had one option: conquer Algiers before the British had the 
opportunity. A successful conquest, it was hoped, would generate personal and international 
political capital for Charles X and for France. The conquest also offered a chance to start anew, 
to replace France’s lost American colonies, and reinvent the state as a modern imperial power, 
but this realization unfolded slowly over the course of the first decade of occupation.53  
The decision was made, and preparations began in earnest in early 1830. By May 11, 
1830, French troops had assembled in Toulon and readied for departure but were forced to wait 
for more favorable winds. Two weeks later, the breeze had picked up and 34,184 soldiers, along 
with 3,389 noncombatants and sailors set off for the shores of Algeria on May 25, commanded 
by General Louis-Auguste-Victor, Count de Ghaisnes de Bourmont and Admiral Guy-Victore 
Duperré. On board the fleet of 635 ships, they stowed field artillery, siege artillery, and cavalry 
horses.54 Unable to land on May 31 as planned due to inclement weather, the French were forced 
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to wait until June 14 to disembark in the Bay of Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers. It took five days to 
off-load all of the equipment and horses, and by that time, their camp was the size of a large city. 
Meanwhile, Agha Ibrahim, the dey’s son-in-law, began to gather the Algerian forces to 
mount a defense. Comprised of approximately 7,000 Turks, 19,000 troops provided by the Beys 
of Constantine and Oran, and 17,000 Kabyles the Algerian forces were poorly outfitted with 
vastly inferior artillery, but their soldiers were armed with longer-range rifles than those of the 
French.55 Still trying to pull the disparate battalions together, Ibrahim’s army offered only weak 
resistance. Instead of bombarding the French and forcing them back to their boats, inadequate 
Algerian firepower allowed Bourmont to establish and expand a bridgehead, creating a defensive 
lodgment. By the time the Algerians were sufficiently organized to launch an attack, the invading 
forces were firmly ensconced and prepared for war.56 
In conference with the Agha at Sidi Ferredj, Hadj Ahmed, bey of Constantine, advised 
him to abandon the idea of constructing redoubts around the seacoast to prevent the French from 
disembarking. Ahmed saw that it would be impossible to transport the necessary cannons and 
munitions in time. It was already too late. Instead, he counseled the Algerians to offer some 
resistance as the French unburdened their vessels and draw the troops away from Algiers to 
terrain favorable for the Algerian style of combat. Once the French completed the evacuation of 
the ships, the Algerians awaited them on the plains of Staouéli, trusting that “God always comes 
to the aid of true believers against the infidels who come to attack the city [Algiers] placed under 
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his protection, and this time his aid would not fail [them] either.”57 Hastily, the Algerian forces 
constructed redoubts, fitted them with cannons and waited.58  
After overpowering the Algerian batteries, the French forced the Algerians into a 
disorganized retreat at the Battle of Staouéli on June 19, 1830. Directly disobeying their 
commanding officers, French soldiers summarily shot the 2000 prisoners they had taken before 
continuing their march toward Algiers.  
The Staouéli plateau [was] strewn with corpses. Two thousand prisoners [were] taken. In 
defiance of their officers, the soldiers themselves insist[ed] on shooting them all. 'One 
battalion's fire brought down this rabble and two thousand of them will never see the light 
of day again.'59 
After the rout, Mustapha Boumezrad assumed leadership over the Algerian troops, commanding 
unanimous support from the Janisseries (Ottoman soldiers) and auxiliary forces. His efficacious 
leadership led to daily death tolls of at least 250 French soldiers between June 24 and 28. During 
this time, Bourmont was busily engaged in acquiring and establishing his artillery to advantage.60  
The French advance guard reached the plateau of El-Biar on June 29. They were then 
within striking distance of the Sultan Kalassi (Fort de l’Empereur), the main defensive structure 
that guarded the western approach to Algiers.61 After two days of fierce fighting in which the 
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French Fourth Light Horse division was almost completely destroyed, the main body of French 
troops arrived in front of the fort on June 30. They then faced the monumental tasks of digging 
entrenchments, fighting off continual Algerian assaults on their position, and setting up the huge 
batteries. At last, in the pre-dawn hours of July 4, the final attack on the fort began. The French 
breached the fort’s walls at 10 o'clock in the morning after five hours of intense artillery 
bombardment. The Turks guarding the fort blew up what remained of it and fled, leaving the 
road to Algiers open.62  
[The French] knew that the Dey had placed his last hopes in the ramparts of this fortress, 
which had been so skillfully besieged, the attacks on which were led with so much talent 
that four days of entrenchment and seven hours of our batteries' fire was enough to 
reduce it to such an extreme that the garrison, comprised of the elite of the Turkish 
militia, no longer heard anything but their own despair, blew up their ramparts, with the 
intent to bury [the French soldiers] under their debris.63 
Following the fall of Fort de l’Empereur, the French moved their batteries to its ruins and 
prepared to bombard the Casbah, “the Citadel.” Emissaries traveled back and forth between the 
French commander, General de Bourmont and Hussein Dey while the shelling of the Casbah 
continued. During a pause in bombardment, two Algerian ambassadors left French headquarters 
with the realization that they could not avoid foreign incursion into the capital city through 
negotiation. The only hope of keeping the French out lay in a desperate armed resistance.  By 
afternoon, the first groups of refugees began to flee the city and by evening, all was chaos. 
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Thousands rushed the city gates with their families and the few possessions they could carry, 
clogging the streets to Constantine in the East and Bab el-Oued in the West. Others took boats to 
Cape-Matifou by moonlight.  In a single night, more than half of the city's population evacuated 
before the arrival of the French.64  
The next day, July 5, 1830, drums announced the approach of the victorious French 
military led by their artillery.65 During a meeting with Marshal de Bourmont, Hussein Dey 
agreed to the terms of surrender, which the French almost simultaneously violated: 
The fort of the Casauba [sic], all the other forts belonging to Algiers, and the port 
of that city will be delivered to the French troops at 10:00 this morning French time.  
The General in Chief of the French Army pledges to His Highness the Dey to 
allow him the freedom and possession of all his personal property. 
The Dey will be at liberty to retire with his family and his personal property to 
whatever place he determines; and as long as he remains in Algiers he and his family 
shall remain under the protection of the General in Chief of the French Army. A guard 
will guarantee his security and that of his family 
The General in Chief guarantees to all the soldiers of the militia the same 
advantage and the same protection. 
The exercise of the Muslim religion shall be free. The liberty of the inhabitants of 
all classes, their religion, their property, their business and their industry shall remain 
inviolable. Their women shall be respected. 
The General in Chief makes this engagement on his honor.66 
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The guarantees of the capitulation convention provided none of the promised protections, 
but they were not meaningless. Rather, they provide standards by which to measure French 
actions in Algeria, standards of their own design. On the very day of the capitulation, after 
guaranteeing the dey’s personal property, Jean-Toussaint Merle reported,  
The Casbah was quickly filled with so many troops that they naturally spread throughout 
the entire palace, and one imagines that the first objects that presented themselves to the 
soldiers were [highly] tempting. I saw several objects in their hands. … This 
dissoluteness lasted for several hours, and it was [largely] the fault of the superior officer 
tasked with governing the Casbah[. He] lost his head first and took such poor measures 
that the sentries were not placed and the billet distributed until 6:00 that evening.67 
The city, already in mourning over the military defeat, suffered greatly at the hands of 
triumphant French soldiers.  Bedazzled by Algerian possessions they believed theirs for the 
taking as spoils of war, soldiers “violated person, property, and holy places many times over” on 
the day of the capitulation.68  In the suburbs of Algiers “all the houses that were not occupied by 
the officers were practically demolished; the doors and beams were taken to be used for fires.”69 
Officers joined their out-of-control soldiers in pillaging Algiers. General Loverdo, as just one 
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example, was observed “leaving the city with six mules loaded with stolen goods.”70 In addition 
to the looting, French military engineers were responsible for destroying 425 buildings in Algiers 
in the days following the collapse of the Ottoman government.71  By 1831, the French had 
overtaken 60 percent of the 5000 remaining buildings, and “the wretched owners, the majority of 
whom were expropriated without any compensation, were reduced to begging.”72 Between 1830 
and 1834, Algiers lost two-thirds of its population as people suffered and died or fled the city in 
droves; only 12,000 of the original inhabitants remained in 1834.73 
The immediacy with which the French negated the guarantees of the capitulation terms 
boded ill for both the city and surrounding territories. Although French officers were interested 
in at least a veneer of legality, the convention meant little in practice to French military leaders 
and soldiers. Personal, professional, and political profits were of far greater interest. Of the 500 
million franc treasury the dey was said to possess, only 48.7 million francs made it to the French 
government. The rest, although it was supposed to be protected under the terms of capitulation, 
disappeared.  
The army’s looting and immediate violation of the convention signaled the fact that it 
considered itself exempt from the law, the very law its force had inaugurated. This 
amounted to a portentous announcement that the new regime did not plan to rule based 
upon affirmation and consent, law and legitimacy, institutions thought to be typical of the 
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modern state. Instead, it prepared a specific set of institutions for colonial rule inspired by 
the most unsophisticated forms of power.74  
Following the conquest of Algiers, a tourist guidebook author later wrote, “Losing America, we 
have regained Africa, to which Algeria is the gateway.”75 The French military agreed and sought 
to hold the territory they had fought for, even while metropolitan administrators held 
negotiations with the Ottoman Sultan to exchange Algiers for an extension of their concessions 
along the North African coast from Cape Bougaroun to the border of the Tunisian Regency.76  
General de Bourmont proceeded to expel the Ottoman rulers from Algiers and the 
neighboring territories, stating that he could not “allow [the Algerians] to fall back under the rule 
of the Turks.”77 He then followed metropolitan orders to attack Bône but for his own reasons. 
Parliament was interested in Bône because it had historically controlled trade through its port 
under an earlier Ottoman Capitulation agreement, and it sought to keep the Marseillais merchants 
content by protecting their Mediterranean interests. A successful Bône campaign, they believed, 
might also cause Ahmed, bey of Constantine, to submit to French authority. Metropolitan 
officials did not intend the military to go beyond securing this city, but Bourmont continued after 
an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Bône, to march on Blida, Bougie, and Oran in an effort to 
“forc[e] the hand of his government in Paris.”78 The July Revolution of 1830 blocked his efforts. 
When Louis Philippe replaced Charles X, he removed Bourmont from his position, whose 
                                                
74 Brower, 16. 
75 Addi, “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” 94–95. 
76 Ageron, 6. 
77 de Bourmont, “Proclamation,” in Ageron, 7, trans. Michael Brett. 
78 Ageron, 7. 
 132 
successor, General Bertrand Clauzel, firmly supported the idea of continued conquest, but to 
extend French, rather than Algerian, rule in the North African territory.79 
Conquests: Real and Imagined 
Armed with the Republican ideals of freedom, law, and order, the Americans and French 
marched into the Wabash Valley and Algiers, proclaiming the territories' independence from 
British and Ottoman tyranny, respectively. Despite such rhetoric, however, military officials in 
each territory resorted to the use of brutal force to assert their authority and to “pacify” desirable 
lands. Even General de Bourmont, who sought to instantiate an Algerian leadership following 
French conquest, set in motion events that led to the massacre of an entire city (Blida) and 
ignored his officers’ confiscation of Algerian homes, property, and lands. Subsequent French 
generals employed even harsher techniques to bring Algeria to heel, and those who refused to do 
so were quickly removed from office. As French officers and soldiers profited from the spoils of 
war, American militia leaders through their own efforts or those of the state were rewarded for 
their incursion into the Wabash Valley with valuable property. 
George Rogers Clark was sent into the Illinois Country equipped with weapons, 
munitions, and promises of freedom for the French and Indigenous inhabitants of the region. 
Admonished to “spare no pains to conciliate the affections of the French and Indians,” Clark 
struggled to follow orders.80 Governor Patrick Henry sent him the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
as well as the Treaty of Alliance with France to induce the French inhabitants to join the 
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Americans, as had their sovereign, in the fight against Great Britain and inform the French 
residents of the freedoms to which they were entitled as citizens of Virginia:  
These will serve to shew [sic] our new friends the ground upon which they are to stand, 
and the support to be expect[ed] from their countrymen of France. … Equal liberty and 
happiness are the objects, to a participation of which we invite them.  Upon a fair 
presumption that the people about Detroit have similar inclinations with those at Illinois 
and Wabash, I think it possible that they may be brought to expell [sic] their British 
masters and become fellow citizens of a free state.81 
To John Todd, who was commissioned as the civil commandant of Illinois Country, 
Governor Henry requested that he point out the advantages of American liberties offered to the 
Illinois inhabitants. “The difference between the State of free Citizens of this Commonwealth 
and that Slavery to which Illinois was destined” must be made plain to them. They were also to 
be informed that they could soon expect “free and equal representation … together with all the 
improvements in Jurisprudence and police which the other parts of the State enjoy.”82 
Henry emphasized that Clark and Todd should “conciliate the affections of [both] the 
French and Indians. Let them see and feel the advantages of being fellow citizens and freemen.”83 
This statement deserves some attention, for it reveals that some Americans could conceive the 
French and Indians as equals and, potentially, even fellow citizens of the Americans. Henry’s 
proclamation also highlights the American belief (or rhetoric, at least) that the French and 
Indians were not already free people, but rather “slaves” under the British king’s oppressive 
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hand. Contrary to American assumptions, Native leaders in the region contested the idea that 
they were at the beck and call of the British. In fact, Delaware representatives to Congress 
reminded the Americans that they were a “free and Independent people (which the Delaware 
Nation have ever declared themselves to be).”84 The French demonstrated their own 
independence through their decisions to choose or switch sides in the larger revolution, as well as 
in the smaller battles for the Wabash Valley. 
It is significant that Governor Henry’s missive also limned the consequences of refusing 
the United States’ generous offer. “It is thought the Indian nations may be overawed and inclined 
to peace with us by the adoption of proper measures with you. Or if that cannot be effected that 
such of them as send out parties toward our frontiers on this side of Ohio may be chastised by 
detachments from your quarter.”85 The conflicting messages of this letter demonstrate the 
complexity of thoughts and emotions that Henry (and many others) held regarding Native 
Americans and their capacity to become “fellow citizens.” He does not write that Clark needs to 
‘overawe’ the French but rather conciliate them, but he does use this language in reference to 
Clark’s attitude and mission vis-à-vis the Indians. If Clark could intimidate them with a brilliant 
display of American military power, Indigenous leaders, it was thought, would be more inclined 
to treat for peace. If this attempt failed to produce the desired outcome, however, Clark was free 
to ‘chastise’ Indian war parties that came south of the Ohio River.  
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Similarly, in Algeria, the French claimed to be interceding for and occupying Algiers to 
liberate the Algerians from the tyrannical rule of the Ottoman Empire. General de Bourmont 
even drafted proclamations “to the Koulouglis, the Arabs, and the inhabitants of Algiers,” 
informing them that the French army’s mission was “to drive out the Turks, your tyrants” and 
would return governance to Algerian hands instead of handing the city back over to the 
Ottomans, as the French government under Prime Minister Polignac fully intended.86  In the 
early years of conquest, Tocqueville described Ottoman rule in similar terms and reproved the 
Arabs who cooperated with the Ottoman rulers and allowed them to subjugate their countrymen:  
The Turkish domination was established more easily over the Arabs [than the Kabyles], 
who … live on the open plains. This is how they did it: 5,000 to 6,000 Turks confined to 
Algiers could not alone have subjugated these mobile tribes, who flee at the approach of 
the hand that would seize them. But tyrannies never would have been established if the 
oppressors had not found their instruments among the oppressed.87  
He continued, “this supposed Turkish government was not truly speaking a government 
but a continuation of conquest, a violent expatiation of the conquered by the conquerors.”88 He 
clearly wanted to create a contrast between the onerous nature of Ottoman rule with enlightened 
and civilized French government. It is telling that in subsequent letters he would find it difficult 
to make this case.  
French propaganda also drew parallels between their invasion of Algeria and the 
Crusades to reclaim Jerusalem from the Muslim occupants.89 To bolster support for Charles X 
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and his royalist, pro-Cleric government, propagandists described the French army as the defender 
of the Christian monarchy sent to vanquish the injustice, tyranny and oppression of the Muslim 
Ottoman regime. France portrayed itself as striking a blow for all of Europe to avenge the 
enslavement of “Christian” (read: European) sailors and travelers and the supposed wrongs 
committed against the Algerians. French officials denounced “the [Ottoman] enslavement of 
their subjects, the tributes that the [Ottoman] dey demands from them, and the piracy that 
eliminates all security from the Mediterranean coast and constantly threatens ships that navigate 
that sea.”90 Just before the planned invasion, the French royalist press complained in March 1830 
that “it is a religious duty [for the Muslim dey] to violate the sworn faith of [Christian] infidels,” 
therefore, “it must also be the divine mission of France’s Most Christian King to protect the 
Christian faithful.”91 Even a decade after the collapse of His Most Christian Majesty’s 
government in 1830, Tocqueville referenced this popular analogy during his 1841 tour through 
the colony, writing, “We have just spent the evening with the bishop, who told us himself about 
the circumstances of the prisoner exchange. It was a scene out of the Crusades.”92 Subtract the 
armor and broad swords, and the negotiations between the Bishop, as a representative of the 
Christian French Empire and the heir of the Holy Roman Empire, and Abd-al-Qadir’s lieutenant, 
the leader of the Muslim resistance fighters, could have taken place eight hundred years before in 
the Holy Land. However, in this rewriting of history, the Muslims were not the “invaders”; 
rather, the French had invaded and conquered significant regions of the Dar al-Islam (Muslim 
territory), as recompense for the loss of the Holy Lands to the Muslim forces during the 
Crusades.  
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It is significant that Tocqueville still employed this language more than a decade after the 
fall of King Charles’ government in 1830. The rhetoric held a deeper meaning than the first 
publicists realized. It connected to a vision and aim older than Charles’s support for the Church 
and the contrast his publicists tried to create between his just and Christian rule and that of the 
barbaric, oppressive Muslim Ottoman Empire. The imagery of the Crusades conjured up not only 
an ancient loss, which France claimed to avenge, it also positioned France, figuratively, as the 
heir of the Holy Roman Empire. This imagery, language, and mythology was repeatedly recycled 
throughout the nineteenth century as France sought to regain her prominent position in the 
international political hierarchy, redefine herself after the loss of her first colonial empire, and 
justify the colonization of the Maghreb. The Romans ruled North Africa before the arrival of the 
Arabs, so, as the heirs of the Roman Empire, the French attempted to discursively show that they 
had a greater claim to legitimacy than did the Arabs or the Turks. The Americans also employed 
similar discursive sleights of hand in rationalizing their domination over Indigenous peoples and 
lands.  
Upon arriving in Algeria, the French disembarked with documents in French and Arabic 
declaring their purpose to be the liberation of Algerians from Ottoman rule. The terms of 
capitulation with Hussein Dey repeated these assertions: “The exercise of the Muslim religion 
shall be free. The liberty of the inhabitants of all classes, their religion, their property, their 
business and their industry shall remain inviolable. Their women shall be respected.”93 However, 
the French made less effort than the Americans to extend the freedoms they claimed to offer. 
They did not bring along any constitutional documents, the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
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(1789), or any other governing texts with which to inform and assure the Algerians of their 
rights. On the other hand, some prominent statesmen and thinkers, such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville, believed that the Algerians could and should one day become citizens of France. “It 
is easy to predict,” Tocqueville optimistically wrote in 1837, “a time in the near future when the 
two races will be intermixed in this way throughout much of the regency. But it is not at all 
enough for the French to place themselves next to the Arabs if they do not manage to establish 
durable ties with them and finally to form a single people from the two races.”94 In Tocqueville’s 
words, we see a familiar echo of Thomas Jefferson’s famous statement of hope that the 
Americans and Indigenous peoples would form one people of common blood.95  
However, like the Americans’, the French offer of citizenship would only be extended to 
those who met the qualifications – whether it be an oath of fidelity, as it was for the French in 
American Illinois Country or meeting French definitions of cultural and linguistic assimilation in 
their own colonies.  On the one hand, a number of the American politicians may have truly 
believed it possible and fully intended to make good on their promises to extend citizenship to 
cooperative Native Americans. On the other hand, the militia men tasked with carrying out the 
military conquest from the British, the establishment of American systems of government, and 
the extension of citizenship to those who took the oath were uninterested in offering it to the 
Indians they blamed for raids on their families. Revenge, security, and protection motivated these 
men far more than larger national and international objectives. In the Algerian case, French 
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justifications for the conquest in terms of extending liberty to the Algerians fell flat. Not only 
were soldiers motivated by revenge for their comrades’ deaths on the field of battle, for the insult 
to the French crown, and by personal glory and profit, but French administrators also had little 
intention of considering Algerian Muslims as their equals. Actual citizenship would not be 
offered to Algerians and Native Americans until the twentieth century. The idea that Indigenous 
people could become assimilated citizens of the métropole was held by only a few statesmen and 
only for a brief moment. Many quickly realized that it would be counter-productive to their 
colonial aims to follow through on the offer.  
Between conquest and the extension of citizenship, there was a significant disconnect 
between the aforementioned rhetoric of freedom and the reality of actions undertaken on the 
ground. Rather than ruling by law, as the colonizers claimed, they used violence and brute force 
as tools of governance. This decision, undertaken by the military leaders charged with both civil 
and military responsibilities, undermined their attempts to work with and through Indigenous 
notables. Colonizers’ initial brutality toward Indigenous inhabitants prompted further resistance 
by creating an atmosphere of fear and distrust, which made their task infinitely more difficult in 
the long run.  
Just after receiving the Virginia Declaration of Rights from Governor Patrick Henry, 
along with an admonition to conciliate both French and Indigenous inhabitants of the region, 
Clark ruthlessly attacked a group of warriors returning from the frontier with scalps. Believing 
them to be responsible for murders and raids on the American backcountry settlements, in the 
midst of his offensive against Fort Vincennes in February 1779, Clark ordered their execution 
before the fort gate for all to witness. British Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton recounted the 
details with horror, noting that it served “to contrast the behavior of His Majesty’s Subjects with 
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that of the Rebels, so often celebrated for humanity, generosity, and indeed everything virtuous, 
elevated, and noble.”96 After the Americans had killed two of the Indians and captured the rest, 
they brought them to the street in front of the fort gate where 
One of them was tomahawk’d immediately. The rest sitting on the ground in a ring bound 
— seeing by the fate of their comrade what they had to expect, the next on his left sung 
his death song, and was in turn tomahawk’d, the rest underwent the same fate, one only 
was saved at the intercession of a Rebel Officer, who pleaded for him telling Coll Clarke 
that the Savages’ father had formerly spared his life. 
The Chief of this party after having had the hatchet stuck in his head, took it out himself 
and deliver’d it to the inhuman monster who struck him first, who repeated his stroke a 
second and a third time, after which the miserable spectacle was dragged by the rope 
about his neck to the River, thrown in, and suffer’d to spend still a few moments of life in 
fruitless strugglings — Two serjeants who had been Volunteers with the Indians escaped 
death by the intercession of a father and a Sister who were on the spot. Mr. Francis 
Maisonville … was set in a Chair, and by Coll Clarke’s order a Man came with a scalping 
knife, who hesitating to proceed to this excess of barbarity on a defenseless wretch, 
Colonel Clarke with imprecations told him to proceed, and when a piece of the scalp had 
been raised, the man stopp’d his hand, he was again order’d to proceed, and as the 
executor of Coll Clarke’s will, was in the act of raising the Skin, a brother of Mr. 
Maisonville, who had joined the Rebels, step’d up and prevailed on Coll Clarke to desist. 
… Colonel Clarke yet reeking with the blood of these unhappy Victims came to the 
Esplanade before the Fort Gate, where I had agreed to meet him and treat of the surrender 
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of the Garrison — He spoke with rapture of his late achievement while he washed the 
blood from his hands stained in this inhuman sacrifice.97   
Clark would not have balked at Hamilton’s depiction; it was precisely the image he wanted to 
portray. The Big Knives were fearsome warriors who sought to instill terror in their enemy’s 
hearts through their barbarity. However, as Hamilton observed, Clark’s actions made it more 
difficult for the Americans to claim the moral high ground when they treated their enemies in the 
same manner they had decried when used against them.  
By 1781, Clark’s convoluted diplomacy and ruthlessness cost the Americans almost all of 
their French and Indigenous support in the region.98 He proved that no course of action was out 
of bounds and used threats, intimidation, and psychological abuse to achieve his desired ends. 
These tactics were not only employed against American Indians, but also against the French 
villagers in Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes. While he may have hated Indians, as some 
historians have argued, Clark remained willing to ally himself with them because he recognized 
his precarious position in the Wabash Valley surrounded by French and Native villages (which 
were not mutually exclusive). The only time he treated Euro-American men and women 
differently from Native inhabitants was in the case of the warriors’ execution in front of Fort 
Vincennes. He spared the lives of the Euro-Americans, but it should be noted that he only did so 
after one of his militiamen recognized his own son among the Indians and pled for his life. Clark 
was a brutal man, hardened by his experiences as an American colonist-turned-settler 
frontiersman. 
The French military, although filled with seasoned warriors, did not have the excuse that 
the Algerians presented an immediate threat to their loved ones. Rather, the grievances were 
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further removed from the soldiers’ daily existence. Nevertheless, when the French military 
moved beyond Algiers under the direction of General de Bourmont’s replacement, General 
Bertrand Clauzel, they mercilessly attacked the city of Blida in November 1830, leaving few 
survivors. The Blideans put up a strong resistance, killing twenty-one French soldiers.  In 
response, General Clauzel ordered the massacre and despoilation of the town’s inhabitants. 
Under these orders, the soldiers 
killed randomly in the hours following their arrival in this town. Pell-mell executions of 
people assembled as prisoners followed, which included firing squads and the sabering 
and bayoneting of those who survived. This improvised slaughter dragged on for more 
than six hours. … French soldiers initiated this slaughter, [a French] reporter wrote, and 
Blida’s entire population ‘were all treated like the enemy,’ contrary to the codes of 
military conduct. When troops departed, they left the town deserted. The reporter 
concluded: ‘This unfortunate town can be considered no longer to exist.’ Those who 
survived the murderous violence, ‘the debris of the population,’ returned to Algiers under 
the army’s protection.99 
The disproportionate French reaction to the reasonable response of the threatened 
villagers against a military force is common among colonizing powers. There was a perceived 
need to demonstrate the invading force's power, to intimidate and awe the Indigenous population. 
The massacre at Blida was, in part, to demonstrate the French army’s power to itself, but it also 
served a more pragmatic purpose.100 It cleared a town of its residents and prepared it for 
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incoming settlers who would no longer have to concern themselves with the original owners. 
During the brief moment in which the French government attempted to compensate Algerians for 
the loss of their lands and homes, the Blideans would not be around to make any claims on the 
properties then inhabited by Europeans. It was a convenient, albeit horrifying, solution to the 
problem of pesky Indigenous land claims. 
Furthermore, the violence of conquest did not end with the first sack of Algiers but was 
perpetuated by the continued French presence.  French soldiers proved unruly and difficult to 
control, especially in the wake of victory, and their officers were little better behaved and 
sometimes worse. The destruction of homes, property, and shops reduced once self-sustaining 
people to poverty, destitution, begging, and prostitution.  Algerians who chose to flee were left 
homeless if they chose to return because either their unoccupied home was destroyed or it was 
commandeered by the military.  Proving ownership ex post facto was often difficult.101 “The 
physical violence and usurpation of property with which the era began continued for many years 
[and gradually gave] way to institutionalized forms of violence and usurpation.”102  
In 1833, the French Parliament sent a commission of inquiry to Algeria to write a report 
on the conditions in French occupied territories and offer recommendations based on their 
findings. In a remarkable passage, the report summarized and condemned the callousness with 
which the French governed themselves in relation to the conquered Algerians: 
We have sent to their deaths on simple suspicion and without trial people whose guilt was 
always doubtful and then despoiled their heirs. We massacred people carrying [our] safe 
conducts, slaughtered on suspicion entire populations subsequently found to be innocent; 
we have put on trial men considered saints by the country, men revered because they had 
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enough courage to expose themselves to our fury so that they could intervene on behalf 
of their unfortunate compatriots; judges were found to condemn them and civilized men 
to execute them. We have thrown into prison chiefs of tribes for offering hospitality to 
our deserters; we have rewarded treason in the name of negotiation, and termed 
diplomatic action odious acts of entrapment. … In contempt of a solemn capitulation and 
the most fundamental and natural of the rights of people. In a word, we have outdone in 
barbarity the barbarians we have come to civilize and complain about our lack of success 
with them.103 
At the same time, colonial apologists rationalized the violence by claiming that the Algerians 
killed each other in tribal clashes, covering over the reality that French soldiers wielded the 
weapons responsible for the deaths. Or, they justified  “l’oeuvre française on the grounds that it 
was liberating the natives from the hold of an obscurantist worldview and offering them the 
advantages of a superior civilization.”104 As in America, the Indigenous communities who bore 
the brunt of the “civilizing” assaults impugned such specious claims. 
To augment and legitimize colonial authority, negotiations with Indigenous inhabitants 
were indispensable in both regions. Both the Americans and the French were numerically 
inferior to the Indigenous inhabitants, necessitating strategic alliances or peace treaties. The need 
to work with the Indigenous population in Algeria was not immediately clear to metropolitan 
leaders, but it was to the American leadership in the Wabash Valley.  Clark recognized his 
vulnerability and the necessity of assuring Indian neutrality, and Governor Henry made clear that 
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both Clark and Todd were to avoid threatening Indian lands and to conciliate them, if at all 
possible.  Conversely, the French military under General de Bourmont, intent on capitalizing on 
his victory, expelled Ottoman administrators after the conquest of Algiers, and discussions 
ensued about replacing resistant Algerian officials with more tractable leaders.  
General De Bourmont’s replacement in Algeria, General Clauzel took his predecessor’s 
plans a step further. While Bourmont thought it best to return Algiers to the Algerians and 
establish local elite rule, Clauzel believed that France could govern its possessions in Algeria 
through the installation of Muslim notables as French agents and began negotiating with 
Indigenous leaders in Tunisia on the advice of French Consul to Tunis De Lesseps.105 Clauzel’s 
maneuverings however, risked war with Morocco to the west, and he was quickly recalled to 
France. Further hesitation and indecision on the part of the French leadership muddied relations 
with Algerian notables who received conflicting messages throughout the first decade of the 
French occupation. 
Vastly outnumbered by the French and Indigenous populations in the American territory 
of Illinois, Clark recognized that cultivating their support or at least neutrality was vital to his 
mission.106 “My situation and weakness convinced me that more depended on my own 
Behaviour and Conduct… Situated among French, Spanyards [sic] and Numerous Bands of 
Savages on every Quarter.”107  Immediately following his capture of Kaskaskia, Clark treated 
with several Native leaders through Captain Helm, who served as his ambassador to determine 
whether or not they were inclined to support the Americans or at least remain neutral in the war. 
Clark reported that the tribes nearest the village of Kaskaskia - the Kaskaskia, Peoria, and 
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Michigamea - promptly treated for peace. He then sent letters with Captain Helm to the chiefs of 
the Kickapoo and Piankashaw who were at Vincennes, asking them “to lay down their 
Tomahawk, and if they did not chuse it[,] to behave like Men and fight for the English as they 
had done; but they would see their great father[,] as they called him[,] given to the Dogs to 
eat.”108 Clark’s language in these messages was repeated to other tribes from the Ohio and 
Wabash Valleys, as well as the Great Lakes region. The harshness of these speeches, he 
explained, was due to the “want of Men” and “knowing that it was a mistaken notion in many 
that soft speeches was best for Indians.”109 George Morgan, one of the first and most successful 
American Indian agents, disagreed and resigned his post in May 1779 because he found the 
American policy, which increasingly aligned with Clark’s, to be distasteful and ineffectual.110 
Despite Clark’s poor communication and awkward negotiation tactics, five tribes: the 
Winnebago, Sac, Fox, Potawatomi, and some Miami, “who had received the hatchet from the 
English emissaries… submitted to [American] arms all their English presents, and bound 
themselves by treaties and promises to be peaceable in the future” by early September 1778.111  
Governor Henry was able to report to Congress by November that the Great Blackbird, a 
Chippewa chief had also sent a peace belt to Clark. The Americans interpreted this as a sign of 
the Chippewa’s “dread of Detroit’s being reduced by American arms.”112 Captain Helm, 
stationed at Vincennes, reported that “the Wabash and Upper Indians, consisting of the 
Piankeshaws, Tawas, Peorias, Delawares, …[Mascouten], and some of the Shawanese chiefs, 
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had also given up all their tokens of attachment to our enemies, and pledged their fidelity to the 
United States.”113 Such reports are rather misleading though. British correspondence reveals that 
while some minor chiefs may have sought peace with the Americans, they did not speak for 
entire tribes. Through treaty negotiations, Americans attempted to establish the legitimacy of 
those willing to meet with them, but Indigenous clans refused to recognize treaties signed by 
men other than the leaders they themselves authorized. Throughout the two decades of American 
occupation examined in this study, American Indian agents continually attempted to designate 
alternative Indigenous leaders, as did the French in Algeria, but Native communities remained 
resistant to their efforts and divided in their loyalties.114 
The French were more intentional in their efforts to install new and more malleable 
Algerian leaders. Shortly after conquest, French Consul to Tunis De Lesseps suggested placing 
Tunisian princes as beys in the provinces of Oran and Constantine. Before receiving metropolitan 
approval, General Clauzel, on his own authority, signed two treaties with the Tunisian dey. The 
first granted the Tunisians full sovereignty and the beylik of Constantine on their western border. 
The second secured a Tunisian bey for the province of Oran, which had fallen into anarchy as the 
Moroccan sultan and Algerian tribes vied for ascendancy in the vacuum created by the 
abdication of the Ottoman bey.115 There were two versions of these treaties. The French version, 
communicated to Paris but unknown to the Tunisian signatories placed the Tunisian beys under 
French authority, while the Arabic versions contained no such caveats.116  
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Similarly, there were two versions of the treaty between General Desmichels and Abd al-
Qadir, Algerian marabout, military and civil leader in the West. The secret version of the treaty, 
this time, was written in Arabic and ceded to Abd al-Qadir a commercial monopoly over the port 
of Arzew, recognized his sovereignty in the West, and promised him aid and arms.117 In direct 
contradiction, the French version of this treaty conveyed to Paris that Desmichels had achieved 
the submission of the province of Oran and a free-trade agreement. Thus, the French military 
commanders were willing to deceive their North African counterparts by placing them, 
unbeknownst to them, under French authority. More worrisome for the French government, 
military leaders also demonstrated their willingness to defy or dismiss the metropolitan 
administration’s authority and deceive Parisian government officials about the deals negotiated 
with North African notables in order to achieve the military’s aims - pacification and the removal 
of all Ottoman officials and remnants of Ottoman authority. 
French meddling in the politics of Algerians was not limited to conspiring with the 
Tunisians or crafting secret treaties. They also interfered in the customary structures of 
leadership as their influence stretched into Constantine and beyond to confront Abd al-Qadir’s 
resistance - a story that will be told in greater detail in the next chapter. For now, it is important 
to observe that some French thinkers recognized the potential of governing through Algerian 
notables, and a version of this idea was later implemented. In 1837, Tocquevile advised 
In Algeria as elsewhere, the great task of a new government is not to create what does not 
exist at all, but to use what does exist. …The Arabs name their own leaders; we must 
preserve this privilege. They have a military and religious aristocracy; we must by no 
means seek to destroy this, but rather to get hold of it and take part of it into our pay, as 
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the Turks did. It is not only useful to draw upon the Arabs’ political customs, but 
necessary to modify the rules of their civil law only gradually.118 
Rather than following Tocqueville’s sage advice and work through the tribes and 
leadership structures that already existed in Algeria, France sought to create new ones. 
Beginning in 1840 General Bugeaud and other French administrators attempted to create an 
artificial Algerian aristocracy through which France could exert its will. Instead of “the strong, 
unified and respected aristocracy envisaged by the French, the experiment produced a weak and 
disparate body of leaders whose legitimate, that is, inherited, authority was often vastly 
disproportionate to the powers thrust upon them by the French.”119 Once established, however, 
the French found it difficult to dismantle this royaume arabe. It took decades to unravel the 
ineffective power structures because the Algerians had co-opted them to suit their own political 
purposes.   
While there were advantages to working with rather than against the invaders, there was a 
fine line to walk. For as much power as they may have accrued through their relations with the 
colonizers and willingness to bend to their wishes, Indigenous leaders also risked enraging their 
countrymen who, if circumstances permitted, might rise against them in retaliation for their 
cooperation with the foreign aggressors. Resistance to their presence provoked attacks, but 
cooperation did not necessarily preserve the safety and security of accommodationist leaders 
from colonial settlers, militias, or even the military forces with whom they had allied themselves. 
As both Tocqueville and numerous American observers noted, those who worked most closely 
with the colonizers were often the ones who suffered the most at their hands.  
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The motivations, intentions, and objectives of Indigenous leaders were far more complex 
and often contradicted European and American assumptions. A few, like the Delaware and 
Shawnee at Coshocton, resolutely supported the American cause, regardless of their treatment, 
but this would not last. Shortly after the Delaware delivered their message to Congress, John 
Todd, the American civil governor of Illinois County, warned Clark of an impending war with 
them. However, British Indian agent, Captain Alexander McKee, clarified that the Delaware 
were “frightened by the encroachment of the [American] Rebels,” whom they knew to be 
avowed Indian haters. By 1779 and 1780, it had become dangerous for even friendly Indians to 
deliver messages to American forts and settlements warning of British attacks. On just such an 
errand, long-time American friend and ally, American settlers murdered Delaware chief White 
Eyes. When news of his death reached the Coshocton Indians, they renewed their vow of 
neutrality in spite of widespread fear.120 
By 1781, the idea that the only avenue to peace was to eradicate the Other took root 
among Native and settler communities alike.121 In a speech to British Commandant of Detroit 
Major De Peyster, a Miami war chief asked for British assistance in a campaign against the 
American stronghold at Vincennes. Necessity, he acknowledged, compelled him to make this 
request. He argued that if they  
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let [the American fort at Vincennes] exist, it is the help of our enemies and the cause of all 
the troubles among the nations. … We ask you all to join us in this undertaking, it is of 
interest to us all… This is the best time to insure great peace. My father, we extend the 
hand and pray thee to let us know thy sentiments on this subject…This is the true time to 
make all peaceable.122   
Shortly thereafter, De Peyster wrote to Brigadier General Powell that by all accounts, 
Clark was planning an expedition into Indian Country and wished it were in his power to assist 
in their defense. Prisoners from the backcountry informed him that if Clark’s incursions failed, 
“the settlers upon Kentucke will leave that country altogether.”123 Already, British Indian agent, 
Alexander McKee informed him that the Kentucky settlers were “night and day employed in 
removing their Families and Effects to a large Settlement called Bryant’s Station.”124 General 
Haldimand, too, expressed his desire to send troops with the Miami and other British-allied 
Indians to “extirpate that reprobate settlement for while it exists it will be a continual source of 
alarm to the Indians and a receptacle for our Enemies from the Missi[iss]ippi & other 
countries.”125  
The Americans had long expressed such sentiments and since 1779 had raided nearly a 
dozen Indian villages with the express purpose of driving them from their lands - both to remove 
the threat of further attacks and to acquire the territory for future settlements. Simon Girty, 
British Indian agent and interpreter, reported to Major De Peyster that on April 20, 1781, 
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American Colonel Daniel Brodhead and 500 militia had burned Coshocton, a town of peaceful 
Delaware, and killed fifteen men. He took the women and children prisoners, along with four 
men, all of whom he later released. Deflecting blame, Brodhead stated that he could not control 
the enmity of the militiamen and was not at fault for the deaths of the fifteen men. However, he 
went on to proclaim that within seven months, “he would Beat all the Indians out of this 
Country.”126 Even the American commander at Fort Pitt was puzzled by Brodhead’s choice to 
attack the friendly Indians at Coshocton who, he reported, had “always given the most 
convincing proofs of their attachment to the Cause of America, by always giving us Intelligence 
of every party that came against the frontiers; and on the late expedition, they furnished Col. 
Brodhead and his party with a large quantity of provisions when they were starving.”127 Sadly, 
this was only a precursor of the atrocity to come a year later. Those who seemed to suffer the 
most from frontiersmen’s Indian hatred were the very people who willingly offered them the 
most assistance.  
In a prescient letter, British General Frederick Haldimand wrote to Major De Peyster that 
the settlers alone were the enemy on the frontier because Virginia could not spare troops to 
support them.128 Observing that they were taking advantage of lulls between Indian raids to 
“establish themselves in good settlements,” Haldimand pointed out that the Native warriors were 
capable of preventing this and should at all costs. “The Body of Indians assembled at 
[Sandusky], if Vigilant & Enterprising have it in their power to Repel all attempts that can be 
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made,” but after the settlers “have tasted the sweets of their situation,” they will be difficult to 
remove.129 Native leaders were not deluded or imprudent. They saw through all American 
protestations of innocence to their true motives. In a message from the Shawnee, Mingo, and 
Delaware to British Indian agent McKee, the chiefs proclaimed, 
We mean to defend ourselves to the last man, before we give up our Lands & we will 
spare none, if they begin with us; we likewise desire you to inform all the Indians about 
Detroit our situation immediately, let them be strong and consider for the best, as the 
Americans we see are determined to take the Country from them & us, we beg of you 
(Father) at any rate to tell the Hurons, Ottaways, Chippaways & Six Nations as soon as 
possible & bid them be strong, there is wampum gone thro' all the Indians to the same 
purpose.130 
Frontier leader, George Rogers Clark for all of his bluster and rashness was no fool either. In 
early October 1781, he wrote that “all the Illinois and the Indians to a man, except the Kaskaskia 
will set on us with inveteracy. Two-thirds of those formerly in our interest, have already taken up 
the hatchet this fall… But necessity will oblige the whole of them to take up the hatchet in a 
short time to clothe themselves.”131 
Just as relations broke down between Americans and Indigenous communities in the 
western territories over land disputes, negotiations also fell apart in Algeria for the same reason.  
During his 1841 tour through Algeria, Tocqueville recorded a conversation with the French 
commander at Djijelli, who described the difficulty he faced in negotiating peace with three 
nearby Kabyle communities.  The tribes were certain that the French intended to expropriate 
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their land. This was not an unreasonable assumption, given the French military’s decade-long 
track record in the territory. Nevertheless, the Djijelli commander had nothing of the sort in 
mind. Rather, he merely intended to reduce conflict between the French and neighboring 
Kabyles. He went on to explain that  
you can make a temporary treaty but not a true alliance with [the Kabyles], and that they 
always take care not to get tied too closely to us. The Beni-Caids are about to go to war 
with their neighbors. I had us propose to help them. They were careful not to accept. 
They would have been forever compromised with their compatriots, and no momentary 
interests are worth this drawback to them.132  
It was just as well that the Kabyles kept their distance, as Tocqueville noted repeatedly, “all our 
alliances have led to the destruction or the reduction of those who trusted us.”133 
Conquest was an essential first step in establishing settler colonies. Even though these 
two métropoles did not initially intend to create them in the two regions they occupied, they, 
nevertheless, began their military campaigns with similar motivations and were guided by 
common ideologies.  That does not mean that the same catalysts prompted the foundation of all 
settler colonies, but the parallels between the American and French projects examined in this 
study are striking.  Individual ambitions for socio-economic mobility, metropolitan concerns 
about domestic and foreign political power, and military goals were interrelated catalysts for 
both offensives.  The ideological similarities between the United States and France can be traced 
to their shared Enlightenment heritage, democratic impulses (though not fully realized in 1830s 
France), their common competition with Great Britain, as well as familiar definitions of 
civilization and power.  
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Both military operations and occupations were grounded in similar ideologies and shared 
aspirations. Not coincidentally, both the Americans and French were compelled to make choices 
based on their adversarial relationship with Great Britain, either due to war or international 
imperial competition. Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth 
centuries had become and continued to be the farthest-reaching and most powerful empire with 
its dominant army, navy, and merchant marine. While the United States was in the midst of 
fighting a revolution against Great Britain at the time of their incursion into the Wabash Valley, 
France continued to decline in international prestige through its loss of Egypt and the Battle of 
Trafalgar to the British navy. Both the Wabash Valley for the Americans and Algeria for the 
French proved to be strategic military assets in their rivalry with the British.  
Internal politics motivated metropolitan leaders in each location as well. Both 
governments saw the military campaigns as a way to establish or prop up the legitimacy of the 
current administration. American Revolutionary leaders’ lives depended on the successful 
outcome of the war, and it was advantageous to support their constituents’ defense from British-
allied Indian raids believed to have originated in the Wabash Valley. In France, Charles X was 
losing support while social unrest grew over the flagging economy and frustration with 
unresponsive Royalist policies. A successful conquest of Algiers, the den of the Barbary pirates, 
would demonstrate the justness of Charles’ rule and unite the populace behind the military 
endeavor. Individual profit motives and access to important commercial centers and trade routes 
cannot be ignored as stimulants for military conquest either. However, a baser motive also 
underlay many of the others: revenge. For the American militia, comprised of backcountry 
settlers, it was personal. Indian raids had touched each of their lives. Family members and 
friends were killed, maimed, or captured. Well-aimed tomahawks and musket shots shattered 
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dreams. Blaming the British for inciting these attacks, the militia responded with a vengeance. 
Those who joined George Rogers Clark on the campaign fought to chastise the British, conquer 
their forts, and safeguard their homes and families by preventing further Indian raids. The French 
soldiers were compelled to fight in Algeria to avenge the insult their country and king’s honor 
had sustained. They also sought to prevent the Barbary pirates from attacking European ships, 
enslaving European sailors, and seizing valuable merchandise if not paid off in bribes.  
It is not difficult to understand, then, why each métropole cited liberation as its primary 
mission. Conveniently, this claim created a legally justifiable defense for the conquest. Who the 
invaders claimed to be freeing is surprising, however. While the American militia fought to 
defend their homes and families, Virginia officials also claimed that their objective was to 
liberate the French and Indian inhabitants from the tyranny of the British. Similarly, just as the 
French army fought to prevent further pillaging of European ships, they declared that they had 
also come to free the Algerians from the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Empire.  Both American 
and French military leaders offered assurances to the inhabitants of each territory that their 
religion, property (and women) would be respected. Unfortunately, the proclamations were just 
that – empty words – that were almost simultaneously contradicted by the invading force. 
Violence and brute force, rather than enlightened governance, were the conquerors’ tools of 
choice.  
There was a brief moment at the outset of occupation, in which American and French 
philosophers believed that the Euro-American and Indigenous populations could eventually 
become one people. Citizenship was held out to the Native inhabitants as a real possibility if they 
cooperated with the colonizing forces. This moment did not last long, though. Before many 
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actions could be taken on these enlightened, albeit paternalistic, ideas, colonial officials realized 
it would be detrimental to their long-term goals for the territories.  
Military leaders did not want to lose control over what they had fought for and sought to 
extend the conquest while maintaining territory already in their possession. Due to the distance 
between the occupied lands and the métropoles, the decisions of these men greatly influenced 
metropolitan policies and the trajectory of each region. The next chapter examines the extension 
of conquest, the ways in which the invaders transformed occupied territory into settler colonies 
and their arguments for doing so. 
It is important to remember that settler colonization was not limited to a single form of 
metropolitan government. Both representative democracies, like the United States, and 
monarchies, like France in 1830, established these types of colonies. The initial invasion could 
be small – carried out with just a few hundred militiamen, as in the American case, or it could a 
large-scale military assault undertaken by thousands of professional soldiers. These campaigns 
were launched for a variety of reasons, but in these two case studies, domestic and international 
politics weighed heavily in the decision. The two case studies under investigation here also 
demonstrate that administrators on the ground in the colonies were integral to their formation, 
but so, too, were Indigenous leaders who resisted, accommodated, remained neutral, or played 
competing powers off one another. So often, studies paint choices and actions as dichotomous, 
but this chapter begins to expose the myriad options available to the actors involved.  
By distinguishing between the motivations for conquest and the formation of settler 
colonies, it becomes clear that armed invasion was a necessary first step, but it was not 
sufficient, by itself, to form settler colonies. While neither conquest was truly complete, the 
French had legitimately defeated the Algerians, and the dey signed a formal capitulation. 
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Whereas, the American invasion of the Wabash Valley that began in 1778 succeeded in claiming 
British forts, the militias had not yet beaten Wabash warriors on the field of battle. Still, the 
Americans claimed victory and attempted to exert power over Native communities if they were 
conquered peoples. The imagined American conquest had real consequences for both settlers and 
the Indigenous peoples in the trans-Appalachian west, just as the actual French defeat of 
Algerian forces did in the North African Regency. 
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Chapter 3: Colonization 
Daniel Boone was a man. Yes a big man.  We march, overwhelming all, opening a route 
With an eye like an eagle and as tall as a 
mountain was he. 
 On the highest of these walls, we plant our 
flags. 
Daniel Boone was a man. Yes a big man.  With rage the Arab opposes us in vain. 
He was brave, he was fearless and as tough 
as a mighty oak tree. 
 At each step some new obstacle 
Everywhere their efforts oppose our 
From the coonskin cap on the top of ol’ Dan 
to the heel of his rawhide shoe 
 Courage 
The more difficult [the obstacles] are, the 
The rippin'est roarin'est fightin'est man the 
frontier ever knew. 
 more beautiful is success. 
…Oh! My country, oh beautiful France, 
Daniel Boone was a man. Yes a big man.  Receive the prize of our success, 
And he fought for America,   Constantine is in your power, 
to make all Americans free.  Your laws there reign henceforth. 
What a Boone. What a doer.   If whatever rival troubles 
What a dream come'a truer was he.1  Contested your glorious self-evident rights, 
  Remind your children 
  [Of] the blood [that] sealed this conquest.2 
 
Songs of conquest celebrated settler soldiers’ continued invasions of North America and 
Algeria. Just as Daniel Boone laid claim to the lands on which American settler blood had 
spilled, so the French soldier in the second song claimed the justness of France’s subjugation and 
occupation of Constantine, for which he and his comrades had fought, bled and died. The 
narratives and myths of the conquests were foundational to the later development of an 
identifiable settler identity that was distinct from the Indigenous peoples and from the 
metropoles. Settlers maintained that shedding their blood on and for the colonial soil bound them 
to it, and justified their appropriation and settlement. 
Disregarding metropolitan directives, American colonizers pushed into new western 
territories and immediately began the simultaneous processes of dispossession, land surveys, and 
                                                
1 Ken (Matson) Darby, “Daniel Boone,” TV Series Theme Song, https://youtu.be/8hwqdQ0SkjQ 
(Accessed 27 March 2015). The TV Series starred Fess Parker as Daniel Boone and ran from 
September 1964 to September 1970 on NBC. 
2 A. Bregi, “Ma Campagne à Constantine, Pot-Pourri Militaire” (Song, Paris, 1837), 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris. 
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settlement between 1780 and 1787. French colonizers followed suit in Algeria between 1830 and 
1837.3 In both locations, number of powerful competing Native groups resided, and throughout 
the first two decades of colonization, both Constantine and the American Northwest Territory 
became important sites of Indigenous resistance, accommodation, and persistence. While the 
colonizers sought to capitalize on divisions among Native groups to achieve their objectives. 
This chapter explores the continuation of armed conflict after the initial encounters in both 
regions, interrogates international rivalries and competing claims over the lands, and examines 
the role of both militant settlers and Indigenous leaders in shaping this stage of settler colonial 
development.  
The process of transforming the American colonies into states equal in status and rights 
with the original thirteen and incorporating Algeria into the French state were complicated, 
contested, and fraught processes. This transition was not merely the result of top-down policies. 
Frequently, legislation was slow to catch up to events that had already transpired. Settlers, 
militiamen, soldiers, and Native resistance leaders in the contested territories compelled the 
métropoles to craft policies to govern and protect their newly acquired colonies.4  
In North America, violent exchanges continued as increasing numbers of Americans 
moved into the backcountry. Their presences put greater pressure on already tense relations 
between the colonists and their Indigenous neighbors. At the same time, the appearance of 
                                                
3 I use the term “colonizers” here to denote those who were to continuing to advance the colonial 
project. Some were settler-soldiers but not all, so I use the broader term “colonizer” as opposed 
to “settlers.” 
4 This approach and perspective is in direct contrast to that of Barbara Alice Mann in her 2008 
work, George Washington’s War on Native America, in which she takes a top-down view of the 
American-Indigenous relations and settlement processes in the Old Northwest Territory. She 
argues that Washington lost the Revolutionary War in the western territories because he did not 
conquer the Indigenous population there but rather compelled many communities to ally 
themselves with the British against the Americans. 
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surveyors portended the American belief that Native lands were, or would soon become, the 
property of the United States. Coercive treaty negotiations with unauthorized representatives of 
Wabash and Ohio Valley Indigenous communities further strained relations between American 
settlers, authorities, and Native communities in and near the contested territories.5 Even as 
American militias led campaigns against Native villages and settlers flooded into disputed 
territories, Indigenous leaders fought legal, diplomatic, and military battles to protect their 
homelands and families. Some maintained ties with Great Britain to acquire arms and 
ammunition; others forged trade connections with the Spanish in St. Louis and New Orleans to 
the same ends.6 Each of the stakeholders in the contest for the trans-Appalachian west strove to 
protect their interests against competing claims, even at the cost of their lives. 
Likewise, control over Algerian lands was bitterly contested. While the French military 
sought to extend its reach into the hinterland outside previously occupied cities, Algerian 
resistance fighters took advantage of British national interest in North Africa to acquire military 
supplies for their campaigns. In the eastern province of Constantine, Hadj Ahmed Bey 
maintained ties to his sovereign, Ottoman Sultan Mahmoud II in an effort to bolster his defenses 
against French incursions. All the while, French generals disregarded the official policy of 
restricted occupation and extended France’s claims beyond the initial conquest of Algiers and its 
surrounding territory. Furious over Hadj Ahmed Bey’s staunch refusal to acquiesce to their 
demands, a small French force under General Bertrand Clauzel suffered a demoralizing defeat at 
the gates of Constantine in 1836. Following the 1837 Treaty of Tafna with Abd al Qadir, the 
                                                
5 Communities involved in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784): Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee 
(Iroquois), which included the Seneca, Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida, and Tuscarora. 
The Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785) included the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa and Ottawa. 
The Treaty of Fort Finney (1786) included the Shawnee. 
6 Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America, 224; DuVal, 
The Native Ground, 154. 
 162 
resistance leader in the west, the French Minister of War finally acceded to General Charles-
Marie Denys de Damrémont’s request to attack Constantine again and avenge the previous 
year’s loss.  With this decision, the metropole finally moved to support its military’s aggressive 
campaigns of acquisition. Bellicose settlers and military leaders in both the Wabash Valley and 
Algeria compelled metropolitan administrators to both recognize the process of colonization 
already underway and develop reactive policies to legitimize prior actions.  
America: The Battle for Legitimacy and Sovereignty 
Even as they fought to ensure that nation’s continued existence, backcountry settlers and 
leading statesmen determined that the lands on which Americans were settling should be brought 
into the new nation. The trans-Appalachian settlers presented a 1776 petition to the Virginia 
Assembly. The settlers begged for assistance against avaricious land speculators trying to claim 
the territory for North Carolina and against the constant Indian threat. They recounted recent 
settlement history, stating that “many of [the] petitioners became adventurers in this part of the 
Colony in the year 1774,” the same year as Lord Dunmore’s War, “in order to provide a 
subsistence for themselves and their posterity.” ⁠7 Shawnee and Mingo attacks on the countryside 
convinced a number to abandon their settlements until the following year, “after the country had 
been discovered and explored,” when “many more became adventurers.”8 1776 saw even greater 
numbers of “adventurers,” and more “cabin improvements were made [that year] than in any 
[prior] year.”9  
                                                
7 “Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky, 15 June 1776,” in George Rogers Clark Papers, 
IHC 8: 11-12. 
8 Ibid, 11-12. Map: “Indian Tribes, 1790,” The Norton Anthology of American Literature, Nina 
Baym, ed., 8th edition, online. 
http://wwnorton.com/college/english/naal8/section/volA/maps/american7_4.jpg (Accessed 27 
March 2015). 
9 Draper MSS 4C485 in Footnote 1, IHC 8: xxi.  
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The Kentucky settler petitioners argued that settlement would benefit Virginia because it 
would provide a buffer against Native American attacks: “And as at this time of general danger, 
we cannot take too much precaution to prevent the inroads of the savages, & prevent the effusion 
of innocent blood…”10 Their argument ignored the fact that the attacks were the direct result of 
their settlement. Not only would Virginia be safer, but would profit from continued settlement 
and access to navigable rivers and extant trade networks. 
 If these arguments were not enough to convince Virginia’s leadership to defend the 
settlements, the petitioners also demonstrated their commitment to the recently proclaimed 
American ideal of representative rule and popular sovereignty as the basis for political 
legitimacy.11 At a time when Virginia’s most prominent leaders were locked in a deadly struggle 
with England over these very principles, this was a powerful argument. They had already elected 
a governing council and two men to represent them at the Convention, for, they observed 
“without law or authority, vice here could take its full scope, having no laws to restrain, or power 
to control.”12 This fact had already been amply demonstrated by the rash actions of the militant 
settlers in the events leading up to the Battle of Point Pleasant in 1774, but the petitioners 
maintained that they had institutionalized law and order by 1776. Their argument followed that 
as responsible citizens who were even willing to raise and fund their quota of men to support the 
revolutionary cause, they deserved sponsorship, support, and protection from Virginia. As the 
                                                
10 “Petition from the Inhabitants of KY,” 15. 
11 The first settlers in the Trans-Appalachian West established assemblies for self-government, 
drafted and posted petitions to ensure agreement before electing representatives to carry them to 
first the Virginia House of Burgesses and later to Continental Congress. In their petitions they 
took pains to demonstrate their commitment to democratic forms of government, law, and order. 
James Rood Robertson, ed., Petitions of the Early Inhabitants of Kentucky to the General 
Assembly of Virginia, 1769-1792 (John P. Morton (incorporated) printers to the Filson club, 
1910) See especially, "Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky," June 15, 1776 in IHC 8: 11-
16. 
12 “Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky,” 15 Jun 1776. 
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previous chapter demonstrated, Virginia’s governor heeded the settlers’ call for aid and provided 
funds and arms to the settlers to defend themselves under the leadership of George Rogers Clark 
and secretly urged him to carry the fight to the British and Native warriors in the Wabash Valley. 
In the Philadelphia meeting room of the Continental Congress on October 10, 1780, the 
American government finally agreed with the frontiersmen. On that date, Congress declared its 
intention to make the western territories, even the unappropriated [Native] lands, available to all 
Americans once the states ceded their claims, thereby acknowledging the federal government’s  
Figure 5: Map of Political Boundaries of North America After 1783 Treaty of Paris13 
 
dependence on state compliance to achieve their aims. Once the states granted the federal 
government jurisdiction over the western territories, the Continental Congress resolved to bring 
those territories into the union as republican states with “the same rights of sovereignty, freedom 
                                                
13 “Map of Political Boundaries of North America After 1783 Treaty of Paris,” Library of 
Congress, Global Gateway. http://international.loc.gov/intldl/fiahtml/map6.html (Accessed 31 
March 2015). 
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and independence, as the other states.”14 However, the authors made no mention of the Native 
sovereigns of the lands to which they laid claim. 
Similarly, the Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution in 1783, proclaimed 
peace between Great Britain and the United States, but it made no mention of the Native 
Americans who served on both sides of the war. In the treaty, Great Britain recognized American 
independence and sovereignty east of the Mississippi River, south of the Great Lakes, and north 
of the Spanish Floridas, despite the fact that Indigenous peoples were the true sovereigns of most 
of the newly acquired territory.15 As soon as rumors of the treaty reached the Northern and 
Wabash Valley tribes, leaders met with British commanders to determine the gossip’s veracity 
and express their outrage if it was true. After centuries of dealings with the Euro-Americans, 
Native ambassadors were well versed in the language of rights and law and used it to bolster 
their legal claims to their own lands. Great Britain could not cede what it did not possess. 
Indigenous headmen declared that they were “a free People subject to no power upon earth-- 
That they were the faithful Allies of the King of England, but not his subjects, that he had no 
right whatever to grant away to the States of America, their rights or properties without a 
manifest breach of all Justice and Equity, and they would not submit to it.”16 It was true that 
Native leaders had permitted Frenchmen to settle amongst them to trade and allowed the British 
to use the forts built on Native grounds for the same purpose after the British victory over the 
French in 1763. However, the Native peoples of the Great Lakes and Wabash Valley had never 
                                                
14 10 October 1780, Journals of the Continental Congress (JCC), 18: 915 
15 Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America, 223–225; 
Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 93; Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 272–
280. 
16 Brig. Gen. Allan Maclean to Gen. Frederick Haldimand, Niagara, 18 May 1783, in MPHC, 20: 
119. “Your Excellency will look upon this as very strong Language, but it is nevertheless true, 
and exactly as Translated to me by the Principal Indian Interpreter, it therefore becomes my duty 
to report it to Your Excellency for Your Information.” (Ibid) 
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granted “one inch of Land, but what these Forts stood upon,” nor ceded their sovereignty to any 
foreign power.17 Great Britain’s pretension to give away Indigenous lands to the United States 
was the greatest betrayal of their trust.18 Even after the Revolution, Great Britain still remained 
an active partisan in the affairs of the Great Lakes region and sought to “undermine the [land] 
cession that the treaty explicitly promised” to the American government.”19 
American fears, especially of British influence in the west, were well founded, but the 
British were not the only threat Americans faced. In successfully pressing the British to retain 
their forts in the Great Lakes region and support Indigenous leaders in their efforts to maintain 
the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) boundary line, the Native peoples of the Northwest Territory 
demonstrated that they were not “mere pawns in an imperial game.”20 Rather, they governed the 
relations and events in this region. Their ability to re-assert the boundary line from the 1768 
treaty and the fact that the British backed this stance highlights Native agency and independence 
of thought, as well as British dependence on their Indigenous allies. Through continued trade and 
military support in the Great Lakes region, the British assuaged their guilt over ignoring their 
Native allies in the American peace treaty.21   
After the war’s conclusion in 1783, peace depended primarily on the actions of the 
backcountry settlers. The British reported that although anxious and aggrieved over continued 
hostilities through 1782, their Native allies “sat on their mats” and waited peacefully with a 
forbearance that surprised British officials. Many militant American settlers, on the other hand, 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 General Haldimand to Hon. Thomas Townshend, Quebec, 23 October 1782, in MPHC, 10: 
662-4. 
19 White, The Middle Ground, 410. 
20 Taylor, The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American 
Revolution, 115.  
21 White, The Middle Ground, 408–410. 
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indiscriminately blamed all Native peoples for the depredations committed against their 
settlements and sought revenge.22 It would be the Americans who first broke the uneasy truce.23   
Once the peace treaty between the United States and Great Britain was signed in 1783, 
thousands of Americans and immigrants to the new country flocked to the western borderlands. 
The surge was so strong that the military could not contain it settlers pushed into unappropriated 
Native territories. 24 Speeches made at the Sandusky council held between the British and Native 
leaders in September 1783 confirmed military commanders’ observations about the volume and 
destinations of westward migrating American settlers. At the council, Deyonquat, or the Half 
King, of the Delaware rose to speak to the British commanders on behalf of the Indigenous 
confederation: 
Father! Listen! As also our Brethren the Six Nations, you have told us there is Peace. You 
know the Rights of our Indians in this Country, and you also know that the Tomahawk is 
now laid down. Brethren the Six Nations you know where the Boundary Line was fixed, 
since you were the people who fixed it. We now inform you that the Virginians are 
already encroaching upon our Lands, and we desire you and our Father to be strong, and 
desire them to desist from encroaching upon us, otherwise they will destroy the good 
                                                
22 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 272–281; General Haldimand to Hon. 
Thomas Townshend, Quebec, 23 October 1782, in MPHC 10: 662-4; De Peyster to Brig. Gen. 
Maclean, 21 November 1782, in MPHC 11: 321-323; De Peyster to Haldimand, 3 May 1783, in 
MPHC 11: 362-363. 
23 De Peyster to McKee, Detroit, 6 May 1783, in A. S. De Peyster, Miscellanies, Appendix, XL. 
Miami Records 1781-4, OVGLEA. 
24 Arthur Lee, Commissioner to treat with Western Indians in 1784, “Journal,” Neville B. Craig, 
ed., The Olden Time; a Monthly Publication Devoted to the Preservation of Documents and 
Other Authentic Information in Relation to the Early Explorations and the Settlement and 
Improvement of the Country around the Head of the Ohio (Cincinnati: R. Clarke & Co, 1876), 
334–344; Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country; White, The Middle Ground, 
417; Griffin, American Leviathan, 183–211; Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 224–225. 
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work of Peace which we are endeavoring to promote.25 
After years of warfare and unofficial raids and counter-raids, the assembled Native leaders 
agreed that they were grateful for the peace Americans offered, but not for their terms. A 1783 
Congressional investigatory committee relayed the same message to American statesmen – that 
although the recently hostile tribes were ready for peace, they were not yet inclined to turn over 
the lands the Americans so desperately coveted.26 While the committee observed that “motives 
of policy as well as clemency ought to incline Congress to listen to the prayers of hostile Indians 
for peace,” they suggested instead that “lines of property should be ascertained and established 
between the United States and them.”27  
The commissioners offered several justifications for appropriating Native lands. They 
reminded Congress that they had promised portions of the uncultivated lands “as a bounty to 
their army and in reward of their courage and fidelity.”28 In addition, the rising domestic 
population and increasing emigration necessitated the “speedy provision for extending the 
settlement of the territories of the United States.” What was more, the United States government 
was broke, or in the words of the committee, “the public finances do not admit of any 
considerable expenditure to extinguish the Indian claims upon such lands.”29 This statement also 
reveals that at least some American statesmen recognized Native property rights and the need to 
“extinguish” them before the United States could truly claim ownership. Nevertheless, the 
deplorable state of American finances required that a way be found to generate revenue as 
                                                
25 Deyonquat speech, “Transactions with Indians at Sandusky,” 26 August – 8 September 1783, 
in MPHC 20: 182. 
26 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 281–282; Francis Paul Prucha, The 
Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1987), 7–8. 
27 JCC, 25: 681. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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quickly as possible. The public creditors, the committee recalled for Congress, “have been led to 
believe and have a right to expect that those territories will be speedily improved into a fund 
towards the security and payment of the national debt.”30 
The Committee on American-Indian affairs concluded that even if “an Indian war should 
be rekindled, repeated victories might produce the retreat of the Indians, but could not prevent 
them from regaining possession of some part of the distant and extensive territories, which 
appertain to the United States.”31 Americans recognized that their military was not strong 
enough, nor (implicitly) did they have enough settlers in the region to prevent the Indians from 
reclaiming their lands, even if the United States could push them off in the first place.  There was 
no guarantee of success. This was all conjecture. Even if the United States succeeded in winning 
“repeated victories,” a feat they had not hitherto accomplished, they could not hold the territory 
they won. Nevertheless, Americans referred to these territories as “appertaining to the United 
States,” not to the Indigenous peoples who inhabited them. 
In 1783, resorting to warfare against the Native population in the northern and western 
territories would be costly. Even if the Native population could be “totally expelled,” the 
American military commanders, along with Secretary of War Henry Knox, feared pushing them 
into the arms of the British in Canada. Augmenting British Canadians’ strength with Indians, 
they would “become formidable in case of any future rupture, and in peace, by keeping alive the 
resentment of the Indians for the loss of their country, would secure to its own subjects the entire 
benefit of the fur trade.”32 Once again, American military commanders in the western territories 
refused to recognize that the Indians were grieved over American actions and reported that it was 
                                                
30 JCC, 25: 682-3. 
31 JCC, 25: 681-2. 
32 JCC, 25: 682. 
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solely the fault of the British for stirring up Indian resentment and pushing them to violence.33 
Native communities needed no British reminders of American land appropriations and 
depredations. However, this obstinate perception perpetuated the common myth that the British 
were behind all Indigenous raids, the confederacy, and warfare, ignoring the fundamental agency 
of Native civil and military leaders, as well as the significant role Indigenous women played in 
the decision-making process.34 
The committee and American Congress further deluded themselves into believing that the 
Indigenous peoples could not possibly have “any reasonable objections against the establishment 
recommended,” since they were “aggressors in the war, without even a pretence [sic] of 
provocation.”35 Once again, the American commissioners chose to ignore what the Native 
leaders reiterated: their young men raided the frontiers because American settlers repeatedly 
encroached on Indigenous lands. Furthermore, as the borderland tensions grew and finally burst 
in the 1782 American massacre of the peaceful Gnadenhutten and Salem Indians, Indigenous 
communities had more than just cause for outrage and reprisal.36 Ignoring the settlers’ attacks on 
their Indigenous neighbors, the commissioners only recounted their exaggerated grievances 
                                                
33 John Doughty to Knox. Fort McIntosh, 21 October 1785, in C.W. Butterfield (Ed), Journal of 
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against the Indians: “in return for proffered protection, and liberal supplies [from the British], 
and to the utter ruin and impoverishment of thousands of families, they wantonly desolated our 
villages and settlements, and destroyed our citizens.”37  Even if they chose to waive the right of 
conquest, the commissioners maintained that “a bare recollection of facts is sufficient to manifest 
the obligation [the Indians] are under to make atonement for the enormities which they have 
perpetrated, and a reasonable compensation for the expences [sic] which the United States have 
incurred by their wanton barbarity; and they possess no other means to do this act of justice than 
by a compliance with the proposed boundaries.”38  
While modern scholars have indicted American leadership for ignoring the atrocities 
committed on both sides of the frontier conflict, contemporaries decried the one-sided coverage 
as well. Congressmen and reporters recounted the injustices done to American families, but they 
ignored the desolation American militias wrought on Native communities, crops, and families. 
An American journalist denounced his fellow countrymen for presenting one side of the story, 
narrating only the horrific violence that Native warriors committed on the backcountry 
settlements without explaining the militant settlers’ provocations that led to the raids. 
Responding to an account published in the Massachusetts Spy, the editorial author railed, 
[The writer of the letter published in the Spy] ought to have told us, that Col. Lewis and 
his companions met their fate when attempting to prosecute a scheme in disobedience to 
the order of Congress and their treaty with the Indians, -- He ought to have told us, that 
just before the close of the late War, a number of the Western people, under the mask of 
friendship, went to a neutral Indian village, near the forks of the Muskingum and there in 
cold blood butchered more than one hundred of these people.-- He ought to have told us, 
                                                
37 JCC, 25: 683. 
38 Ibid. 
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that all the murders committed by the Indians in that quarter since the peace, were on the 
wretches concerned in the Muskingum wickedness; or on those who by their crimes have 
provoked a just resentment.39 
Even in 1786, not all Americans were comfortable with bellicosity of backcountry settlers and 
astutely observed that settlers’ raids as much as those of the Indigenous warriors continued the 
cycle of violence and that one could not be blamed without looking at the culpability of the other 
as well. 
Despite this uproar, Congress acted on the myth that the western territories ceded by 
Great Britain became American lands by right of conquest. Beginning in 1784, the United States 
sent commissioners to treat with Western nations, as well as the Six Nations and Southern tribes 
to acquire land they believed to be theirs and make it official by treaty.40 While claiming lands 
by right of conquest was common practice among both European and Native American nations 
in the eighteenth century, Indigenous leaders contested American claims on the grounds that the 
Americans had not defeated their Native warriors on the field of battle.41 Nevertheless, on 
                                                
39 "Respecting the Indians, &c. in the Western Territory," Thomas's Massachusetts Spy; or: The 
Worcester Gazette, 16 February 1786, Delaware Records 1786-1787, OVGLEA. 
40 British Brigadier General Allan Maclean tried to reassure his Indigenous allies that “the States 
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408, 417. “The American republic that claimed to have conquered most of the pays d’en haut 
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October 22, 1784, Arthur Lee, a Commissioner Plenipotentiary for the United States, signed a 
new Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the Six Nations, granting peace to the Six Nations, as 
conquered foes in the late war. In exchange for peace, the Six Nations agreed to return prisoners 
captured during the war and cede a large portion of their territory to the United States, 
completing the boundaries of present-day Pennsylvania except for a tiny triangle in the state’s 
northwest corner (granted in 1792).42  
Just two months after the signing of the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Lee observed the 
unceasing waves of settlers pouring into the western lands: “Batteaux pass daily, with whole 
families, stock, and furniture, for Kentucky. Those from Virginia take boat[s] at Wheeling, 
which is situated on the Ohio, about ninety miles below Pittsburgh.”43 He also observed that the  
Western Indians were both discontented and angry with the Six Nations, for having made 
a treaty with us without consulting them. This was the object of the general confederacy 
which they mentioned, at Fort Stanwix; and these Indians charge the Six Nations with a 
breach of faith, plighted in this confederacy. It is certain this was the wish of the Six 
Nations, and the intent of their speech; but the decided language we held obliged them to 
an immediate determination, which bids fair to prostrate their confederation, and its 
                                                                                                                                                       
region. … The theory of conquest foundered on the weakness of the new republic” (White, 417); 
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diabolical object.44 
The Six Nations had a long history of unilaterally making decisions without the 
consultation or consent of neighboring Indigenous communities, making their 1784 treaty 
negotiations with the United States unsurprising and yet doubly aggravating.45 Furthermore, their 
independent actions threatened the Native confederation that had formed in 1783 to safeguard 
Native lands from American avarice.46  While other communities were incensed over the Six 
Nations’ treaty with the Americans, it must be recognized that the American commissioners 
compelled their representatives to make a quick decision and gave them no time to confer with 
their own communities, let alone any others in a strategic move to undermine the confederacy.47  
In 1785, delegates from the Wabash communities also signed a treaty with the American 
commissioners – the Treaty of Fort McIntosh – unbeknownst to their villages. These delegates 
were instructed to hear the American message and deliver it back to their civil chiefs without 
action.48 However, Half King of the Wyandot and Captain Pipe of the Delaware took it upon 
themselves to sign the treaty.49 As in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix negotiations the year before, the 
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commissioners at Fort McIntosh held several Indigenous leaders prisoner until both white and 
black Americans captured during the Revolution were returned. Both the 1784 Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix and the 1785 Treaty of Fort McIntosh set boundaries between Native and American 
settlements. However, the strong language used in the Treaty of Fort McIntosh broke with the 
simplicity of its precedent. In an innovative departure from the language of the previous treaty, 
the authors of the Treaty of Fort McIntosh, declared, "The said Indian nations do acknowledge 
themselves and all their Tribes to be under the protection of the United States and no other 
Sovereign whatsoever.”50 Furthermore, the Treaty of Fort McIntosh allowed Wyandot, 
Delaware, and Ottawa to live and hunt only within the bounds of the lines set by the United 
States, which represents an important shift in thinking about Native lands.51 Rather than drawing 
geographic borders around American settlement, the treaties of the 1780s began to restrict 
Natives to circumscribed lands, slowly forming the basis for what became the reservation system 
in the nineteenth century.52 This process paralleled that of the French cantonnement system in 
Algeria, explored in the next chapter. 
The Treaty of Fort McIntosh also clarified matters of legal jurisdiction that the previous 
treaty ignored. If any American citizen or non-Native person tried to settle on Indian land, 
they forfeited United States protection, and the "Indians may punish the offenders as they 
please[d]. If any Indian or Indians shall commit a Robbery or murder on any Citizen of the 
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United States, the Tribe to which he shall belong, shall be bound to deliver him over to the 
nearest post, to be punished according to the ordinance of Congress."53 This clause not only 
spelled out the rights and obligations of the Indigenous communities and the United States in 
dealing with the fractious backcountry settlers and wayward Natives, but it also revealed the 
federal government’s weakness and inability to police its own borders.54 
While the Treaty of Fort McIntosh attempted to be more thorough than the previous in 
establishing legal precedents, and Americans perceived it as legitimate, it was never enforced. 
The Native delegates sent to this council were only authorized to hear, but not act, on the 
American message, so their communities rejected the treaty as invalid.55  
Similarly, the 1786 Treaty of Fort Finney with the Shawnee, repeated the language of the 
1785 treaty and stubbornly perpetuated the myth of the conquest of Native Americans: “The 
Shawanoe nation do acknowledge the United States to be the sole and absolute sovereigns of all 
the territory ceded to them by treaty of peace, made between them and the King of Great Britain 
the fourteenth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four.”56 However, this 
treaty, like that of Fort McIntosh, was also unenforceable because the negotiations were poorly 
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attended by an unrepresentative group of delegates who were unauthorized to sign them. 
Afterward, even the Delaware signatories Half King and Captain Pipe renounced the treaties as 
“dictated” or forced, stating that they feared the Americans would burn their villages if they did 
not sign them.  What was more, the ensuing frontier violence prevented American surveyors 
from mapping and marking the appropriated lands.57 
The rapid succession of Native treaties signals how American officials scrambled to keep 
pace with the flow of settlers into the western territories. The mid-1780s treaties were hastened 
by both the rapidity with which emigrants poured into the trans-Appalachian west and by the 
urgency of President Washington and Congress to pay for war debts through western land 
sales.58 Following the treaty agreements at Forts Stanwix and McIntosh, Washington wrote to 
Indian Commissioner Arthur Lee, 
I am pleased to find that the Indians have yielded so much; from the temper I 
heard they were in, I apprehended less compliance, on their part.  This business being 
accomplished, it would give me pleasure to hear that Congress had proceeded to the 
disposal of the ceded Lands at a happy medium price, in a District sufficient and proper 
for a compact State. Progressive seating will be attended with many advantages; sparse 
settlements with many evils. …59  
The interests of the landed elite in government diverged from those of the Commissioners, 
whose interests lay much closer or coincided with those of the settlers, especially when George 
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Rogers Clark participated in the treaty negotiations. Washington was clearly concerned about 
both the Indigenous and settler threats to peace in the western territories, whereas the 
Commissioners’ sole purpose was to acquire as much land as possible from the Native 
communities for distribution among American settlers who were flooding into the lands 
regardless of what Congress decided to do with them.  
At the same time, metropolitan officials, Indian Commissioners, and the settlers held 
similar ideas about how to acquire Native lands. Washington continued in a letter to Congress 
that “if the other tribes are in earnest and will observe the Treaty and a third treaty is concluded 
with the more southerly Indians, their spirit must yield, or they could easily be extirpated.”60 In 
other words, President Washington brazenly stated that if the Indigenous leaders could not be 
convinced “peacefully” to move off federally claimed lands, the United States could uproot and 
totally destroy them.  
Native Chiefs were not naïve about American intentions. As one among many examples, 
the Shawnee wrote to their translator and emissary, Alexander McKee, begging him to intercede 
for them and help them create an Indigenous alliance against their common enemy – the 
American settlers: “You now see trouble is coming upon us fast. We think it nigh at hand. The 
Virginians are settling our Country & building Cabbins [sic] in every place. … Acquaint our 
younger Brethren the Lake Indians and the Six Nations with our situation that the Americans 
intend to pay us a visit early this Spring, when the grass is four inches high."61 
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The treaties resulted in one significant accomplishment, however: the unification of many 
of the Indigenous villages from the Six Nations communities in the east to the Illinois villages in 
the west. John Doughty, Major Commandant at Fort McIntosh under Colonel Harmar reported to 
General Knox on October 21, 1785: 
This treaty [at Fort McIntosh] and the one at Fort Stanwix, with the steps the Honorable 
the Continental Congress have thought fit to take in sending out the surveyors, have had 
the effect to unite the Indians and induce them to make a common cause of what they 
suppose their present grievances. They are told by the British, and they are full in the 
persuasion, that the territory in question was never ceded to us by Britain further than 
respects the jurisdiction or putting the Indians under the protection of the United States. 
From this reasoning, they draw the conclusion that our claim in consequence of that 
cession ought not to deprive them of their lands without purchase. I believe you may 
depend upon it that this is the reasoning of their chiefs. I am so informed by several 
persons who have been among them.62 
Native leaders viewed the early Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) as a legally binding agreement 
that was not to be overturned in subsequent treaties. It was this understanding that formed the 
backbone of Indigenous leaders’ legal case against the treaties of the 1780s.  
Representing Native counter-claims, Major Doughty wrote to American Secretary of War 
Henry Knox in 1785. His letter reveals the acuity of Indigenous leaders, as well as their 
familiarity with Anglo-American legal constructs. Referring to conversations with Delaware and 
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Wyandot representatives, Doughty observed, 
Our acting upon the late treaty made at this place last winter, in beginning to survey their 
country, is certainly one great cause of their present uneasiness. 
If a confederacy of the Indian tribes to the westward should take place, of which there is a 
prospect, they will become very formidable from their numbers. Should an event of this 
kind appear probable, from what information Congress may have before them, it appears 
to me evidently for our interest that some steps should be taken to engage some of their 
nations in our favor; in this case, I beg leave to offer it as my opinion that one great step 
to be pursued should be a distribution of a few presents among them, and a constant 
intercourse with them by emissaries well acquainted with their language and manners, 
who shall always be in their towns, counteracting the unfavorable impressions that are 
daily forming against us.63 
While the United States did attempt to follow this rational course of action, there was little 
funding to support the gifts necessary for diplomacy with Native Chiefs. To complicate matters, 
the men who served as diplomats were often ill suited to the task because of their biases and 
unwillingness to understand and observe Native customs. Even those who sought to reestablish a 
middle ground of diplomacy rather than coercion were largely unsuccessful because continued 
settler encroachment on Native lands and violence against Native peoples undermined American 
ambassadors’ efforts at every turn.64 
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United States: Fending Off Internal and External Threats 
A confluence of interests compelled the United States to pay attention to the trans-
Appalachian west and the backcountry settlers: external threats from Great Britain and Spain, 
internal discord among the states, and the need to repay public creditors.65 Between 1783 and 
1812, threats from the British and Spanish compelled the United States to take steps to bind 
settlers to the federal government by conciliating some of their requests for recognition of land 
claims and for defense.66 The government also sought to ease the path to citizenship for 
immigrants and improve transportation routes to enhance commercial and communication 
networks. By improving roads and constructing canals on the waterways between the east and 
west, George Washington hoped to stave off British and Spanish influence and attach the 
backcountry settlers more firmly to American interests. “For if this Country,” Washington 
warned,  
which will settle faster than any other ever did (and chiefly by foreigners who can have 
no particular predilection for us), cannot, by an easy communication be drawn this way, 
but are suffered to form commercial intercourses (which lead we all know to others) with 
the Spaniards on their right and rear, or the British on their left, they will become a 
distinct people from us, have different views, different interests, and instead of adding 
strength to the Union, may in case of a rupture with either of those powers, be a 
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formidable and dangerous neighbor.67 
Not only did Washington and other American officials worry about the dangers Great 
Britain and Spain posed but also decried the hazards that contentious states posed to the union. 
Regarding state squabbles over Native American land cessions in the western territories, 
Washington wrote to Richard Henry Lee, then President of the Congress, 
For the copy of the treaty held with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, you will please to 
accept my thanks. These people have given I think, all that the United States could 
reasonably have required of them; more perhaps than the State of New York conceives 
ought to have been asked from them by an other than their own Legislature. I wish they 
were better satisfied. Individual States opposing the measures of the United States, 
encroaching upon the territory of each other; and setting up old and obsolete claims, is 
verifying the prediction of our enemies, and is truly unfortunate.68 
Rival land claims and contending local interests were bedeviling the larger federal project, 
Washington complained.  
a kind of fatality attending all our public measures, inconceivable delays, particular States 
contracting the plans of the United States when submitted to them, opposing each other 
upon all occasions, torn by internal disputes, or supinely negligent and inattentive to 
everything which is not local and self interesting and very often short sighted in these, 
make up our system of conduct. Would to God our own Countrymen, who are entrusted 
with the management of the political machine, could view things by that large and 
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extensive scale upon which it is measured by foreigners, and by the Statesmen of Europe, 
who see what we might be, and predict what we shall come to. In fact, our federal 
Government is a name without substance: No State is longer bound by its edicts, than it 
suits present purposes, without looking to the consequences. How then can we fail in a 
little time, becoming the sport of European politics, and the victims of our own folly.69 
Here lay the powerful trope for pulling quarreling states and factions into a new political order. 
New York ceded its claims to western territories in 1781, but Virginia did not cede the land it 
claimed west of the Appalachian Mountains to the federal government until 1784. On March 1, 
1784, Congress accepted Virginia’s cession of the western lands along with all seven of the 
state’s stipulations on which the cession was based.70 By so doing, Congress removed one of the 
final impediments states posed to their objectives: to take advantage of the flood of settlers by 
selling land to cover the national debt and to reconcile the states to federal interests.  
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Figure 6: United States Land Claims and Cessions 1782-180271 
Once states ceded their claims on the western lands, Congress could determine how to 
govern them and honor both their public debts through land sales and the military land bounties 
promised to veterans, thereby establishing the colonial system of the United States.72 On the 
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same day that Congress accepted Virginia’s land cession, Thomas Jefferson proposed to divide 
the territory into states and gradually implement a representative government in each territory.73 
While Jefferson’s suggestion was not immediately acted upon, it planted seeds that grew into the 
Land Ordinance of 1785. This ordinance established the methods for appointing and regulating 
surveyors of the western territories ceded to the United States through treaties. It also established 
the rectilinear method of dividing the land into six-mile-square townships and then into one 
square mile (640-acre) plats. Additionally, land was apportioned for the Secretary of War and the 
use of the military. The ordinance prescribed the manner in which lots were to be sold, as well as 
a minimum price so the land could not be devalued or overvalued through speculation. Finally, it 
honored the promise of land to soldiers and their families who served in the Continental Army, 
thus honoring the government’s debt to them.74 
Elated with the passage of the land ordinance, Richard Henry Lee, then president of the 
Continental Congress, wrote of his hopes that the disposal of lands northwest of the Ohio River 
in accordance with the ordinance would “extinguish about 10 Millions of the pub[lic] debt.” He 
praised the institution of federally-run land sales as “almost the only [means] that we have 
for discharging our oppressive debt."75 More than that, however, the Land Ordinance of 1785 
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signaled that the United States intended to acquire all the lands northwest of the Ohio River and 
all the way to the Mississippi River.76  
American Commissioners acted on the belief that moving quickly would create the 
desired state of affairs in fact, even if the Native leaders objected to the treaties. With a flood of 
thousands of settlers rushing onto their lands, the Commissioners knew it would be difficult for 
the Native communities to prevent further encroachments. In this way, Indigenous headmen 
would be forced to accept the treaties and land loss as a fact whether they liked it or not. This 
belief prevailed in the long run, but it ran counter to the realities on the ground in the 1780s.  
Out of all the metropolitan officials, Secretary of War Henry Knox best understood that 
the myth of land acquisition by right of conquest was just that – a myth.77 With a tiny support 
staff of three clerks and a messenger, he organized a meager army – approved only in 1784 to 
combat the threat of an Indian war. On him “rested the burden of garrisoning the West, of 
protecting the settlers, and above all in his mind, of maintaining the honor of the United States 
by just and humane dealings with the Indian tribes.”78 Knox concluded that the United States 
faced two options: (1) forcefully pushing the Indigenous peoples off their lands with an 
expanded and disciplined army, or (2) negotiating land sales through treaties with Indigenous 
leaders. The costs of the first far outweighed those of the second, and in a bout of conscience, to 
which, it must be said, many early American leaders were prone, he observed that a “conciliatory 
system” would absolve the United States from “blood and injustice which would stain the 
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character of the nation … beyond all pecuniary calculation.”79  
By 1785, reports from the backcountry revealed the disparity between the myth and 
reality. Not only did outraged Indigenous peoples present a threat to Congress’ plans, but so, too, 
did American settlers.80  In May 1785, Colonel Harmar, stationed in the western territories, 
reported that “the number of settlers farther down the river [from Fort McIntosh] is very 
considerable and, from all accounts daily increasing.”81 Harmar was only able to clear illegal 
settlers up to 150 miles from the fort but no farther, so he devised a plan to establish additional 
forts along the river in an attempt to keep up with the rapid pace of settlement. Writing again in 
October 1785, Harmar hoped the army’s new position at Fort Harmar on the mouth of the 
Muskingum River would make this task easier. The squatters pled with Harmar to allow them to 
gather their crops before leaving, but “Lenity [sic],” Harmar reported to Knox, “I thought to be 
out of the question, and have directed Captain Doughty, on his way down to burn and destroy 
any remaining cabins between [Fort] McIntosh and Muskingum.”82  
Then serving as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, agreed with Harmar’s assessment 
and promoted a more orderly and peaceful approach to westward migration. Jay also lobbied for 
more concentrated settlements rather than the wide dispersal that Virginian policies had 
encouraged, warning that if his advice was not observed, the white settler “savages” would pose 
a greater threat to the union than the resident Native inhabitants. 
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In my Opinion our Indian Affairs have been ill managed. Details would be tedious. 
Indians have been murdered by our People in cold Blood and no satisfaction given, nor 
are they pleased with the avidity with which we seek to acquire their Lands. Would it not 
be wiser gradually to extend our Settlements, as want of Room should make it necessary, 
than to pitch our Tents through the Wilderness in a great Variety of Places, far distant 
from each other, and from those Advantages of Education, Civilization, Law, and 
Government which compact Settlements and Neighbourhood afford? Shall we not fill the 
Wilderness with white Savages, and will they not become more formidable to us than the 
tawny ones who now inhabit it?83 
In an April 1787 report to Congress, Knox argued that haphazard incursions into Native 
territories and United States public lands, such as Harmar and Jay described, would prevent “the 
great national advantages resulting from a wise administration of the western territory.”84 Unless 
such behavior was curtailed immediately, it would be impossible to remove subsequent intruders.  
It was therefore necessary for the United States government to exert its authority over the 
settlers as much as over the Indigenous population American officials attempted to control. 
Congress voted to provide more troops for this purpose a week later. By then, it was already too 
late. 
The rapid and illegal settlement of the Ohio and Wabash Valleys provoked “warm 
hostilities” with the Native communities who sought to protect their homelands and hunting 
grounds.  Consequently, in June 1786 Virginia sent two more companies of soldiers to the rapids 
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of Ohio “to repel the incursions or depredations of the Indians.”85 At the same time, Congress 
also considered a petition from the inhabitants of Kaskaskia, requesting to organize a 
government for the region. In response, the Secretary of Congress informed them that Congress 
was considering the matter and that it would draft a plan for a temporary government as quickly 
as possible.86 That plan became the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 – the blueprint the United 
States used to establish colonial governments, transform all of its colonies into states thenceforth, 
and rationalize its growing settler empire. 
Algeria: The Battle for Continued Occupation 
Soldier settlers provided the impetus to maintain occupied lands in French Algeria. Men 
such as General Bertrand Clauzel and General Monck d’Uzer extended the military’s holdings 
beyond the initial conquest to enhance French prestige and to personally profit from land 
acquisition. Clauzel, in particular, saw Algeria as compensation for the American colonies 
France lost to Great Britain in the Seven Years’ War.87 However, it took years to bring a 
majority in Parliament to this view.  
Envisioning an agricultural settler colony, Clauzel compensated for Parliament’s 
indecision by acting of his own volition while serving as Governor General in 1830-1831 and 
1835-1837. His “Ferme expérimental d’Afrique,” however, failed when he attempted to create a 
model farm of tropical crops that France had to purchase elsewhere. Nevertheless, French 
colonial scientists remained interested in the idea and continued experimenting with tropical cash 
crops, and other colonial administrators sought to aid their studies through the development of 
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gardens and nurseries.88 When Clauzel returned to North Africa in 1835, he continued to 
encourage colonization, proclaiming, “By force of perseverance, we shall create a new people 
who will grow even more rapidly than those established on the other side of the Atlantic [in 
North America].”89 While French agronomists continued to study the feasibility of Clauzel’s 
agricultural dreams, Clauzel advanced his vision for the settler colony in 1836 by establishing a 
system whereby settlers could acquire land according to their abilities and means to “improve” it. 
Settlers who were granted concessions had to cultivate the land and meet certain production 
requirements within a period of years after taking possession. If these requirements were met, 
settlers obtained full title to the lands they worked.90 Through his concessionaire program and 
his own acquisition of Algerian lands as a settler soldier, Clauzel pressed Parliament to maintain 
and defend the colony he helped to create.91 
Beginning in 1830, even before the French parliament had voted to keep its possessions 
in Algeria, military reports included detailed accounts of the geography, produce, demography, 
and political maneuverings in Constantine. The city of Bône captured French interest because of 
its history as one of the areas France had “acquired” or at least had commercial access to through 
the capitulations with the Ottoman Empire since 1560 C.E.92 In 1827, the Algerians reclaimed 
the city, along with La Calle, another French commercial port, and forcefully removed French 
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merchants from both.   
Regardless of Parliament’s hesitation and cautionary missives, the French military made 
three attempts to take Bône between 1830 and 1832, exhibiting a dogged determination to restore 
French honor by reclaiming its former commercial outpost as well as a foothold in the coveted 
eastern province. During this time, a three-way contest ensued for the city and region between 
the French under Captain Édouard Buisson d’Armandy, the province’s Ottoman-Algerian 
governor, Ahmed Bey, and the pretender Ibrahim Bey who sought control over the province.93  
This city was of particular interest to Hadj Ahmed Bey of Constantine because it lay 
within his province and because it served as a hotbed of intrigues against him. Knowing this, the 
French took advantage of the political ambitions of several local leaders, and even an emigré – 
Yousuf, an interpreter from Tunis and capitaine indigène under General Clauzel, who aspired to 
power in the eastern province of Algeria.94 At the same time, the Algerian (and Tunisian) leaders 
manipulated French interests to suit their own quest for power, establishing mutually beneficial 
relationships, but ones that lasted only as long as one side found the other useful in their efforts 
to advance their own cause.95  
                                                
93 Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 62-63. 
94 Schreier, “From Mediterranean Merchant to French Civilizer,” esp. 637. Yousuf, an ethnic 
Jew, claimed he had been born in Italy and was captured by pirates as a child, converted to Islam 
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Algeria in the early to mid-nineteenth-century – Jacob Lasry – and together, they procured food 
and material goods for the French military, allowing it to continue its conquest. Their brutal 
methods of acquiring goods from the people in Tlemcen and the surrounding area in 1836 led to 
much criticism both in Algeria (see Ahmed Bey’s memoir) and in France, where most of the 
outrage was directed at General Clauzel who had hired them (see Collingham, The July 
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95 At the same time, relations between Hadj Ahmed Bey and the Bey of Tunis were strained – 
something which both the French military informants and Ahmed, himself, noted. The Bey of 
Tunis was anxious not to give the French any reason to enter his own territory, and coveting the 
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After most of the population had already suffered a severe famine and then fled the three-
way struggle for their city, the French, with Yousuf leading the attack, finally conquered Bône in 
1832.96 At last, the French had a foothold in the desirable eastern province, two years before 
Parliament finally decided to keep the lands. The military of course, had other ideas, and the 
commandant at Bône launched exploratory missions into other areas of the province as soon as 
the French had ensconced themselves there.  
First, the French occupied the buildings of Bône. In a preindustrial society land is the 
single most valuable commodity, and the French viewed Algeria after 1830 as a place 
where land was virtually for the taking. That it was taken at the expense of the Algerians 
was simply of no concern.97 
Algerian land was just waiting to be taken and used “appropriately” – settled by 
Europeans and farmed using “modern” western agricultural techniques.98  
In Bône such a situation as existed after 1832 is usually described euphemistically as 
‘fluid.’ After all, beachheads operate according to snafus, not law. Most everything is ad 
                                                                                                                                                       
fertile and prosperous region of Constantine, even offered some support for the French in return 
for promises of being made governor over Constantine as well. 
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hoc; what is determinative is the fait accompli. So it was in Bône. Land transactions 
occurred faster than they could be recorded, administrative procedures and practices were 
applied after the fact, corruption was rampant as bribes exchanged hands, and the law did 
its best to cloak the proceedings in a veneer of legitimacy. In short, there is simply no 
way to sort out in any precise manner the volume or chronology of land sales in such a 
situation.99 
Land transactions in Bône followed the Algiers pattern closely, despite French administrators’ 
efforts to impose discipline and systematic land acquisition practices. When Clauzel came to 
Algeria on September 2, 1830 to replace General de Bourmont, Clauzel expanded the Comité des 
Domaines, the office of public domain in Algeria. Headed by Captain Prosper Gérardin, an 
Arabic interpreter, two native Algerians formed the rest of this committee: Mustapha ben Chau 
and Mohammed ben Cobtau. Upon arrival Clauzel confirmed Gérardin’s position, appointed two 
European assistants, a receveur des domaines and a percepteur de droits divers, and retained two 
Muslims but different men than those first commissioned. Although the committee’s name 
changed under Clauzel, its mission remained the same but was equally unsuccessful. 
Their mission was to tally the holdings and wealth of the Algerian Beylik (including all 
of the Ottoman ministers in Algiers), but their task was made difficult by the uncooperative and 
vague responses they received from Hussein Dey’s officials. The French attempted to bring some 
order to the chaos that ensued following the conquest of Algiers, to map and record the beylikal 
lands that had fallen into France’s public domain in Algeria with the conquest and establish 
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procedures for both public domain lands and private land transactions.100 Despite their industry, 
confusion in property matters was growing fast. A horde of speculators had followed hard 
on the heels of the Army of Africa. Properties of all kinds and of all legal status were 
bought and sold at a furious pace.  Many natives sold what they had no legal right to sell, 
including beylik properties of which they were only tenants. ... Many an army officer and 
civil functionary profited from the Algerian tour to enrich himself personally. A decree of 
November 8, 1830, officially forbidding the alienation of domain lands, seems to have 
had almost no effect on slowing the speculative fever or protecting public lands.101  
This state of affairs reveals the depth of oversimplification of the American colonization process 
in French reports. The parliamentary commission sent to report on the state of affairs in Algeria 
contrasted their struggles to fix themselves profitably on Algerian soil with their perception of 
European colonization in North America. Unlike MacMahon’s triumphal 1870 account, the 
commissioners remained skeptical about the potential success of their endeavor in 1833:  
The establishments of Europeans in North America have prospered because they were 
founded by hardworking, religious men who went in search of freedom to practice their 
religion and not by men [who were] enemies of all constraint and moral restraint. They 
found in this vast temperate continent, forests that furnished the most useful materials for 
constructing homes, heavy fertile soil, and rivers as numerous as [they were] powerful, 
opening an easy road/avenue to export the products of the colonists’ labors. What is 
more, the country was only occupied by tribes who nourished/fed themselves by hunting 
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and fishing; tribes who traversed a certain expanse of territory… who were completely 
ignorant of agriculture, never even raising beasts (livestock), and knowing nothing of 
land ownership: so that, naturally and without effort, they carried into the most remote 
places their arrow and fish hooks, as game and fish disappeared before the population and 
the arts of civilized men. …All of these immense advantages, which permitted the United 
States to attain this great degree of prosperity that, at this moment has captured the 
attention of the world, cannot be found in Africa.  There, no forests; except perhaps on 
the slopes of the Atlas [mountains] where we have not penetrated; there are no rivers to 
the sea, only a few [inland] streams, sometimes swollen/flooded by the winter rains, 
sometimes dried up by the burning summer heat, at all times, navigation is impractical; 
the ground is in some places sandy and arid, in other places clayey and marshy; and you 
cannot use this soil. The least infertile [meaning, the most fertile] places are situated near 
towns or in sheltered valleys, and are possessed by owners who will not cede their land 
except for a high price, if the French government covers/provides them with justice or 
they will become irreconcilable enemies if they are dispossessed by violence or by the 
reprehensible maneuvers of the Europeans. The rest of the plains is the domain of 
nomadic tribes, who need them for pasture in order to exist … the desire for vengeance 
and the need to pillage are instilled in them at birth. 102  
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ont porté dans des lieux plus reculés leurs flèches et leurs hameçons, à mesure que le gibier et le 
poisson disparaissaient devant la population et les arts des hommes civilises. … Tous ces 
immense avantages, qui ont permis aux États-Unis de s’élever à ce haut degré de prospérité qui 
fixe en ce moment les regards du monde, ne se trouvent nullement en Afrique. Là point de forêts, 
si ce n’est peut-être sur les flancs de l’Atlas où nous n’avons pas pénétré; point de fleuves, 
seulement des rivières, tantôt gonflées par les pluies de l’hiver, tantôt desséchées par les ardeurs 
de l’été, en tout temps impraticables à la navigation; un sol tantôt sablonneux et aride, tantôt 
argileux et marécageux; et de ce sol vous ne sauriez en disposer. Les parties les moins stériles, 
celles qui sont situées à portée des villes ou dans des vallées abritées, sont possédées par des 
propriétaires qui ne céderont leur terrain qu’à haut prix, si le Gouvernement français les couvre 
de sa justice, ou qui deviendront des ennemis irréconciliables s’ils sont dépouillés par la violence 
ou par les manoeuvres coupables des Européens. Le reste des plaines est le domaine de tribus 
nomades, qui ont besoin du parcours de ces pâturages pour exister … c’est faire naitre en elles le 
désir de la vengeance et le besoin du pillage. » 
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Nevertheless, the commissioners recommended France keep its possessions in North 
Africa because “abandoning our conquests would offend the nation’s legitimate pride [and] 
sacrifice the commercial advantages and political power.”103 Parliament also sought to appease 
the European settler constituency that had grown up in Algeria during their four years of 
indecision. “In that time the original Marseille interest was significantly reinforced by an on-site 
constituency composed of new property owners, speculators, would-be settlers, merchants, 
military officers and civil administrators, all of whose interests in different ways depended upon 
retention of the conquest.”104 Even though the colonization of Native lands was a long, drawn-
out, hard-fought, and violently contested affair, Parliament eventually supported the objectives of 
European settlers and the French military in Algeria.  
General Monck d’Uzer was one of the most prominent, powerful, and vocal members of 
the European Algerian constituency. Beginning in 1832, his endeavors in eastern Algeria, though 
disputed in the metropole, served to advance France’s “commercial advantages” through land 
expropriation around Bône. Military commanders and settlers like d’Uzer disregarded the official 
policy of restricted occupation and continued pushing the colonization of Algeria into new 
territories. The ad hoc policies, land grabs, support for new settlers to set up farms and 
businesses, and persistent lobbying efforts of settler soldiers turned dreams of empire into reality 
and ambiguously defined land into settler colonies, whether the metropoles were ready for them 
or not.105 After the capture of the city, General d’Uzer replaced Captain d’Armandy as 
commandant of Bône on May 15, 1832. There he remained until Yousuf temporarily replaced 
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him while waiting for Governor General Clauzel to take command in 1836.106 As commandant 
of Bône, d’Uzer lobbied against the application of the 1832 decree banning property transactions 
between Algerians and Europeans in the city and “promptly became one of the biggest 
landowners in the area by buying up no less than 2,000 acres for 30,000 francs plus 1,200 francs 
in rent” from beleaguered and terrified Algerians.107  
And the manner in which he obtained the property was more scandalous still, for it was 
alleged that he colluded with ‘his’ Algerian agent, one Mustapha ben Kerim – who just 
happened to be the chief of police for the Algerians of Bône – to hoodwink the Algerians 
into selling their land. In other words, d’Uzer was engaging in precisely the sort of 
speculation that the 1832 land law attempted to halt.108  
The scale of his land speculation and his use of soldiers to work the farms as free labor was too 
much for the Parisian officials to ignore, however, and they recalled d’Uzer to Paris, replacing 
him with Yousuf. Undaunted, d’Uzer returned to Bône and continued lobbying the Governor 
General, a land speculator himself with grand plans for turning the Algerian countryside into 
European farmland, for more extensive settlement. Successful in his efforts, d’Uzer received 
authorization to establish a new village, Duzerville, just outside Bône. He owned all of the land 
on which the town sat including the neighboring farms, which he worked as a settler until his 
death in 1849.109 Although his example was one of the more extreme cases of land appropriation 
and exploitation, d’Uzer’s ardor for the region around Bône was not at variance with other 
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French commanders’ views of that province. They saw the conquest of Bône as the gateway to 
the fertile province of Constantine. 
Between the conquest in 1830 and 1834, while France was still undecided whether or not 
conquered Algerian cities should be kept as French colonies, Parliament sent a commission to 
Algeria in 1833 to collect data and offer recommendations.110 During the interval in which 
General d’Uzer held Bône, the French Parliament at last voted in 1834 to keep the possessions 
they had already acquired in Algeria and to consider Algeria as an official French colony. The 
parliamentary commission’s report the previous year concluded that despite the failures, France 
should stay in Algeria to honor public opinion and uphold national pride in the face of Great 
Britain’s meddling support of the Algerian resistance.111 Unable to vote one way or the other on 
the commission’s suggestion, Parliamentary discussions devolved into a deadlock between pro- 
and anti-colonial factions. To break the impasse, the Minister of War, Soult, Duc de Demaltie 
drafted the Royal Ordinance of July 22, 1834, which created “a military colony named ‘les 
possessions françaises dans le Nord de l’Afrique,’ [and] placed [it] under the authority of the 
Ministry of War.”112 Louis Philippe signed the ordinance into law and officially recognized 
Algeria as a French colony. While an official policy of “limited occupation” was in place, the 
military acted as if it had never heard of the decree and continued its march into new towns and 
regions of Algeria not yet under French control.  
After the French Parliament voted to keep its holdings in Algeria and retain it as a colony 
in 1834, the Minister of War directed the military to pursue a policy of limited occupation, but 
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Governor-General Clauzel had different ideas and organized the first campaign against 
Constantine in 1836.113 Fortunately for the governors-general, King Louis Philippe was a 
proponent of the Algerian conquest. He believed it bolstered national pride, gave the army an 
outlet, and legitimated the ascension of one of his sons to the throne upon his death.114 Although 
a monarch, Louis Philippe believed that royalty should demonstrate their mettle and ability to 
lead on the battlefield as proof of their worthiness for the position they held.  Champion of a 
pacific international policy, at least in Europe, King Louis Philippe understood that peace did not 
offer prospects for military honor for his sons. However, the conquest of Algeria provided 
opportunities for the dauphins [princes] to prove themselves and to win distinction on the 
battlefield.115 Parliament’s policy of restricted occupation remained the official objective until 
the siege and fall of Constantine by 1837 opened up coveted tracts of land to European 
settlers.116 Thereafter, in a significant change in colonial land policy, the French government 
aligned itself with its military and supported an aggressive approach to land acquisition and 
management in the Tell (the mountainous coastal region north of the Sahara).117 
Algeria: The Conquest of Constantine 
In 1835, after reestablishing his power and overcoming upstart rival leaders who sought 
to take his place as governor of Constantine province, Ahmed Bey received a letter from Govern-
General Clauzel. Clauzel offered to recognize him as Bey of Constantine, but only if Ahmed 
agreed to pay the lezma (a graduated poll tax) and submit himself to French rule.  A reformer, 
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Ahmed had created a council of local leaders, his divan, which he brought together to hear their 
advice on all significant matters, including international diplomacy. He did so again when he 
received General Clauzel’s letter, which he read to the divan as soon as they convened. His 
councilors stated that since Constantine was a province of the Algerian Regency, the decision 
ultimately rested with the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmoud II.  Therefore, it was necessary to write to 
the Sultan and inform the French that they could not respond to General Clauzel’s offer until 
they had received a response from the Porte.118 However, Ahmed noted that even before 
receiving Sultan Mahmoud’s response, the French capture of Bône, in 1832, completely ruptured 
any possible relationship between them. From that moment on, he recalled, he had “no other 
thought than to present the greatest possible obstacles to their subsequent endeavors.”119  
Reports such as Captain Saint-Hippolyte’s notes on Constantine also served to whet 
French appetite for the fertile lands in North Africa. This report, in particular, provided 
information essential for planning Clauzel’s campaign against the stronghold of Constantine – 
travel times, prominent geographical features, as well as the desirability of the province to justify 
the conquest. “Of the three Beyliks of the Algerian Regency,” Saint-Hippolyte effused, “the most 
extensive, the richest, and the most important was that of Constantine in the East,” which was 
bordered by the sea, the Jurjura Mountains and salt marshes, and the Regency of Tunis.120 With 
coastal access to the north, an eastern border with Tunisia, and the desert to the south, 
Constantine was a hub of trade networks that connected sub-Saharan Africa, eastern North 
                                                
118 “Memoir of Ahmed Bey,” 5, CAOM. Ahmed Bey followed the same course of action – 
convening the divan each time he received a letter from the French, and their advice 
corresponded with both his own feelings and the wishes of Sultan Mahmoud – continue to 
respond evasively, defer to the Sultan and keep the French at bay. (C.f. “Memoire,” 10-11, 24.) 
119 “Memoir of Ahmed Bey,” 8. CAOM. 
120 “Expédition de Constantine: Notes extraites des Mémoires du Capitaine Saint-Hyppolyte.” 30 
Août 1836. 80 MIOM 1672, no. 1. CAOM. 
 201 
Africa, and the Mediterranean. “Farther away is the desert whose solitude is frequently [broken] 
by caravans coming from the center of Africa toward Tunis and Tripoli in particular, which 
having frequent enough relations with Turkey, offers an avenue to products from the Tropics.”121 
French military commanders, and travelers alike, repeatedly described the province of 
Constantine as the most extensive, important, and the richest of the three beyliks of Algeria. 
Additionally, it was the foremost among them in the production of wax, honey, butter, wheat, 
barley, and livestock. It was a coveted gem and one that French administrators believed to be the 
linchpin of their colonial strategy and ultimate success.122 It was therefore essential that the 
French survey, map, and claim as much of this territory as possible. For this reason, in 1837, the 
colonial administration began to organize a survey office, or Cadastre, that would be responsible 
for visualizing space and assigning economic values to land.123 When Governor General Clauzel 
took over command of the French portion of the eastern province in 1836, it was to launch an 
assault against Constantine. On a previous visit to Paris, he had easily convinced French Prime 
Minister Adolphe Thiers that the French needed to conquer Constantine and establish a system of 
“absolute domination”: 
The establishment of this system required a series of military operations to be undertaken 
simultaneously in three large sections of the Regency. Preparations for the planned 
expedition began in the first days of August … But on the 30th of the same month, an 
order from the Minister of War [Nicolas Joseph, Marquis Maison] suspended the 
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preparations. The Maréchal was told to withdraw [back] into the existing limits of the 
occupation, reserving to the new cabinet the task of deciding on the proposed system.124  
The new Prime Minister, Louis-Mathieu Molé, replaced Minister Thiers in September 
1836. Molé was as conservative as his new Minister of War, and refused Clauzel’s request for 
troops to conduct the proposed expedition. Heedless of the government’s wishes, Clauzel set off 
for Constantine with approximately 8,600 men in November 1836, just as the winter rains turned 
to sleet.125 
 In the summer of 1836, rumors of this planned expedition reached Ahmed Bey. He 
immediately sent spies to Bône to gather more information and set about preparing for the 
expected attack. In short order, he procured arms, cannons, ammunition, food, and called his 
troops in from the surrounding area. In addition to his 1500 infantrymen and 5000 cavalrymen, 
he had 1000 men on guard inside the city walls, comprised of Turks, Algerians who refugees 
from the 1830 conquest of Algiers, as well as his own contingent of artillerymen.126   
 As the French set out for Constantine, Ahmed made good on his promise to challenge his 
enemies at every step.  With his city guard firmly ensconced and well prepared, he set out to 
harass the soldiers on their miserable march through the mud and snow. By the time the French 
army arrived at the nearly impregnable city, hundreds of injured and ill soldiers had already been 
left behind. While Clauzel divided his army into two units to attack two gates into the city, 
Ahmed, following behind the French, caught them in a pincer between his artillery firing from 
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the battlements of the city in front of them and his infantry and cavalry behind. Finally admitting 
defeat, Clauzel called for retreat.127  
Ahmed feared that totally destroying the army would further provoke France and instill 
an unstoppable desire for revenge. However, his troops were incensed at the attack and pushed 
their Bey to lead them, albeit reluctantly, in pursuit of the struggling French army. Stopping in 
Guelma, a short distance from Bône, Ahmed waited for a French negotiator to arrive to discuss 
the terms of French surrender, but no one ever came.  When he realized that no ambassador was 
coming, he began the return trip to Constantine, collecting discarded supplies the French army 
left behind in their hasty retreat. With the seized equipment, ammunition, and food, he recovered 
all his expenses from the battle and profited an additional 100,000 douros.128 
 After his victory, Ahmed began putting Constantine in a state of readiness for the next 
attack. He informed Sultan Mahmoud of their victory but also that he suspected that the French 
would try again. In response, the Sultan congratulated Ahmed for his triumph and promised to 
send “a sufficient quantity of men and cannons.”129 Soon after receiving this message, another 
note arrived apprising Ahmed of four Ottoman ships that had just landed at Tunis filled with 
Ottoman troops, 12 cannons and 150 artillerymen bound for Constantine. However, the Bey of 
Tunis refused to let the troops and armaments cross Tunisia to get to Constantine. He begged the 
sultan and Ahmed’s pardon but feared French reprisals for any aid he offered Constantine, even 
tacitly.130  
                                                
127 Collingham, The July Monarchy, 249; Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 144–147; Ernest 
Mercier, Les Deux Sièges De Constantine (1836-1837) / Vernet, Horace,; 1789-1863.!; 
(Illustrator) (Constantine: L. Poulet, 1854), 17–41. 
128 “Memoire of Ahmed Bey,” 16-20. CAOM; Temimi, Le Beylik De Constantine Et Hadj 
`Ahmed Bey (1830-1837). 
129 “Memoire of Ahmed Bey,” 20-21. CAOM 
130 “Memoire of Ahmed Bey,” 21-23, CAOM. 
 204 
Meanwhile, Charles-Marie comte de Damrémont had replaced Clauzel as Governor-
General and Lieutenant General Thomas Robert Bugeaud concluded the Treaty of Tafna with 
France’s greatest threat in western Algeria, the Emir, Abd al-Qadir, on May 20, 1837.131 With 
this treaty, France was freed of fighting a war on two fronts.132 At the same time, Damrémont 
made, he thought, a generous offer to Ahmed Bey that would allow him to maintain his position 
as a colonial governor of the province, but under French rather than Ottoman rule, in return for a 
100,000 franc per annum tribute.  The Bey flatly refused the proposal and waited for Ottoman 
military support to come to his aid against the French. When this news reached Paris, it provided 
the French Minister of War an excuse to authorize Damrémont’s request to attack the city. By 
this time, French administrators had begun to support the military’s acquisitive stance in Algeria 
and moved away from their previous policy of restricted occupation. The second siege of 
Constantine marked this significant transition.  
 Under the direction of General Damrémont, the French military, once again divided itself 
into two corps upon arrival at the fortified city. Ahmed, believing the same tactic would work a 
second time, placed the French in a crossfire between troops he left to guard the city and the 
combined forces of his infantry and cavalry. To augment Ahmed’s troops, Kabyles from Djidjelli 
and Collo marched to the capital city, but they arrived too late. Following a week of 
bombardment, the French had already breached the city’s one weakness – the Djedid gate – by 
the time of their arrival.  In an attempt to slow the military down, Ahmed signaled to his artillery 
to aim for the generals, which included one of the royal princes. While his artillery succeeded in 
                                                
131 Collingham, The July Monarchy, 249; Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 147–153; Lucas-
Dubreton and Buckley, The Restoration and the July Monarchy, 278. 
132 The significance of the Treaty of Tafna in France’s decision to attack Constantine again is 
discussed at length in Abdeljelil Temimi, Le Beylik de Consantine et Hadj ‘Ahmad Bey (1830-
1837) (Tunis, 1978), 184-190.  
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killing Governor-General Damrémont along with dozens of other soldiers, the French redoubled 
their assault on the city.133  
Left in charge of the city, Algerian commander Ben Aissa foresaw the brutal effects the 
French breach would have on the Constantinois and began evacuating everyone, beginning with 
the women, children, and elderly. They streamed out of another gate and fled to the cliffs of 
Rummel, lowering themselves, some successfully, some tragically, down the sheer walls. From 
his perch on the cliffs at Constantine, French writer Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat recorded 
with horror the human toll of the 1837 French conquest of this Algerian stronghold.  
I stood on the edge of the terrifying ravines and stared at the sloping peaks over which 
thousands of men and women, trusting the abyss more than the mercy of the French 
victors, sought to escape. Their means of salvation were ropes attached to the upper walls 
of the rocks.  When these ropes broke, human masses could be seen rolling down this 
immense wall of rock.  It was a veritable cascade of corpses.134 
Following the collapse of the Constantinois resistance, thousands of men and women preferred to 
flee their homes and take their chances with the gorges of Rummel. Hundreds fell to their deaths 
when frail ropes snapped, and many more lost everything they had when they abandoned their 
property to the French, who then declared it vacant and confiscated it for the public domain.  
The Tafna Treaty had left the eastern boundary of France’s Algiers enclave unclear, 
however, and ‘Abd al Qadir had extended his authority into regions that occupation 
                                                
133 “Memoire of Ahmed Bey,” 21-23, CAOM; Collingham, The July Monarchy, 249; Mercier, 
Les Deux Sièges De Constantine (1836-1837) / Vernet, Horace,; 1789-1863.!; (Illustrator), 56–
66; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, The Restoration and the July Monarchy, 279; Ruedy, Modern 
Algeria, 61. 
134 Jean-Joseph François Poujoulat, Voyage en Algérie: Etudes Africaine (nouvelle edition) 
(Paris: Librairie d’éducation, 1868), 244. Translation from Mahfoud Benoune, The Making of 
Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 38. 
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troops would have to cross in order to travel to [the newly conquered city and province 
of] Constantine. After attempting and failing to get a modified convention, the French 
forced the issue in October and November 1839 by sending a force headed by the Crown 
Prince on a fateful march from Constantine through the disputed territory to Algiers. 
‘Abd al Qadir and his advisors, who had seen the break coming … now … issued a 
formal declaration of jihad and on November 20 [1839] Arab irregulars descended on 
French farms in the Mitidja Valley, destroying in a few days the settlement efforts of 
several years and sending those colons fortunate enough to survive fleeing back to 
Algiers in panic. It was now clear that the policy of restricted occupation … had reached 
the end of its road. France must evacuate the country or subjugate it completely.135 
The conquest of Constantine had opened this question and provided the linchpin in French 
colonial policy-making. With the siege, France declared not only that would it keep the cities and 
properties it had already conquered but also would continue to attack and seize as much land as 
possible east from Algiers to the border of Tunisia.136  
Comparative Synthesis 
Colonizers created narratives of conquest that later became the foundational myths of the 
settler colonial states. Sometimes, settlers themselves generated these stories, as in the case of 
Daniel Boone and George Rogers Clark on the American frontier. Boone asserted that the 
settlers bought the land on which they lived with their specie, blood, and toil. Through their 
struggle, the settlers had ‘earned’ the right to keep the land. What is more, American settlers 
began to claim that Native homelands ran in their blood as much as, and because, the lands ran 
                                                
135 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 63. 
136 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 63. 
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with it.137 In Algeria, military commanders, like General Monck d’Uzer staked claims to vast 
tracts of land they bought, or forced purchase, from Algerian inhabitants. Others simply claimed 
property by occupancy when Algerians fled from violent confrontations in the cities.  When the 
rightful owners returned to their homes, they found French officers and soldiers had expropriated 
them and faced uphill battles to regain their houses and lands, if they were able to at all.138 
Additionally, martial settlers were a crucial component of advancing settler colonialism. 
General d’Uzer in Algeria and Major Clark in America provide two case studies of the 
significant role that settlement-minded soldiers and aggressive settlers played. The American and 
French colonial projects could not have gotten off the ground without self-interested men of 
action who displayed little regard for official policy and who identified themselves with the 
settler community. Clark, a surveyor for the Ohio Land Company, wrote enthusiastically to his 
father and brother in 1774. He described the land he had explored in the Ohio Valley and of his 
ambition to claim much of it for himself, even as he surveyed it for others. As one of the first 
“pioneers,” Clark witnessed and participated in the brutal raids between the settlers and their 
Native neighbors. He became a violent man shaped by a violent world who used any means 
necessary to accomplish his land acquisition objectives. Similarly, General d’Uzer pushed his 
settlement agenda once he had conquered the city of Bône, Algeria. Taking advantage of the 
inhabitants’ fear of the French invaders, he bought much of the territory surrounding Bône for a 
fraction of the land’s value, despite metropolitan policies forbidding such practices at the time.139  
Just as frequently, government officials, too, crafted narratives of conquest to take 
advantage of what the settlers and military had already accomplished on the ground, thereby 
                                                
137 Wolfe, “The Settler Complex.” 
138 Ruedy, Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain. 
139 Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 64. 
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coopting their successes for metropolitan objectives.  Through the Treaty of Paris, Americans 
laid the groundwork for the creation myth of the United States.140 They claimed that the Native 
Americans had instigated the war, and since they had sided with the British, they were conquered 
peoples. Therefore, the United States had a right to seize Indigenous lands as spoils of war. To 
add insult to injury, not only did the American negotiators of the treaty forget about the 
invaluable support, intelligence, and literal guidance their Native allies provided them, they also 
conveniently forgot that they had not actually defeated Indigenous forces in any decisive battles. 
Similarly, through discourses of conquest, French officials claimed that all beylikal lands (lands 
belonging to the Ottoman governor, or bey) became part of the French public domain in Algeria 
since the military had defeated the bey. However, the commanders in Algeria claimed far more 
land to be “beylikal” than the bey had actually held, thus appropriating far more territory than 
was legally justifiable. Since the metropole remained unsure about whether or not keeping 
conquered Algerian lands was desirable, Parliament passed laws that attempted to curb continued 
land acquisition. Colonial proponents, like Governor General Clauzel and General Monck 
d’Uzer vociferously fought such limitations and frequently disregarded them during the first six 
years of occupation, leading up to and including the first siege of Constantine.  
In addition to the epic conquest of Algiers in 1830, the two battles for Constantine 
formed the foundation of the creation myths of the French Algerian state. The French had taken 
two fortified cities that were previously believed to be impregnable, and even more significantly, 
had finally occupied Constantine, the province that showed the strongest visible connections 
with the Roman legacy of the region.  
 This myth held that French military and metropolitan administrators were the most suitable 
                                                
140 For other references to the narrative of the United States creation as myth, see White, The 
Middle Ground, 417; Buss, Winning the West with Words. 
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inheritors of Rome’s former imperial holdings in North Africa. France appropriated Rome and its 
colonial legacy on four levels: scientific, religious, literary and mythical, which “suggests that 
there was more to the process than the justification of an imperial presence.”⁠141 The mythology 
connecting Rome and France coalesced gradually and grew out of the circumstances of conquest 
and occupation. The education and classical training of military officers, colonial administrators, 
and scholars prompted them to view Algeria through the lens of its position as an ancient Roman 
territory. Furthermore, Roman texts on their North African colonies provided a “reassuring point 
of reference” in unknown territory and offered a guide to methods and the possibilities that 
colonizing this region presented even though Rome’s example served as a theoretical bulwark 
for the French colonial project.  
Constantine was the linchpin to this vision, the figurative and literal gateway to creating 
and maintaining a French colony throughout the entire Regency and extending their lands toward 
the eastern borders of ancient Roman territories. The conquest of the fortified capital of the 
eastern province marked a turning point from a metropolitan policy of restricted occupation to 
the adoption of the military’s policy of conquest and hold.  
Waged to uphold French honor and extend French control in Algeria, the 1837 
Constantine campaign was celebrated in the arts both during and after the siege and conquest.  
                                                
141 Patricia M. E. Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin 
Past,” French Historical Studies 25, no. 2 (2002): 296. 
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Figure 7: “La Prise de Constantine”142 
While the soldier on the frontlines gloried in the victory and its import for the motherland, the 
monarchy celebrated the military triumph as well. Massive commissioned paintings depicted the 
princes’ achievements on the battlefield, including a series dedicated to the siege of Constantine 
in 1837, in which the Duc de Nemours, the son of King Louis Philippe, distinguished himself, is 
representative of the symbolic dimension of this war for the French monarchy. Even though 
Louis Philippe’s hopes to establish a hereditary and meritocratic monarchy were later dashed, the 
Orléanists’ symbolic and real investment in the colonial project provided the impetus to 
perpetuate the war and settlement despite legislators’ outcries over the expense.143 While 
undertaken for political reasons, the settlers in Algeria viewed such actions as evidence of the 
government’s commitment to the new colony.144 
                                                
142 "La prise de Constantine 1837 par Horace Vernet" by Horace Vernet. Licensed under Public 
Domain via Wikimedia Commons - 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:La_prise_de_Constantine_1837_par_Horace_Vernet.jp
g#/media/File:La_prise_de_Constantine_1837_par_Horace_Vernet.jpg (Accessed 31 March 
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143 In sum, Louise Philippe's quest for military opportunities for his sons motivated his continued 
support for Algerian colonization. (Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 124; Peter Dunwoodie, 
Writing French Algeria [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998], 9.) 
144 Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 83-124. 
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As the successful second siege of Constantine served as a discursive gateway to the rest 
of the Regency, the Treaty of Paris (1783) served as the United States’ legal and discursive 
gateway to the western (i.e. Native) territories for American settlers. The treaty confirmed Native 
leaders’ growing fears and established in American law the boundaries of the new nation as the 
Great Lakes to the northwest, the Mississippi River on the west, and the thirty-first parallel as the 
southern border.145 Both Indigenous and French inhabitants of the Wabash Valley dreaded 
American incursions into their lands and viewed the treaty as an ominous first step toward the 
possible loss of their lands.146 For their part, American government officials and negotiators 
initially used the Treaty of Paris to propagate the myth of Native Americans as “conquered” 
peoples. This legal myth was then employed to compel Native leaders into treaty negotiations in 
the mid-1780s.147 
In response to native protests over the conclusion of the treaty without their input or 
consent and the view that the British had ceded their lands to the United States, American 
commissioners at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784), declared:  
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You are mistaken in supposing that having been excluded [from the treaty] you are 
become a free and independent nation, and may make what terms you please. … It is not 
so. You are a subdued people, you have been overcome in a war.148  
Through the mid 1780s, the United States attempted to perpetuate this myth and transform it into 
a reality through questionable treaty negotiations with unauthorized members of Native 
communities.  Deploying the “right of conquest” justification for land appropriations, American 
commissioners compelled Native signatures on hastily drawn up treaties that ceded large swaths 
of Indigenous lands to the United States. While the Indigenous confederation contested the 
legality and validity of these treaties, settlers rushed to take advantage of the newly acquired 
land, as did the federal government. Surveyors were sent out almost simultaneously with the 
commissioners to survey and plat land for immediate sale to settlers to raise much-needed funds 
for the impoverished government.149 
As the settlers and military leaders continued to push farther into Native territories, 
metropolitan officials sought to understand what was happening on the ground, but they rarely 
trusted either the settlers or military leaders to provide accurate and actionable reports and 
therefore sent out investigatory commissions. The perceived necessity of such investigations 
reveals the split between colonial administrators in the métropole and settlers, militia, and 
military on the ground. The resulting reports provided detailed answers to specific questions to 
guide legislation and, while they deplored the methods used, advised both the United States and 
France to continue to colonize the regions of interest. 
                                                
148 Revolution and Confederation, ed. Colin G. Calloway, Vol 18 of Early American Indian 
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Publications of America, 1979-), 317, 323-324. 
149 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 278–283; White, The Middle Ground, 
408–418. 
 213 
Despite the efforts of the militaries, settlers, and metropolitan administrators to exert their 
will over the territories they desired, the Indigenous peoples of both regions limited their actions. 
Europeans and Americans on the ground often recognized the mismatch between stated policies 
and the realities they faced. In the Wabash and Ohio Valleys, Native communities still held the 
vast majority of land and were the de facto sovereigns of it, regardless of American posturing 
and myth-making following the Revolution. The Indigenous confederacy, for example, 
successfully contested the treaties of the 1780s. Indigenous leaders invalidated the treaties of 
Fort Stanwix (1784), Fort McIntosh (1785), and Fort Finney (1786) because the Native 
representatives sent to the treaty councils were not authorized to sign on behalf of their 
communities. They had been instructed to listen to the American message only and report it back 
to their villages for deliberation before any decisions were reached or actions taken.  The 
subsequent two decades of continual fighting between American backcountry settlers and 
militias and Native warriors made clear that the United States did not yet govern the territory it 
sought to incorporate into the union. Likewise, it took a decade of total war under General 
Robert Bugeaud, followed by two more decades of fighting before France could declare Algeria 
“pacified.” In that first decade after the conquest of Constantine, Abd al Qadir led the resistance 
movement in the east while Hadj Ahmed Bey continued to battle the French and “present every 
possible obstacle” to their progress until finally capitulating in 1848.  
Indigenous leaders sought the aid of former colonial governments to support their 
resistance to American and French invasions. Even as their representatives met with American 
commissioners to plead for the recognition of the firm boundary of the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty 
between their peoples, many Algonquian diplomats pragmatically continued to lobby the British 
for aid, guns, and ammunition to defend their families and homes from the encroaching 
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Americans. In Algeria, Ahmed Bey negotiated with the Ottoman Sultan Mahmoud II for soldiers 
and arms to resist the incursion of the French military into his province and his capital. While the 
resistance leaders were unable to obtain the support necessary to hold the colonizers at bay, they 
continued to struggle against the settlers and the militaries that backed them for decades.  
In both regions, Indigenous territory became borderlands through the incursion of settlers 
and the advancement of the colonizing military presence that compelled the inhabitants to flee or 
sell their property for a mere fraction of its worth. Despite Jefferson’s revised version of this 
process, his original is closer to the truth. It still does not paint it starkly enough though. Violent 
confrontations created borderlands in settler colonies as militaries and settlers moved in to exert 
their will over, and appropriate lands from, the Indigenous populations.  
By 1783 in America and 1834 in Algeria, militant settlers forced metropolitan 
administrators to recognize the colonization that had already begun. Left with few choices that 
would preserve their honor, the metropoles declared the lands to be official colonies, asserted 
their intention to incorporate them into the metropolitan governing structure and take advantage 
of the opportunities they presented. While officials wrote policies and created a legal veneer for 
the activities already taking place on the ground, settlers and martial men, who were not 
mutually exclusive groups, pressed into new lands, establishing settlements and staking their 
claims.  
On the surface, and from the safety of the capital cities, this transitional stage appeared as 
a logical and smooth progression. It was anything but that. It took years for the administrators to 
decide to keep the lands, even though they were already settled with Euro-Americans (North 
America) and Europeans (Algeria). Moreover, land acquisition was not a simple undertaking 
because the desired territories were already occupied. The lifeways of the inhabitants who had 
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lived there for generations were integrally tied to the land, and they did not give up their homes 
and property easily merely because others wanted it. Many of the Indigenous people were not 
acquisitive; they sought the means to survive and they sought social capital, sometimes through 
material possessions they could give as gifts, and sometimes through political capital they could 
exert as power. Through fear and manipulating the desires of a few Indigenous leaders, the 
colonizers sought leverage to acquire more and more land. However, the Native leaders of the 
Wabash Valley and Constantine were not to be so easily outmaneuvered.  
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Chapter 4: Control  
When the colonizing militaries finally defeated the confederated and organized Native 
resistance forces in the Wabash Valley (1795) and Algeria (1848), they had firmly established 
their settler colonies at last. In the decade that preceded these victories, metropolitan legislation 
finally began to catch up to the military policies already in force on the ground. Internal, as well 
as external, pressures and perceived threats compelled both French and American governments 
to shore up methods of control, or “technologies of rule.” This concept describes material, 
symbolic, and representational devices used to understand and rationalize the population, land, 
and resources over which the metropolitan governments claimed to have power. These 
technologies relied on the use of experts, such as surveyors, as well as symbolic and real forms 
of power.1 “Legibility” was another essential element of Western statecraft and describes 
colonial administrators’ impulse to impose order and simplify seemingly chaotic social 
structures, resources, and land into an orderly, coherent, manipulable, and controllable system.2 
In the first two decades of settler colonization, with long-term commercial interests in mind, the 
metropoles’ single most important objective was to establish control.3  
                                                
1 This definition is my own but stems from Foucault’s examination of governmentality in his 
1978-1979 series of Collège de France lectures and has been influenced by reading analyses of 
Michel Foucault’s work [such as Thomas Lemke, “An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, 
Governmentality, and State Theory,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, No. 15 
(2007)]; Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002). Symbolic and real forms of power, in this case included 
maps and military might. See also Lauren Benton, "Spatial Histories of Empire,” Itinerario 30, 
no. 3 (2006): 19-34. 
2 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 1–24. 
3 For the American case, cf. Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812; 
Prucha, American Indian Policy; Onuf, Statehood and Union; David Andrew Nichols, Red 
Gentlemen & White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American 
Frontier, Jeffersonian America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008). I am 
extending arguments that have been made about the United States during the early republican 
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When the United States claimed the western territories following the Treaty of Paris in 
1783 and France invaded Algeria in 1830, they had few tools to craft settler colonial institutions 
or governing structures. From experience as British colonies (the United States) and colonizing 
American territories (France), they developed numerous creative legislative tools and 
justifications over time and tailored to each situation as it arose within the settler colonies. These 
colonial technologies of rule came to include increased military forces; policy development; 
institutions of control such courts and prisons; land surveys; treaty negotiations. As the 
colonizing forces (militaries, officials, and settlers) sought access to more land, they also created 
a number of policies to remove the Indigenous peoples and make space for settlers. 
Sequestration, refoulement (pushing Indigenous peoples back from desirable property), and 
cantonnement (placing boundaries around Indigenous communities and/or creating 
“reservations” for them) entered the settler colonial toolbox. 
This chapter looks at the final moment of the initial phase of settler colonization when the 
military and metropole began to work in greater harmony. In America, it traces Indigenous 
resistance movements and American counterattacks through the Native Confederacy's defeat at 
the Battle of Fallen Timbers against American General Anthony Wayne's forces in 1794.  It 
places particular emphasis on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which established a template for 
integrating colonized lands into the United States as territories under the administration of the 
US government and eventually as states. It then uncovers similar French land policies in Algeria, 
the role of Indigenous leaders in fighting, fleeing, or accommodating the French, as well as the 
discursive moves the French government made to justify its acquisition of Indigenous lands.  
                                                                                                                                                       
period to the context of French Algeria. Both metropolitan governments felt pressured to 
establish their legitimacy in answer to internal and external exigencies. Additionally, the United 
States and France developed congruent solutions to meet similar challenges that their colonies 
posed. 
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United States: Black Clouds and Council Fires 
Immediately after signing the Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution 
in1783, American officials attempted to impose the “right of conquest” on Native peoples in the 
Ohio and Wabash Valleys to justify the acquisition of land. However, their stance predated their 
ability to enforce the mid-1780s treaties and land cessions by a decade. From 1783 through 1793, 
Native war chiefs led successful campaigns against American backcountry settlers to protect 
their homelands.  The Treaties of Fort Stanwix (1784), Fort McIntosh (1785), and Fort Finney 
(1786) were unenforceable because Native communities in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys 
maintained their sovereignty over the region, despite the United States’ claims to the contrary.  
The treaties also had the unintended consequence of uniting these Indigenous communities 
against the United States. Under the leadership of the Miami and militant Shawnee, the 
Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Piankeshaw, Wea, Five Nations, and even the Wyandot and Delaware 
(formerly United States allies) formed a powerful Native confederacy.4  
Loosely organized in 1783, the ties that bound the Native confederacy together became 
stronger in response to the mid-1780s treaties. As the confederacy became more powerful and 
rallied around a common commitment to resist the imposition of those treaties, it pushed the 
United States to step back from its rhetoric of conquest and take a more conciliatory tone in 
negotiations.5 In a council meeting, Shawnee, Delaware, and Wyandot war chiefs warned that “if 
                                                
4 Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, "'A Superior Civilization': Appropriation, Negotiation, and 
Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795," in The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and 
Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850, ed. Daniel P. Barr 
(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006), 118-142. Dowd also argued that the “Americans' 
killing of neutralist supporters among the Delawares, Shawnees, Cherokees, and Creeks between 
1782 and 1788 brought unprecedented opportunities to Indian militants” and strengthened the 
bonds between Native communities in the borderlands. (Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 99)  
5 Richard White, Middle Ground, 433-443. White argues that this confederacy also came to 
absorb European alliances toward the end of the 1780s and depended on British aid by the early 
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the surveyors [came…] to survey the land or if any of the white people [came] to sit Down on it, 
[they would] put [their] Old men and Chiefs behind [them] and fight for [their] land while [they 
had] a Man.”6 Similarly, American trader David Duncan reported that the Ottawa, “Chippewa 
and other nations that arrived at the Shawnee Town on their way to the council at the mouth of 
the Miami” decided that if the council should be about obtaining Native lands, they would return 
home and the Americans “shall have as much [land] as they want that is the Breadth of their 
Back, Belly or side[,] which ever way [they] fall [dead in battle].”7  Duncan concluded that the 
commissioners responsible for the previous negotiations had “done a Great injury to [the] United 
States” by stirring up the resentments of the Indigenous communities with whom they treated.8  
By 1786, the civil chiefs who attempted to maintain peaceful relations along the frontier 
had lost control over their young men. They kept their people close to home and at peace but 
were powerless over the furious warriors, especially those of other nations.9 Speaking on behalf 
of Shawnee leaders as well, they stated that they had “done all [they could] to Stop these Bad 
People but [could] do nothing with them.”10 They faced a difficult predicament.  
                                                                                                                                                       
1790s. The confederacy pushed for acceptance of the principle of common Native land 
ownership and for the Ohio River to be the boundary, which they later pushed back to the 
Muskingum River. This principle meant that land could not be ceded to the Americans unless the 
confederacy, not an individual leader or community, agreed to the cession. 
6 David Duncan to Harmar, Pittsburgh, 28 March 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 4,William 
Clements Library. Delaware Records 1786-1787, OVGLEA. See also, White, Middle Ground, 
436-439. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Barnes, Native American Power in the United States, 1783-1795. 
10 A missive from Delaware and Wyandot Chiefs at Sandusky to American Major Hamtramck on 
June 1, 1786 revealed how little they could do to prevent continued cycles of violence on the 
frontiers.  Delaware and Wyandot Chiefs of Sandusky, Speech to Major Hamtramck, Sandusky, 
1 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, William Clements Library, in Delaware Papers 1786-1787, 
OVGLEA. 
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In conversation with one of the United States surveyors in 1786, Captain Pipe of the 
Delaware chided the Americans for being in too great a hurry to survey the lands they desired. 
Wyandot chief, Half King, then explained that the Wyandot and Delaware could not offer up the 
lands the Americans wanted just yet. They were “between two fires” – afraid of the Americans 
but also of the powerful “back Nations” of the Wabash Valley and Illinois Country. Half King’s 
evocative imagery provides a useful metaphor for the quandary of Indigenous communities, 
settlers, and even metropolitan officials in settler colonies. In their own way, each existed 
between two fires – settlers between metropolitan policies and Native warriors that limited their 
freedom; Indigenous civil leaders between martial settlers and militant Natives; and metropolitan 
officials who sought to mitigate the threat Indigenous peoples posed to their expansionist 
policies as well as the dangers their own settlers posed to regional stability.  
Martial settlers, like George Rogers Clark, only made relations worse. Raising a company 
of men to “chastise” the Natives at the end of June 1786, Clark was “determined not to return 
without d[e]stroying their country or reducing them to Terms of [his] own.”11  Simultaneously, 
Secretary of War Henry Knox counseled just the opposite approach to General Harmar, revealing 
once again the chasm between officials’ vision of the settlement process and American-Native 
relations and those of the martial settlers. The official United States policy was not to “chastise” 
Native people but merely to “repel the incursions or depredations of the Indians [and] … not 
form any offensive operations into the indian [sic] country without … express orders.”12  
Knox’s orders indicated a significant shift in United States policy in 1786. Previous 
orders were to keep the settlers out of “Indian Country” and prevent them from harassing the 
                                                
11 Clark to Wyllys [opened by W. Finney], Danville, 25 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, 
William Clements Library, in Delaware Records 1786-1787, OVGLEA. 
12 Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. Miami 
Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA. 
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Indigenous peoples. Instead of protecting Indigenous peoples from the lawless “white savages," 
the American state quickly transitioned to protecting their settlers.13 However, if settlers squatted 
on lands that the United States government had not yet sold them or migrated onto Native lands, 
they were beyond the pale. Such settlers flouted U.S. authority, provoked Native hostility, and 
circumvented the revenue-generating function that western lands were supposed to serve for the 
American government.  In both Native treaties and American law, the U.S. government gave the 
Native peoples permission to punish the wayward settlers.14  
Furthermore, an “Indian war” would “exceedingly embarrass the United States” and 
ought to be avoided “[consistent] with the dignity of the nation.”  Knox ordered Harmar to  
prevent or remove every just cause of complaint on the part of the indians. But if they 
will wantonly be the aggressors, and attack the troops or settlers under the protection of 
the troops, make them if possible repent it with bitterness. But you will remark that this 
conduct is only to be dictated by the principle of unprovoked aggression on their part.15  
The problem with this prescription was that the settlers believed every Native attack was 
unprovoked.16 
Knox’s views contrasted strongly with a number of military leaders on the frontier, as 
well as with the settlers living in constant fear of Indian raids. Anxiously awaiting word of 
impending Indigenous campaigns against him, Captain Finney was “convinced that Military 
force only can make a permanent peece [sic] with the Indians & Circomscribe [sic] their Bounds, 
                                                
13 For “white savages,” see Jay to Jefferson, 14 December 1786. 
14 Cf. “Northwest Ordinance of 1787,” Territorial Papers, 2: 45; “Treaty of Greenville,” 3 
August 1795, Territorial Papers, 2: 525-534. 
15 Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. Miami 
Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA. 
16 Taylor, The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American 
Revolution, 138–139; Griffin, American Leviathan, 192–193; White, The Middle Ground, 384–
420. 
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the Treasure Expendid on Treatty’s might be much more Advantagesouly apply’d in Equipping 
Troops for that purpose.”17 While not unanimously subscribed to, parallel sentiments that 
minimized the humanity of the “other” developed on both sides of the settler colonial conflict in 
response to the unceasing cycle of violence. 
Many Native young men came to view the backcountry settlers in terms that mirrored 
settlers’ understanding of them. “The Indian nations of the American side [as opposed to Spain’s 
nominally held territory] are so decidedly displeased and irritated against the Americans, that 
daily we are receiving news that they kill them whenever they meet them.”18 Similarly, [Captain] 
Le Gras reported from Vincennes that 450 warriors had gathered to “massacre all the Americans 
they should find,” but the Native warriors still differentiated between white settlers and warned 
the French of the impending attack.19  
Congress waited in great expectation for the western land sales to fill the depleted 
coffers; the work of the surveyors was, therefore, immensely important. Consequently, Knox 
advised Harmar to “take the field and collect the greater part of your force immediately in the 
neighborhood of the surveyors, so as to prevent their being sacrificed by the banditti Cherokees, 
whose residence on the head waters of the Scioto [River] would enable them to frustrate the 
wishes of Congress by deterring or killing the surveyors.”20 Guarding the surveyors protected the 
                                                
17 Finney to Harmar, Fort Finney, 3 July 1786, Harmar Papers Reel 2, Clements Library, Miami 
Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA. 
18 [Spanish commandant of St. Louis] Franco Cruzat to [Spanish Governor] Don Estevan Miró, 
St. Louis of Ylinueses, 19 July 1786, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, Part 2, ed. Lawrence 
Kinnaird (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 173-4.  
19 Le Gras to General George Rogers Clark, Post Vincennes, 22 July 1786, Spain in the 
Mississippi Valley, Part 2, ed. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1949), 175-181, in Delaware Papers, 1786-1787, OVGLEA. 
20 Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. Miami 
Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA. 
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interests and will of Congress, the government of the new republic.21 Successfully defending the 
will of the government would serve to legitimate its authority over both the Native population 
and settlers it sought to control. Completing the land surveys and plats also served to make the 
land “legible” to the government and therefore controllable. In the late 1780s, both American 
administrators and settlers continued to relentlessly, desperately pursue their intended course of 
action and persisted in surveying the lands that they claimed according to the hotly contested 
treaty cessions of the previous years.22  
On August 7, 1786, Congress passed the “Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian 
Affairs,” thereby establishing a system of military governance, the responsibilities of territorial 
superintendants and procedures for trade.23 The ordinance redefined the two geographically 
based departments and placed them under the United States War Department. The southern 
department consisted of all lands within the boundaries of the United States south of the Ohio 
River, while lands north of the Ohio River and west of the Hudson River comprised the northern 
department. A superintendent governed each department and reported directly to the Secretary of 
War. The ordinance also granted the northern superintendent the right to appoint two deputies 
“to reside in such places as shall best facilitate the regulations of the Indian trade” and to grant 
trade licenses to Americans.24 The superintendent reported on the sentiment among the Native 
communities in his department to the Secretary of War and governors if the Natives threatened 
action against their states. He also oversaw the gifts given to Native leaders, in addition to 
American-Native trade, and sent records of the transactions to the Board of Treasury, thus 
                                                
21 Report of Committee of United States Congress, 20 October 1786 in Pennsylvania Archives, 
1st Ser, 9: 72-3. 
22 Treaties of Forts Stanwix (1784), McIntosh (1785), and Finney (1786). 
23 “Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” 7 August 1786, Territorial Papers 2: 19-22. 
24 “An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” 7 August 1786, Territorial Papers 2: 20. 
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linking the treasury with the oversight of Indigenous commerce, the movement of Native peoples 
and American citizens, and the Department of War.  
At the same time, government officials continually expressed fears about internal and 
external threats to American political stability. Whether or not the American state was actually at 
risk of falling apart or that the western territories were truly on the cusp of allying with Great 
Britain or Spain against the United States is debatable.25 However, early American leaders’ 
perceptions that those possibilities were real and posed a grave threat to national security drove 
their decision-making. Therefore, determining how to satisfy backcountry settler demands for 
protection and incorporation into the American federal government became an essential task for 
Congress as 1786 faded into 1787, and tensions continued to escalate in borderlands.  
Congress optimistically passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to officially recognize 
the colonies that settlers had established, provide for their governance, and outline the process by 
which they could become states. It created a system of limited representative governance under 
an authoritative governor and declared that as new states within the union, they would enjoy 
equal rights and privileges, including full representation in Congress.26 At a time when more than 
                                                
25 Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United 
States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983, 2001), see esp. 183-
184. 
26 Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812, 37–38; Onuf, Statehood and 
Union, xiii–xiv, 58–66; White, The Middle Ground, 416, 431; Barnes, Native American Power in 
the United States, 1783-1795, 54, 121; Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 132–133. The 
ordinances of the 1780s formed the foundation of the American colonial (viz. 'territorial') system 
and provided a template for bringing all future colonial projects and lands under the sovereignty 
of the United States and into the federal governing structure. The 1754 Albany Plan of Union 
was the first proposal of westward colonies on the Ohio River and in Great Lakes region, 
Wozniak argues (288). The settlement of western territories was linked to establishing and 
maintaining border security (288). Wozniak suggests that the ordinances addressed three 
dilemmas the colonies were meant to overcome: (1) security concerns over potential Indigenous, 
British, and Spanish attacks, (2) acquiring western claims, and (3) 'the desire for a sphere of 
continued growth of colonial trade, settlement and land speculation' (302). (C. J. Wozniak, “The 
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a few American and international statesmen speculated that the United States teetered on the 
brink of collapse under the weight of regional divisions, the threat of Native American war, and 
the constitutional crisis, the Confederation Congress looked forward to a successful expansive 
union. 
Given that the Revolutionary War had been fought, in part to protect property rights, 
Congressmen were sensitive to the many petitions they received from both French and American 
settlers seeking to safeguard their land claims in the backcountry. The French, on the one hand, 
relied on their “ancient” right acquired from the original inhabitants, the Piankeshaw, in much 
the same way early Anglo-American colonists justified their own property rights in New 
England.27 American settlers, on the other hand, made a compelling case by documenting their 
alignment with American revolutionary principles and values. Many of the early settlers were 
veterans of the war and were owed land in payment for their service. They also pointed to the 
merits of their character – they were worthy of the lands they claimed as intrepid adventurers 
who were neither  
borne down under the weight of poverty nor deterred by difficulties, determined to seek 
an asylum into some of the rich countries which the fate of war had subjected to the 
American empire … unmindful of a long & perilous navigation, of the inclemency of the 
seasons, of the savage fury of innumerable Indian tribes through whom we had to fight 
our way.28  
                                                                                                                                                       
New Western Colony Schemes: A Preview of the United States Territorial System,” The Indiana 
Magazine of History (1972): 283–306.) 
27 Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier; “Petition of 
the Inhabitants of Post Vincennes,” 26 July 1787, Territorial Records 2: 58-60. 
28 “Petition to Congress from the Illinois Country,” August 27, 1787, Territorial Records, 2: 68. 
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These men and women, according to their petitions at least, embodied a steadfastness that early 
Republican leaders admired. "By becoming champions of individual liberty and local 
sovereignty, [the frontiersmen] forced men in positions of power to accommodate, but not to 
surrender their notions of social order."29 What was more, their home state of Virginia 
sanctioned their settlements, and the cession of land from Virginia to the United States 
“stipulated … that the settlers who had professed themselves citizens of that State should have 
their possessions & claims confirmed to them; which was agreed to by Congress.”30  
In recognition of the justness and legitimacy of their claims, they requested that Congress 
acknowledge and confirm their property ownership and guarantee to them 500 acres for every 
white male American citizen in the territory,  
With a respectful confidence that the Honorable the Congress will not overlook our 
grounded expectations as claimants under the French Charters, our rights as Settlers 
under the State of Virginia, and our sufferings as a wandering family, Your Petitioners as 
in duty bound will ever pray for the honor welfare & glory of the United-States of North-
America.31 
After numerous similar petitions, Congress confirmed the settlers’ land claims in the summer of 
1788.32  In their response, Congress sought to attach both the French and American settlers 
firmly to the interests of the United States. 
                                                
29 Andrew Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 
(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), xi. Cayton also maintains that the frontiersmen's 
independence in the Ohio Valley and the individualistic land rush by common people rather than 
the orderly land speculation of gentlemen "was part of the larger revolution in American life in 
the late eighteenth century” (xi). 
30 “Petition to Congress from the Illinois Country,” August 27, 1787, Territorial Papers, 2: 69. 
31 “Petition to Congress from the Illinois Country,” 70. 
32 “Resolved: That measures be taken for confirming in their possessions and titles the french 
[sic] and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers at post St Vincents who on or before the year 
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By the late 1780s, the Native confederacy compelled the United States to give up the 
myth of conquest as the pretext for acquiring Native lands and to return to the former policy of 
“purchasing the right of soil of the Indians[. R]eceiving a deed of sale and conveyance of the 
same, is the only mode of alienating their lands, to which they will peaceably accede.”33  With 
the reputation of the United States ever in mind, Knox observed,  
Your Secretary humbly apprehends that the United States may conform to the modes and 
customs of the Indians in the disposal of their lands, without the least injury to the 
national dignity. … to attempt to establish a right to the lands claimed by the Indians, by 
virtue of an implied conquest, will require the constant employment of a large body of 
troops, or the utter extirpation of the Indians.34  
While the latter two options – expanding the military presence in the American backcountry or 
driving the Native peoples out of the lands using any means necessary – were under 
consideration, Knox and most Congressmen viewed them unfavorably.35 These means of 
acquiring the desired territories were only to be used as a last resort. Yet, correspondence, 
                                                                                                                                                       
1783 had settled there and had professed themselves citizens of the United States or any of them, 
and for laying off for them at their own expence [sic] the several tracts which they rightfully 
claim & which may have been allotted to them according to the laws & Usages of the 
Governments under which they have respectively settled.” (“Resolution of Congress: The 
Inhabitants of Vincennes,” August 29, 1788, Territorial Papers, 2: 145). 
33 “Report of the Secretary at War: Indian Affairs,” May 2, 1788 in Territorial Papers, 2: 104; 
Banner, 133-134. 
34 “Report of the Secretary at War: Indian Affairs,” May 2, 1788 in Territorial Papers, 2: 104. 
35 Washington to Henry Knox, Mount Vernon, 5 December 1784 in Fitzpatrick, The Writings of 
George Washington, 28: 3-5; Washington to the President of Congress, Mount Vernon, 15 
March 1785 in Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington, 28: 108-109; Knox to Harmar, 
War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. 
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particularly among military commanders, exposes their willingness and that of the United States 
to employ force to achieve their objective.36 
Furthermore, the political instability during the “Constitutional crisis” – waiting for the 
states to ratify the new Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation and establish a 
durable government – pushed United States officials to acquiesce to Native demands.37  
As an extensive indian [sic] war in the present political crisis, and with an exhausted 
treasury, would be an event pregnant with unlimited evil, your Secretary submits, with all 
deference, the consideration of the propriety of so modifying the instructions to the 
Governor of the Western territory, and the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, as to admit 
of their extinguishing, by purchase, the indian [sic] claims to the Western country, 
described in the former treaties [of 1784, 1785, and 1786], with such additions, as the 
said commissioners shall be able to effect.38 
The American stance reverted to a recognition of Native land rights and sovereignty shortly after 
the signing of the 1786 Treaty of Fort Finney when the confederated Native communities 
threatened war, and Knox reported that the United States could not fund a proper defense.39 
                                                
36 Harmar to Knox, Philadelphia, 22 October 1785 in C.W. Butterfield (Ed), Journal of Captain 
Jonathan Heart, 1785. (Albany, 1885), 92-94; Finney to Harmar, Fort Finney, 3 July 1786, 
Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. See also, “Report of Committee of United States 
Congress,” 20 October 1786 in Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Ser, 11: 72-3. “That the Committee, 
therefore, deem it highly necessary that the Troops in the Service of the United States be 
immediately Augmented, not only for the protection and support of the frontiers of the States 
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United States" (Report of Committee of US Congress, 1786, page 72). 
37 Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic, 183–186; Onuf, Statehood and Union; Nichols, 
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38 “Report of the Secretary at War: Indian Affairs,” 2 May 1788, in Territorial Papers, 2: 105. 
39 Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812, 32–52. 
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Those on the ground took a different stance, however. Notably, Governor Arthur St. 
Clair’s tone shifted in 1788 to align with that of the militant settlers. In his communications with 
Native leaders, St. Clair became antagonistic and threatening. Imperiously addressing 
Algonquian peoples in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys, he raged about the frontier violence. 
However, he neglected to acknowledge the atrocities by backcountry settlers behind the latest 
cycle of attacks. What was more, the symbol of the United States, its flag, had been fired upon! 
Of greater concern was the attack on “a small party of Soldiers [who] were sent to watch the 
Council Fire, kindled at your request; --to build a Council House for you to meet in; and to take 
care of the provisions sent there to feed you.”40 Venting his umbrage, he continued,  
Answer me, Should these things be? In the name of the United States I require an 
immediate explanation of these transactions, and demand satisfaction and the restitution 
of the Prisoners – Until these are made, as there can be no confidence[,] it will be 
improper we should meet one another in Council. … Brothers The United States are 
sincerely desirous of Peace, but if you will have War, why you shall have War.41   
Native statesmen expected such brashness from American war leaders, like George 
Rogers Clark, but St. Clair was a civilian governor, despite his military rank. His intermingled 
threats and convoluted peace offerings were both confusing and menacing to the recipients of his 
messages. After receiving reports from a recent council of the confederated tribes, St. Clair 
determined that “a war with the Western tribes … seems inevitable … a war with them will 
probably involve some others [tribes]; and it will soon become general,” he posited. “In that 
case, permit me to give you my Ideas of the most effectual manner of bringing them to their 
                                                
40 St. Clair to the Indians in Council, 13 July 1788, Territorial Papers, 2: 128. 
41 Ibid. 
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Senses.”42 St. Clair’s arrogant assumptions about how to bring the “haughty” Indigenous peoples  
“to their senses,” proved to be ill-conceived when both General Josiah Harmar (1790) and forces 
under his own command (1791) suffered the worst defeats the American military had ever 
seen.43  
 American settlement and the establishment of governing structures and institutions of 
control continued apace. In 1788, St. Clair reported that the “Government [of the territories] has 
been put in motion – a County erected by the name of Washington, Courts instituted, and the 
Officers necessary for the Administration of Justice appointed.”44 The following year, Acting 
Governor Winthrop Sargent enumerated the settlement progress between August 1786 and 
December 1789: “the Migration from the Head Waters [of the Ohio River] & under Observation 
of Fort Harmar … stands thus: 1264 Boats – 23618 Souls, 10244 Horses – 2539 Cows – 2280 
Sheep – 687 Waggons [sic] – in which is comprehended Our Settlements.”45 Emigrants arrived 
almost faster than they could be counted and often outran the land that had been surveyed, 
platted, and prepared for sale. Looking back on a century of settlement in the Northwest 
Territory, Israel Ward Andrews triumphantly described “The Beginnings of the Colonial System 
of the United States” in 1885:  
The formation of this society comes at an opportune moment. In a little more than three 
years a century will have elapsed since the first permanent white settlement was made 
within the limits of the great region Northwest of the River Ohio. That settlement was the 
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beginning, not only of this good State of Ohio, but also of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin, which have all been formed from that Northwest Territory. It was not an 
accidental settlement that was made on the 7th of April, 1788, at the mouth of the 
Muskingum, nor was it any fortuitous collection of men that first planted themselves on 
the soil of Ohio. It was the result of careful deliberation by wise and prudent and patriotic 
men.46 
As the “rage of emigration” continued, St. Clair, Washington, and Knox worried about 
the United States’ loss of control over the settlers and the settlement process. The “Advantages 
of [that] Country” drew settlers to migrate of their own accord and “establish themselves without 
Authority.” St. Clair feared that those who settled the land outside of the aegis of the United 
States government “would introduce a Spirit of Licentiousness … that might not be very easily 
repressed.”47 His concerns were well founded and shared among other leading officials.  
To address concerns about the lack of control and the possibility that the United States 
might be seen as weak, St. Clair requested funds and men to augment the administrative and 
judicial infrastructure of western territories. He asked that more judges be sent out from each of 
the states to develop a coherent set of legal codes to which the diverse population would be 
                                                
46 Israel Ward Andrews, “The Beginnings of the Colonial System of the United States,” An 
address delivered before the Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society at its first public 
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amenable. An attorney general, he stated, was essential to assist him in understanding the 
policies the judges drafted, as he had little legal training, and finally, he recommended that a 
printer, press, and supplies be sent to publicize the laws once they were passed.48 The following 
year, he sent orders to Kaskaskia to build a prison 
As there is nothing more necessary for the happiness of society than the proper 
administration of justice, the prevention of crimes or the punishment thereof in cases 
where it is impossible to prevent them, and that good citizens be protected in their lives, 
and their property.49  
Control over the settlers, as much as the Native population, was of utmost importance to the 
United States.  
 An important aspect of exerting control over the settlers was ensuring their attachment to 
the United States and preventing a transfer of their allegiance to nearby foreign powers. Great 
Britain and Spain eagerly awaited the collapse of the United States and an opportunity to regain 
their lost American colonies. American officials and military leaders walked a fine line as they 
attempted to regulate settlement – keeping Americans out of Native territories, maintaining 
peace between the backcountry Americans and their Indigenous neighbors, while they acquired 
and surveyed more Native land. In an effort to keep Americans loyal to their government, St. 
Clair did his best to place troops and militia strategically to protect the settlements.50 However, 
settlers continued to encroach on Native lands and attack Native villages, adding fuel to the cycle 
of violence.  
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 By 1790 when St. Clair sent Antoine Gamelin to the Wabash villages with a message of 
peace and an invitation to a treaty council, Gamelin received ambivalent and cool responses from 
the confederated Native leaders. At each village he visited – the Piankeshaw, then the Kickapoo 
communities, and the Wea – he received the same response: the chiefs could not give him an 
answer until they had consulted with the Miami, the leaders of the confederacy. The Shawnee 
war chief Blue Jacket refused to provide an answer until he had sent word to the British 
commandant at Detroit – a response that infuriated the Americans.51 Blue Jacket explained that 
the Shawnee did not trust the  
sincerity of the Big-knifes [American settlers], so called, having been already deceived 
by them. That they had first destroyed [Shawnee] lands, put out their fire … taken their 
women [and…] they [could not] forget these affronts. Moreover, that some other nations 
were apprehending that offers of peace would … tend to take away their lands52 
and the new American settlement on the Ohio River served “as certain proof that [the 
Americans] intend to encroach on [Shawnee] lands.”53 After hearing that Gamelin’s mission 
failed to bring the Wabash nations in to sign a peace treaty, St. Clair concluded that Wabash 
communities had essentially declared war.54  
 The only response, St. Clair proclaimed, was to employ “force to reduce them to reason” 
and to defend the reputation of the United States. “Should the Savages be suffered to insult the 
Government, and murder and rob the People with impunity, its credit would be lowered very 
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much, both with foreign Nations and its own Citizens.”55 Consequently, Congress agreed to fund 
and launch a campaign against the confederacy in the Wabash Valley.56 With 1,453 troops 
comprised mostly of untrained militia and only three hundred soldiers, Harmar set out for the 
Miami towns in late September 1790.57  
St. Clair and Harmar initially portrayed the campaign as a success. “The substance of the 
work is this,” Harmar wrote in November,  
our loss was heavy, but the head quarters of iniquity were broken up. At a moderate 
computation, not less than 100 or 120 warriors were slain, and 300 log-houses and 
wigwams burned. Our loss about 180. The remainder of the Indians will be ill off for 
sustenance; 20,000 bushels of corn, in the ears, were consumed, burned, and destroyed, 
by the army with vegetables in abundance. The loss of Major Wyllys and Lieutenant 
Frothingham, of the Federal troops, and a number of valuable militia officers, I sincerely 
lament.58 
British sources reveal that it was the worst American military defeat to date.59 American military 
commander and Northern “Indian” Superintendent, Rufus Putnam, later recalled the significance 
of Harmar’s loss: 
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Our prospects are much changed. in stead of peace and friendship with our Indian 
neighbours a [horrid] Savage war Stairs us in the face. the Indians in stead of being 
humbled by the Destruction of the Shawone [Shawnee] Towns & brought to beg for 
peace, appear determined on a general War, in which our Settlements are already 
involved. [The Native peoples] were much elated with [their] success & threatened there 
should not remain a Smoak on the ohio by the time the Leaves put out.60 
In an attempt to recover from the defeat and prevent additional Native raids on the frontier 
settlements, Washington promoted Governor St. Clair to Major General and placed Colonel 
Richard Butler second in command while General Harmar was being tried by court martial to 
determine his culpability for the dramatic rout of American forces.61 
Near the headwaters of the Wabash in the pre-dawn hours of November 4, 1791, a joint 
Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware war party under the leadership of Miami chief Little Turtle, 
launched a surprise attack on St. Clair’s unprepared army. Within minutes, Little Turtle’s 1400 
warriors had dispersed the front line of militia who scrambled back to the main encampment.62 
The Americans’ hasty retreat disrupted the soldiers and militia at the next line of defense so they 
could not rally in time to face the oncoming warriors. Picking off the commanders, especially 
those firing the artillery, the allied Algonquian warriors caused even more chaos. Without 
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leaders, the undisciplined men threw down their weapons and ran, leaving women and children 
behind in the field to be killed along with the remaining men who attempted to make a stand. 
Apart from General St. Clair, only one other officer escaped with his life. More than 800 men of 
the 1669 were killed in battle, more than 1000 people total when women and children are 
counted in the number.63 “The retreat in those circumstances,” recounted St. Clair, “was… a very 
precipitate one; it was, in fact, a flight.”64  In St. Clair’s own words, the results of his campaign 
were devastating. He did not even attempt to put a positive spin on what can hardly be termed a 
“battle.” 
Yesterday afternoon the remains of the army under my command got back to this place, 
and I have now the painful task to give you an account of as warm and as unfortunate an 
action as almost any that has been fought, in which every corps was engaged and 
worsted, except the First Regiment.65 
Little Turtle’s unquestioned victory over the American forces strengthened the ties of the 
Native confederacy and gave them additional leverage in treaty negotiations for several years.66 
Faced with the decision of abandoning its colonial project and the quickly growing settlements in 
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the borderlands or committing more resources to their protection, Washington, his cabinet, and 
Congress chose to defend the settlers. Secretary of War, Henry Knox, echoing the sentiments of 
Washington and other officials, declared 
It would appear, that the principles of justice as well as policy, and, it may be added, the 
principles of economy, all combine to dictate, that an adequate military force should be 
raised as soon as possible, placed upon the frontiers, and disciplined according to the 
nature of the service, in order to meet, with a prospect of success, the greatest probable 
combination of the Indian enemy.67 
To that end, Washington, with the advice of his cabinet, appointed former Revolutionary War 
commander Anthony Wayne to lead, train, and discipline the soldiers raised for the next 
campaign.68  
With 3000 well-trained professional soldiers, Wayne surprised a portion of the allied 
Native fighting force after they had fasted for several days awaiting a battle that arrived later 
than expected. Mustered at Fort Recovery built on the site of St. Clair’s defeat, Wayne whipped 
the men into shape, punishing desertion severely and balancing harsh discipline with mercy to 
ensure the loyalty of the troops. By the summer of 1794, Wayne’s force was ready to take the 
field against their Indigenous enemies.69  
Aware of Wayne’s intention, 1300 warriors assembled, set out for “the most 
advantageous ground," and began ritual preparations for battle. One of their spies reported that 
Wayne would attack on August 18 unless the troops stopped to build a fort, in which case, he 
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would attack the following day.70   Wayne struck as the warriors were still assembling and 
recovering from a previous day's fast.71  After a short sharp battle, Indigenous warriors retreated 
below the British fort, “imagining their loss to be much greater than it since appears to have 
been[,] having seen several of their principal Chiefs fall.”72 Eight Wyandot and two Ottawa 
chiefs were killed and more were wounded. When they appealed to Fort Miami for aid, the 
British shut the gates in their former allies’ faces, including the French- and English-speaking 
Canadians who fought along side the Native warriors. The loss of British support and assistance 
left the Indigenous communities starving and dejected following their defeat and the devastation 
American forces wrought on the countryside. In the aftermath of the battle, the American 
military swept through the surrounding territory, destroying homes and crops, mutilating the 
remains of Native warriors and opening graves to drive stakes through dead and decaying 
Indigenous corpses.73 
The Indigenous confederacy’s failure at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 dashed their 
hopes of maintaining the Ohio River as the boundary between their own communities and 
American settlers. It also signified the loss of much-needed British assistance and the beginning 
of true starvation that forced reliance on their American foes. That was only the beginning, 
however. In the 1794 agreement that Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay negotiated with Great 
Britain, the British agreed to abide by the Treaty of Paris (1783) that ended the Revolution. 
According to Jay’s Treaty, the British consented to remove their troops from the Great Lakes 
forts they had held since 1763. Signed November 19, 1794, Jay’s Treaty threatened to remove 
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the British from the immediate vicinity of their Native allies, which would compel Native leaders 
to turn to the Americans for trade goods and food.74  
“Starving, disarmed, and undoubtedly weary of twenty years of war, the northern Indians 
came to terms with Wayne in the Treaty of Greenville, signed over the course of the summer of 
1795.”75 The Treaty of Greenville was a major step toward establishing the territories were 
firmly within the grasp of the American nation as settler colonies.76 It was also an opportunity to 
exert the United States’ newfound authority, obtained through the professionalization of their 
military.  
to indemnify the United States for the injuries and expences [sic] they have sustained 
during the War; the said Indians tribes do hereby cede & relinquish forever, all their 
claims to the lands lying Eastwardly and Southwardly of the general boundary line now 
described. … And whenever the United States shall think proper to survey and mark the 
boundaries of the lands hereby Ceded to them, they shall give timely notice thereof to the 
said Tribes of Indians, that they may appoint some of their wise chiefs to attend and see 
that the lines are run according to the terms of this treaty.77   
The Treaty of Greenville laid the foundation for John Marshall’s 1831 declaration that 
Indigenous peoples were "domestic dependent nations" under the sovereignty of the United 
States: “the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the 
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said United States, and no other power whatever.”78 While the United States had difficulty 
enforcing this position, it was another significant move to establish its settler imperial authority 
over Native peoples. 
Twelve Native groups agreed to cede most of the present state of Ohio and the southeast 
corner of Indiana to the United States government, thereby creating “the original nucleus of 
public domain in the Old Northwest.”79 Lands in the public domain, as we shall see more clearly 
in the Algerian example, were crucial. They provided a cornerstone on which to build structures 
of colonial governance and control and a place for the settlers clamoring for land, as well as 
revenue to fund colonial administration and continued conquest.  
Algeria: Conquering Space, Settling People 
Upon the fall of Algiers in 1830, the French military acquired thousands of acres of 
beylikal lands for the French public domain and took the first step toward settler colonization. 
When the Dey of Algiers capitulated to the French military on July 5, 1830, General Louis 
Comte de Bourmont declared France to be in possession of all beylik lands thenceforth by right 
of conquest.80 Beylik lands belonged to the dey of Algiers and the beys of Constantine, Titeri, and 
Oran and composed the public domain or state-held property.81  
As the military continued its campaign beyond Algiers, it created small circles of French 
power around the conquered cities. Within these zones of French occupation, French military 
                                                
78 “Treaty of Greenville,” 529. See “Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia,” 30 U.S. 1 (1831), 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=30&invol=1 (Accessed 28 
February 2015). 
79 Thomas Campion, “Indian Removal and the Transformation of Northern Indiana,” Indiana 
Magazine of History 107, no. 1 (March 2011), 36. 
80 Terms of the capitulation can be found in Ministère de la Guerre, Collection des actes du 
gouvernement depuis l’occupation d’Alger jusqu’au 1er octobre 1834 (Paris: 1843), 1-2. 
81 Ruedy, Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain, 10:1, 9, 13–
17. 
 241 
commanders sought to enrich themselves through land acquisition and by selling some of these 
properties to anxious speculators.82 They, in turn, sought financial gain through land sales to 
incoming settlers. Of dubious legality, the colonizers scrabbled to place at least a veneer of 
legitimacy on these transactions.83 French bureaucrats based their claims on the French Civil 
Code of 1804, specifically two of the six General Dispositions in Book III - Of the Modes of 
Acquiring Property, as follows: 
713. Property which has no owner belongs to the nation. 
714. There are things which belong to no one, and the use whereof is common to all. The 
laws of police regulate the manner of enjoying such.84 
Codes 713 and 714 were used extensively as Algerians fled before the French military and 
subsequently did not present themselves to the Direction des Domaines to obtain a (French) 
certified title to their property. A decree announced March 1, 1833 specifically cites Article 714 
as justification for land seizures if Native Algerians did not deposit evidence of their land titles to 
the French domain administration within three days of the notice’s publication.85 The decree’s 
author, Pierre Genty de Bussy, like a number of other French military officials sought to acquire 
lands by any means necessary. Major General Eugène Pelissier de Reyanaud reported that de 
Bussy had a great desire to discover domanial properties whose titles, for the most part, had 
disappeared through carelessness of M. De Bourmont’s administration, and for this his favorite 
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idea of which the decree of March 1 was but a pale reflection, was to seize all the properties in 
the regency without distinction, except for those who might be able to make their rights prevail.86 
The desire to acquire land and its actual appropriation, whether for the French state or personal 
profit, advanced the development of a settler colony, with or without metropolitan approval. 
Based on the suggestions of the 1833 commission to Algeria, Parliament decided on a 
policy of restricted occupation to maintain French control over regions already seized, and this 
remained Parliament’s (but not the military’s) primary objective for much of the first decade of 
colonization.  With the passage of the Royal Ordinance of 22 July 1834, France formally 
recognized its military colony, the “French Possessions in North Africa” (les possessions 
françaises dans le Nord de l’Afrique). On September 1, 1834, a subsequent decree delineated the 
hierarchy of governance. The Minister of War was responsible for drafting legislation for the 
colony at the recommendation of the Governor-General, who held both civil and military 
authority in Algeria. “This measure conferred upon Algeria a regime of legislation by executive 
decree totally at odds with French public law, which recognizes the principle of separation of 
powers but which in attenuated form survived until 1946.”87 
While Parliament sanctioned the 1837 siege and conquest of Constantine, it was not yet 
ready to commit itself to a more aggressive system of colonization. 1840 found General Thomas-
Robert Bugeaud still chastising the Assembly about its lack of clear goals and unsystematic 
approach to colonization in Algeria.88 However, Abd-al-Qadir’s provocations in 1839, 
Bugeaud’s admonitions and proposals in1840, and King Louis Philippe’s support finally 
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prompted the French Parliament to join the military in taking an aggressive approach to land 
acquisition and management. 
Abd al-Qadir’s renewed declaration of war in 1839 pushed newly appointed Governor 
General Thomas Robert Bugeaud, to launch his “scorched earth” policy (November 1840 - 
1847).89 In a meeting of the lower Parliamentary council, the Chamber of Deputies, on January 
15, 1840, Bugeaud laid out his plan to vanquish Algeria:90 
…I told the commandant of these columns [in Tlemcen, Mascara, and Medeah]: ‘Your 
mission is not to run after the Arabs, which is useless; it is to prevent them from sowing, 
from harvesting, from grazing.’ (Movement [in the chamber]. Listen!) 
These murmurs seem to indicate that the Chamber finds this measure too barbarous. Sirs, 
one does not make war with philanthropy; he who wills the ends, wills the means!91 
In the same speech, Bugeaud explained that generals won European wars by attacking the 
“centers of population, commerce, industry, customs, records,” but those tactics were not 
possible because in Africa, there was “only one interest that can be wounded” - that of 
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agriculture.92 After pondering the difference between warfare conducted on European and 
African soil, he concluded, “I have reflected on this for a long time… I have not been able to 
discover any other way to subjugate the country except to seize [its agriculture].”93 
 Bugeaud was able to sell this plan as necessary in 1840 because the Algerians were 
successfully resisting the extension of French military control and settlement. The Algerians 
coalesced around two powerful resistance leaders: Abd al-Qadir in the west and Hadj Ahmed 
Bey in the east.94 While the implications of Bugeaud’s plan horrified French legislators, they 
agreed that it was necessary to achieve their goals. As Bugeaud and the military put his plan into 
action over the next seven years, French legislators and the public, alike struggled with the 
gruesome human toll it took on the Algerian population.  
In June 1845, Bugeaud left his chief of staff, Colonel Aimable Jean Jacques Pélissier, on 
a cleanup mission in Dahra. A mountainous region halfway between Algiers and Oran, Dahra 
was the site of prolonged resistance to French incursions. The Governor General instructed him 
to “smoke out” the rebels if they retreated to their caves.  
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Defeated, the Ouled-Riah sought refuge in the impregnable caves in which they had 
placed their confidence to resist the French forces. Previously, they had sent their women, 
children, troops, and all of their riches into these caves. … A simple blockade could last 
fifteen days and waste precious time in order to subjugate Dahra. Colonel Pélissier made 
the decision, therefore, to employ the means which Maréchal Governor [Bugeaud] had 
recommended in cases of extreme urgency. Many flaming bundles of sticks were thrown 
on top of the cave entrances, and all therein were suffocated. On this sad day (June 20), 
approximately 530 Arabs perished. These were the necessary consequences of this 
deplorable war constantly stoked by fanaticism.95 
Laurence Trent Cave, a British captain of the 54th Regiment and Fellow of the Royal 
Geographical Society described the French response to the massacre in Dahra: “That this was an 
unpardonable atrocity, admitting of no palliation, is sufficiently proved by the French 
themselves. The Count of Montalembert, Marshal Castellane, and the Prince de la Moskowa 
expressed their abhorrence of it in the Chamber of Peers; and the opposition Press denounced it 
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in strong terms…”96 Nevertheless, the French public remained generally supportive of the 
colonial project in Algeria.97 
In a devious but ingenious sleight of hand - or words, in this case - Bugeaud called his 
brand of punitive attacks on civilians “razzias,” a term borrowed from Arabic but that named a 
tactic developed in French Revolutionary wars in western France and Napoleon’s invasion of 
Spain.98 The argument that Algerians were using the same tactics against the French seemed 
more plausible when the French used Arabic words to refer to French military strategies. The 
notion that the French were merely responding in kind justified, in their eyes at least, their harsh 
methods. 
The shift to total warfare in 1840 actually motivated settler colonization as a 
“pacification” measure.  French military officers believed that “settling the Algerian interior with 
Europeans solved both the practical issues of security - with settlers spreading out and securing 
the land - and provided the symbolic justification for the massive expenditures of the war, 
transforming the budget’s negative bottom line into hallowed sacrifices made for a higher 
good.”99 As French objectives in Algeria transitioned to the formation of a “colonie de 
peuplement,” or settler colony, attitudes toward the Algerian inhabitants shifted, and 
“dépeuplement” by any means necessary increasingly became a topic of conversation and 
strategizing among French military leaders during the 1840s. Thus, “removal” of the Indigenous 
peoples lay at the heart of French settler colonialism in Algeria, much as it did in the United 
States. 
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The Minister of War, General Schneider, suggested that French commanders also use 
land sequestration as a punitive measure against enemies of the French military and, by 
extension, the French state. Sequestration, he argued, was a way to accelerate both land 
acquisition and pacification processes. Even though this had been the unofficial practice since 
the conquest began in 1830, it became official policy in December 1840. Not only did this serve 
military purposes, but it also “g[a]ve to the European population that [was] settling in Africa 
establishments that [could] provide for the needs of the colony.”100 His tactics coupled with 
Bugeaud’s total war opened up more and more land, and settlement did, in fact, accelerate after 
1840.  
Figure 8: Settlement in Algeria, 1838-1851101 
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By the late 1830s, a considerable European population was already present in Algerian 
urban centers and exerted pressure on the cadastral officials to attend to its needs first before 
surveying and recording the history of rural land ownership, as metropolitan officials desired. 
Despite metropolitan rhetoric and the machinations to establish an agricultural colony, most of 
the European emigrants settled in cities. As of 1848, only 15,000 colons settled in rural areas, of 
which, only 9,000 were French.102 Contrary to this reality, colonial proponents in Paris 
envisioned a rural utopia, comprised of rugged individuals, the way American and international 
accounts portrayed American settlers in the western territories.103 Metropolitan officials believed 
that private agricultural property would redeem the immigrants from the corrupting influences of 
urbanization and industrialization. These visions echoed American dreams about their own 
frontier lands. However, in the United States, the settlement population was primarily rural and 
agricultural; whereas, the myth of this type of settler population in French Algeria persisted, 
despite the acknowledged reality that the opposite was true. The greater urbanization of Algeria 
compared to the American Midwest and fewer numbers of migrating farmers undermined French 
intentions for their settler colony.  
After claiming ownership over beylik and, eventually, other lands, it was then necessary 
for the metropolitan administration to make this land "legible" — to understand the initial land 
classifications, boundaries, quality, and value in order to govern it in politically and 
economically advantageous ways.104 The colonial department overseeing land surveys was much 
                                                
102 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 71. 
103 For the American narrative of “purification” of citizens through settlement on the frontiers, 
see Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, "'A Superior Civilization': Appropriation, Negotiation, and 
Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795," in The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and 
Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850. (Kent, Ohio: Kent 
State University Press), 2006: 118-142. 
104 For a discussion and application of the concept of “legibility,” see Scott, Seeing Like a State. 
 249 
too small to accomplish the tasks colonial administrators demanded of it, and it took two decades 
and an immense expansion of the surveyors’ ranks before French officials had a reasonably 
accurate account of the location, extent, and value of the beylikal properties it claimed between 
1830 and 1837.105  
The Cadastre was created in 1838 to survey rural lands for promotion, appropriation and 
settlement purposes. By 1840, it was so preoccupied responding to city dwellers’ demands for lot 
lines as well as plans for streets and additional fortifications, that the metropole reorganized it 
into separate autonomous rural and urban divisions.106  Despite their efforts, renewed warfare in 
the countryside, name confusion, and a fundamental lack of understanding of Algerian land 
definitions plagued surveyors’ efforts, and the Cadastre was unable to keep up with demand in 
the province of Constantine.  Thus, rational, “enlightened” French administrators failed to 
subjugate the “chaotic” Algerian landscape to their scientific methods. Despite surveys and 
attempts to classify lands, most of the property in the eastern province remained largely 
incoherent to French eyes for nearly two decades. When it finally became legible, it was because 
the French military, settlers, and administrators used brute force to make it conform to French 
understandings of what a “modern” landholding system ought to be. Through refoulement 
(pushing Algerians out of cities and other areas of settlement), cantonnement (placing Algerians 
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on or forming reservations around them), and reshaping urban landscapes according to French 
notions of “ideal” cityscapes, the French slowly “rationalized” the Algerian landscape.107  
Prior to these forceful measures, however, French officials attempted to create out of 
chaos a coherent and easily understood space, but the rational Cadastre was failing to keep pace. 
Settlers and speculators grew impatient. Tired of waiting for official lot lines to be drawn and 
property to “legally” come into the public domain for resale, speculators and colons joined forces 
in 1845 and 1846 to expropriate more land on their own. General Lamoricière wrote a detailed 
letter complaining about colons and speculators who met to discuss how to incite an Algerian 
rebellion in order to confiscate additional lands on the grounds that resistant Natives were 
enemies of the French state.108  While commanders grew frustrated with the upheaval such 
activities created, metropolitan administrators sanctioned them in the decree of December 1, 
1840, as long as the land became part of the public domain.109 French colonialism meant much 
more than expropriation of Indigenous land. It was also about state power and the ability to 
control who settled, where, when, and how. The stories of Algerian and American colonization 
place these power relations and the governing structures they necessitated at the center of the 
settler colonial project.  
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 The land laws of 1844 and 1846 formally and legally established the long-standing 
justification for land expropriation: vacancy. Drafted by the French Minister of War and signed 
by King Louis Philippe for application in Algeria alone, these laws mandated the uses for 
particular parcels of land while stipulating financial penalties for those who chose to ignore the 
policy or could not meet its demands.110 Between 1830 and 1851, the French confiscated over 
52,000 hectares  (>128,000 acres) for the domain through declarations of vacancy.111 The land 
laws of 1844 and 1846 were also meant to transform some of the land into “productive” spaces 
in order to recoup French financial losses incurred during the conquest. Metropolitan 
administrators also hoped that profits from land sales and exports would pay for subsequent 
expenses associated with colonizing efforts.112 
In 1844, it became apparent to French administrators that much of the arable land, even 
that under European ownership, had yet to be cultivated, so the first of the land laws designated 
certain areas of “obligatory cultivation.” French administrators, once again, did more than just 
expropriate land. They situated themselves as the sole arbiters of land use and mandated 
particular activities they believed would make it more productive based on Western, scientific 
cultivation practices. Local knowledge of soil, climate contributed to finding a balance between 
agriculture and grazing to provide enough food for the community, but French officials failed to 
recognize this. Indeed, under the land law of 1844, those individuals holding uncultivated 
property were to pay a yearly tax of 5 francs per hectare on all unused territory, and property for 
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which this tax remained unpaid for a period of six months or longer would then revert to the 
public domain.113  The first arrondissements (districts) to be so designated were Algiers, Oran, 
and Mostagenem in the West, and Philippeville in the East. Later decrees brought the regions 
around the cities of Bône (February 1845), Constantine (March 1849), and La Calle (November 
1849) under this mandate.114   
In each of the regions of “obligatory cultivation,” the law of 1846 directed the Cadastre to 
conduct surveys and verify Algerians’ pre-1830 ownership of the properties they claimed. Those 
who could not show that their property had been in their hands or that of their family before the 
conquest of Algiers were immediately subject to dispossession. Modern and self-proclaimed 
enlightened French administrators who could not read Algerians’ “chaotic” land tenure and 
ownership practices then imposed an external, “rational,” albeit subjective, order on the 
Algerians in a way that was illegible for Indigenous landowners.  Following this law, French 
surveyors mapped nearly 200,000 hectares of land for verification purposes, and in the Algiers 
region alone, claimed 95,000 ha for the state out of the 168,000 investigated. The Algiers 
Cadastre granted an additional 37,000 ha. to individual Europeans, leaving a meager 11,500 to 
Muslims.115 
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Figure 9: Land Allotment Around Algiers by 1847116 
This process became one means of cantonnement or “containing” Native Algerians on 
specific plots of land and appropriating the remaining land for French use that the French state 
declared was unnecessary for Algerians to maintain their livelihoods. This had the effect of 
making more land available for European settlement, but it also made Algerian-held land legible 
to the state and therefore manageable.117 Cantonnement was also a response to refoulement, a 
policy that pushed Algerians out of cities and away from certain areas en masse. The military 
often employed refoulement directly during the first two decades of conquest. Alternatively, 
refoulement was also an indirect result of military actions as terrified Algerians fled from French 
soldiers’ depredations. Philippeville, an eastern coastal city, is a prominent example of deliberate 
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refoulement policies. Founded on the ruins of Tapsa, an ancient Phoenician city, Philippeville 
was one of the first in the province of Constantine that the French limited to European 
inhabitants alone in 1838.118 An English visitor described it as having the “appearance of a fine 
provincial town thinly inhabited” in 1852.   She noted that it was populated “almost exclusively 
with emigrants from Provence, Marseilles, and Corsica” and observed that “many of the houses 
[were] shut up, and the number of bills for lodgings, visible in every window, [were] a sufficient 
proof of the depopulation of the city.”119  
Based on Philippeville’s example, among others in the province, General Bedeau, the 
provincial commandant, decried the policy of refoulement and suggested cantonnement as a 
preferred method to deal with Indigenous Algerians, even arguing that it was in their best 
interests.120  Later legislation protected the policies of refoulement and cantonnement, as well as 
past “irregular” (underhanded and often illegal) practices of land acquisition. The land law of 
July 1851 and the Sénatus-Consulte of 1863 respected existing property rights of both Europeans 
and Indigenous Algerians, legitimizing all previous dispossession schemes.  
The French military subjugated most resistant Algerians along the coast by 1848, thereby 
opening up more land for the settlers that Generals Clauzel, d’Uzer, and Bugeaud, among others, 
believed so necessary to the French colonial enterprise. The military sequestered land from 
“enemies of the French state” and practiced refoulement by pushing Algerians out of cities, such 
as Philippeville. Displaced Indigenous families were often left to fend for themselves after the 
military took their homes or they were forced into cantonnements (reservations). Through 
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dispossession, the French military created a settler colony and Parliament was left to decide what 
to do with it.  
By the 1840s, the French government and military finally began to march to the same 
beat, each reinforcing the technologies of rule the other developed. While the army continued its 
physical conquest of territory, Parliament passed legislation to strengthen hierarchies of power, 
legitimize previous expropriations, and establish justifications for further land acquisition. At the 
same time, the government sought to establish order and make Algerian lands legible and 
therefore profitable. This objective was intimately connected with the goals and structures of 
settler colonialism. The very tools used to make land legible also served as tools of 
dispossession, thereby perpetuating invasion and the creation of settlers. 
Comparative Synthesis 
In the first two decades of conquest and colonization, both the French and American 
settler colonial projects reached several decisive moments. Each of those moments presented 
colonial officials with several options. They could cut their losses and abandon the endeavor. 
They could maintain the status quo by supporting existing institutions and military 
establishments but offer no additional support through funds, men, or materials. Or they could 
increase expenditures, expand existing institutions, develop new governing structures, and 
commit more soldiers to increasingly aggressive military tactics to break Indigenous resistance 
and ensure the safety of the settlers. Both governments chose the last option. Why?  
The metropolitan governments of the United States and France perceived multiple real 
and potential threats to their governments, as well as their sovereignty in the settler colonies. 
American officials were acutely aware of foreign interest in their republican experiment, France 
among them. American leaders were acutely aware of the impending disaster if they failed; Great 
 256 
Britain and Spain were waiting in the wings at the edges of American frontiers to swoop in and 
claim or reclaim vast swaths of American land. American statesmen feared that each of these 
powers would woo American settlers, along with their wealth and property, away from the 
United States to augment their own treasuries, as well as their armed forces if war broke out 
again. George Washington expressed concern over the fact that many of the emigrants to the 
backcountry were born in European nations and suggested that the United States ease their path 
to citizenship to attach them to American interests as quickly as possible.  
While threats to the French government came primarily from within the country itself, 
Parliament also perceived foreign threats to its sovereignty in North Africa.  Fears about 
interference from the region’s former imperial government – the Ottoman Empire – as well as 
European states, particularly Great Britain, induced French officials’ decision to increase its 
military presence and extend its zones of control.121 Settlers in French Algeria, like those in 
America’s western territories, were a mélange of European immigrants and émigrés from the 
motherland and therefore required careful oversight. Eventually, the French Parliament voted to 
grant French citizenship to all settlers of European descent as a way to bind them firmly to 
French interests in the colony. To ensure control over both exogenous settlers as well as the 
Indigenous population, France governed Algeria through its military, as the Americans did in the 
Northwest Territory, for more than a quarter century.   
France and the United States each created similar technologies of rule over time in 
response to perceived needs and circumstances on the ground in the settler colonies.  To put 
down Indigenous resistance movements and protect the settlers, both sent more soldiers, which 
had the additional benefit of allowing both governments to extend their sovereignty over 
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increasingly larger regions. Military leaders successfully lobbied the governments for more 
soldiers, arguing that they were necessary to defeat their Indigenous foes. In the eyes of 
government officials, the larger military presence also provided a show of force meant to awe 
both the Indigenous populations as well as other foreign powers. In the American territories, the 
military presence also served to curb some of the most violent settler outbursts or punish them 
when they could not be prevented.  
The men tasked with carrying out the most brutal aspects of colonial rule shared similar 
perspectives and employed parallel strategies. George Rogers Clark, as already noted, was a 
militant American settler, promoted to General by the 1790s and granted 150,000 acres for he 
and his militiamen from the US government in the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. American 
General Wayne, who defeated the Native confederacy at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, 
precipitating the Treaty of Greenville the following year, declared, “by the sword we must 
procure peace.”122 French General Bugeaud, the man behind the scorched earth policies in 
Algeria was a self-described “soldier peasant,” or a “settler soldier” like Clark, who dreamed “of 
collectivized colonization by the military.”123 Repeating Wayne’s language, but referencing 
ancient Rome, Bugeaud’s motto, “Ense et aratro,” or “by sword and plow,” guided his strategy in 
Algeria.124  “By sword,” he ruthlessly put down Indigenous resistance in the 1840s, and “by 
plow,” or colonization, he sought to maintain the “peace” he had won. 
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Furthermore, the discipline with which Wayne in the United States and Bugeaud in 
Algeria prepared their soldiers for total war was nearly as brutal as the tactics the soldiers were 
trained to perform on the Indigenous populations. In 1840s Algeria 
[t]he conquest had been carried out by conscripts harshly disciplined for the purpose 
under a regime which in some units, the Africa Battalions and the Foreign Legion, 
amounted to torture. In action against the enemy [the Indigenous peoples], meanwhile, 
the worst excesses of the troops were ignored by their commanders.125 
While the troops underwent intensive training that many considered abusive, the havoc they 
wrought on the countryside of Algerian and American territories went far beyond the harsh 
military discipline they experienced. Following the American Battle of Fallen Timbers, Wayne 
recounted, 
We remained three days and nights on the banks of the Miami, in front of the field of 
battle, during which time all the houses and cornfields were consumed and destroyed for 
a considerable distance, both above and below fort Miami, as well as within pistol shot of 
that garrison, who were compelled to remain tacit spectators to this general devastation 
and conflagration … The army returned to this place on the 27th, by easy marches, laying 
waste to the villages, and great quantity of corn, to be consumed or destroyed, upon Au 
Glaize and the Miami.126 
Similarly, reporting on the terrible success of total war strategies in Algeria, a French 
commander wrote, “More than fifty fine villages built of stone and roofed with tiles were 
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destroyed. Our soldiers made very considerable pickings there.”127 Like Wayne, Bugeaud 
reported that he “began to chop down the fine orchards and to set fire to the magnificent villages 
under the enemy’s eyes.” Likewise, General Saint Arnaud informed his superior that he “left in 
[his] wake a vast conflagration. All the villages, some 200 in number, were burned down, all the 
gardens destroyed, all the olive trees cut down.”128 In 1847, Tocqueville concluded that France 
had “made Muslim society far more miserable, disorganized, ignorant and barbarous than ever it 
was before it knew us.”129 The same could be said of the Indigenous population in America’s 
western territories. Tocqueville recommended that France consider the rights and needs of the 
Indigenous Algerians, rather than merely subduing and taxing them.130 Tocqueville’s advice 
went unheeded in this first epoch of settler colonialism.  
As soon as the metropolitan governments began to consider how best to maintain the 
territories already won through military actions and treaties, they turned to the task of passing 
legislation and creating policies for their new settler colonies. These laws focused on the 
métropole’s relationship to the newly acquired land, how it would be governed, relationships 
between settler-soldiers and the Indigenous populations, punishments for infractions, and how 
land transactions were to take place. One of the most important pieces of legislation for the 
American colonies was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided an outline for 
territorial governance and the eventual incorporation of the those territories into the United 
States.131 It established a governor who also served as the commander of the militia to defend the 
settlements, called for judges to draft laws based on those of their states that applied to the 
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particular circumstances they found in the territories, and enabled settlers to elect representatives 
to a general assembly. The ordinance also outlined the rights of settlers in the territories, as well 
as the qualifications to vote and to serve as a representative in the general assembly. Once the 
general assembly formed, they were to take over legislative duties from the judges and elect a 
non-voting representative to participate in debates in the United States Congress. Grounded in 
“the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty," the stated objective of the legislation 
was to extend those principles into the western territories “as the basis of all laws, constitutions, 
and governments [and] to provide also for the establishment of States, and permanent 
government therein, and for their admission to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing 
with the original States.”132  
Just as the settlers in the American western territories petitioned for recognition, rights, 
and representation, settlers and proponents of colonization in Algeria sought similar measures 
from the French government. Some pro-colonial officials went so far as to claim that “the new 
conquest ‘must not be called a colony,’ with all that term connoted, but rather must be made ‘one 
of the most beautiful provinces of France.’”133 In this, the United States provided an apt model 
since its “territories” were rarely referred to as colonies in contemporary discourse, even though 
that is what they were. Furthermore, “‘It is vital,’ wrote one [French settler in Algeria] in 1845, 
‘to legislate for the incorporation of Algeria into France as an integral part of its territory. 
Neither the press nor the settlers themselves must rest without winning this crucial point.’ And 
indeed, from 15 April 1845 the civil territory of Algeria, at least, was assimilated into the 
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metropolitan system of government.”134 By 1847 and 1848, settlers, speculators, and pro-
Algerian factions in the French government were highly successful in their lobbying efforts. As 
the July Monarchy neared its end (by coup, as it happened), “projects for assimilating the settled 
areas of Algeria were well underway, and the desire to make the colony part of France was 
brought to fruition by the republicans of 1848.”135 
As the governing bodies of each mother country passed laws, sent and supplied troops, 
and drew up treaties with Native leaders to acquire more land, questions arose about how to 
control the amalgamation of émigrés to the territories. As the United States organized its 
governance of the Northwest Territory, it selected and sent judges out to write policies 
specifically for the territories as the need arose and to try cases in an attempt to keep order in the 
contentious backcountry. After all, American Governor St. Clair wrote, prisons were equally 
necessary to ensure justice and maintain peace and happiness for inhabitants. Therefore, one of 
the first tasks he ordered to be completed in Kaskaskia, one of the outpost settlements in the 
Northwest Territory, was to build a prison near the church. While legislation had been passed to 
set aside land for schools in each territory, prisons appeared to be prioritized as an immediate 
need.136  
The French, too, were highly concerned with maintaining order and created, and re-
created, a hierarchy for legislation and a judicial system for both the European settlers and the 
Indigenous population.137 In Algeria, French desires to “rationalize” Islamic judicial systems for 
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the Algerian population in addition to installing their own for the Europeans complicated this 
process. Whereas, the American government with its tiny bureaucracy for the western territories 
left Indigenous “law” and punishment systems in the hands of Native leaders, the French saw 
colonization as an opportunity to instill greater order in Native institutions while imposing new 
colonial judicial, administrative, and social structures.138 
In the early stages of the settler colonial projects, it was also important to develop 
systems of land management: acquisition, surveying, platting, marketing, selling, assessing, and 
taxing. In the United States, while squatters moved out and set up homes and farms in 
ungovernable droves, the government simultaneously requested the military remove them from 
their illegal settlements while their surveyors worked to inspect and map out the lands, as well as 
the all-important boundaries between American settlements and Indigenous property. Both 
settlers and Indigenous peoples complicated the work of the surveyors. Squatters settled on land 
they had not purchased, in fact, was not even ready for sale by the United States government, and 
Native leaders contested the validity of the treaties the United States cited as their legal grounds 
for claiming the territories the surveyors had been sent to appraise. Consequently, Native 
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warriors haunted the footsteps of the surveyors and occasionally attacked the men as they 
worked their way through the wilderness.139 Finally, officials requested military escorts to allow 
the surveyors to complete their work because the government was already unable to keep up with 
the pace of settlement and demand for land and needed to profit from it to recover from the 
recent expensive war.  
In Algeria, French surveyors were equally behind the pace of land acquisition, sale, and 
resale. Their task was made more difficult because of the government’s desire to assess rural 
lands for sale, while the settlers clamored for attention to be paid to their urban homes to support 
both the resale of the properties and to create maps from which infrastructural improvements 
could be planned and enacted. This tension was so great that the government had to divide the 
Cadastral department into rural and urban divisions so that both projects could proceed apace. 
The Cadastral surveys not only mapped the land but also began to provide reports on census 
data, making the land and people legible, countable, and taxable.  
Methods of disciplining inhabitants, or “technologies of rule” were essential to the 
maintenance of the colonies, so managing relations between the Indigenous peoples and settlers 
was another fundamental task for French and American colonial officials. During the conquest 
and initial stages of settlement, the military was primarily responsible for controlling settlement 
and maintaining peace. Over time, military oversight was no longer sufficient or an efficient 
method of promoting harmony on the frontiers. Colonial officials needed intermediaries who 
represented the interests of Native communities while balancing them with the needs and 
concerns of the settlers and maintaining a positive relationship with the military, should they be 
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needed to quash violence. Both colonies developed similar institutions to fill this need. The 
United States inherited a system of “Indian Departments” from the British and then created 
additional departments and added more officials to oversee relations with the Native Americans. 
These departments eventually became incorporated as the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1824. In 
Algeria, France created the bureaux arabes, which served a similar role, and like the “Indian 
agents” sent to the Native American communities, most of the officials had a military 
background if they were not actively serving at the time of their appointment.  
The United States built on the English model of managing Indigenous affairs and 
developed its “Indian policy” slowly over time. “Principles were worked out from time to time as 
experience and as circumstances changed,” but American principles were also grounded in 
British colonial experience.140 In 1755, Great Britain established northern and southern “Indian 
departments” with one superintendent for each. On August 7, 1786, the American Continental 
Congress passed “An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs” to organize an American 
“Indian” affairs bureaucracy to replace that of the British.  
Like American “Indian” policy, “‘Arab policy’ was decided [by French military 
commanders] empirically, on the spot.”141 French Governor-Generals appointed a Muslim or 
French “Arab agha” to govern a military colonial district and then created an “Arab office” 
(bureau arabe) under La Moricière (1833-4). Under Pellissier de Reynaud (1837-9), the Arab 
Office became the Directorate of Arab Affairs, which prompted General Valeé to adopt the 
protectorate system in the Constantine province outside of the public domain lands and to divide 
Algeria into “civil territory open to European settlement and military territory from which this 
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was excluded.”142 In this, the French innovated on the simpler American organization by 
attempting to keep the military separate from the civilians and keep settlers out of “unpacified” 
territories. After 1839, Bugeaud dismantled the directorate in favor of the Turkish makhzan 
system on which his mentor, Clauzel (1834-1836), had previously relied. Then the new director 
of the Bureaux Arabes, Eugène Daumas (1841-1847), carefully studied resistance leader Abd al-
Qadir’s administration and convinced Bugeaud to adopt a similar system of indirect government 
through Arab chiefs. “This resort to the traditional nobility, at least to those of its members who 
wished to serve the French, became the rule of native policy.”143 A student of the Arabic 
language and of Algerian moors and customs, himself, Daumas then resurrected the Directorate 
of Arab Affairs and began to establish bureaux arabes in each military circle of the provincial 
subdivisions.  
By contrast, inside the “pacified” domanial lands, the former beylikal lands that France 
claimed following conquest, France established civil governments and allowed European 
settlement. Civil servants and magistrates in these locations “behaved as if they were in France” 
and instituted “a French system of justice in which only French metropolitan law was 
applied.”144 Algerians still resided in these territories and would have otherwise lived under 
Muslim law adjudicated by qadis. However, with the establishment of the French metropolitan 
judicial system and the forced assimilation of Algerians under the French civil governments 
effectively destroyed Muslim institutions in these locales.145  
Governments run on money. Finding ways to raise revenue was (and is) absolutely 
essential. While American citizens and statesmen were averse to taxes immediately after the 
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Revolutionary War, France had long levied them on their citizens and sought ways to do so more 
effectively. The United States therefore, had to be more creative in its funding sources, making 
the acquisition and disposition of land through sales and payments for services a significant 
focus of fiscal policy.  The public lands became the nation's most valuable asset, a bargaining 
chip in domestic politics, a goad to settlement, a source of wealth and power in an agricultural 
society.   Ironically, a nation conceived in a tax revolt against a colonial power determined to 
have the locals pay for their imperial protection now used newly-acquired land to help fund the 
governance and protection settlers pouring across that same real estate.146   
In addition to land disposition, controlling and taxing trade became another important 
governing structure in both settler colonies, although this particular technology of rule looked 
different in each location. 
Whereas the safety and tranquility of the frontiers of the United States do in some 
measure depend on the maintaining of good correspondence between their citizens and 
the several nations of Indians in amity with them: And whereas the United States in 
Congress assembled, under the 9th of the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union 
have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the trade and managing all 
affairs with the Indians not members of any of the states…147 
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The “Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs” also spelled out the process by 
which Americans were to obtain licenses to trade, pass through, and reside in Native territories. 
To acquire a trade license, the applicant first had to be a United States citizen and obtain a 
certificate signed and sealed from his state’s governor verifying his character and qualifications 
for employment. He then had to take that certificate, along with payment for the fifty-dollar 
license fee to the Indian Department superintendent in the region in which he wished to conduct 
business. Finally, he had to provide a bond of 3000 dollars to the United States government and 
agree to all rules and regulations Congress had passed and all future legislation pertaining to 
Native affairs. When he had finally accomplished all of this to the satisfaction of the 
superintendent, he was allowed to trade, but only for one year before he had to renew his license. 
The superintendent for the region was also tasked with collecting and recording the fees, bonds, 
and fines for crossing into Native territory without the proper permit and then transmitting the 
money, bonds, and the records to the United States Board of Treasury.148 
Trade licenses also allowed traders to live in Native communities, as “white persons” 
were not otherwise permitted to reside on Indigenous lands.  If someone was not a trader but still 
wanted to enter Native territories they had to go through a similar process to obtain a passport 
that would grant them permission to legally enter the space. Officials intended these permits to 
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limit and monitor the movement of people as much as govern Native trade because they were 
highly concerned about the character of Americans entering or settling near Native territory.149  
France faced similar problems in Algeria and while some officials saw the colony as a 
dumping ground for the urban poor and those militating against the government, colonial 
officials in Algeria worried about the disruption such colonists might create in the already 
unstable and volatile environment.  
Authorities in Paris and Algiers used controls on the issuance of passports and the 
influence of local officials in France to prevent ‘undesirable individuals from reaching 
the colony. …the Algerian colonial state [was] a trans-Mediterranean entity that sought to 
regulate the movements and behavior of European emigrants as much as those of 
indigenous Algerians.150 
As American traders had to obtain verification of their upstanding moral character from their 
state governors before receiving permission to enter Native lands, French emigrants had to show 
signed guarantees of their character from their mayor to secure their passports to Algeria, which 
was also still largely Indigenous territory in the 1830s and 1840s.151 However, pressure from 
elite settlers already in the colony pushed the metropolitan government to ease their restrictions 
and even to provide free passage to able-bodied laborers beginning in 1838.152 
The rate of settlement increased in the second decade of conquest and colonization and 
pushed metropolitan administrators to begin creating an infrastructure to support the settler 
colonies. Consequently, the métropoles gave birth to the structures of settler colonial 
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governance. The institutions they created needed to fulfill several of the government’s basic 
needs for control and revenue generation. They also had to meet the needs of settlers by creating 
relatively secure zones for settlement in areas where the colonizing militaries had quashed 
Indigenous resistance movements. Through land surveys, the métropoles sought to quantify and 
locate already acquired properties, and through legislation, they sought to establish procedures to 
appropriate and sell additional lands. To fortify metropolitan and settler authority, administrators 
drafted policies to govern the territories, laws to which settlers and Indigenous peoples were held 
accountable, as well as courts and prisons to ensure their enforcement. Another key to control in 
the colonies was to regulate the movement of people. Both the United States and France sought 
to select desirable settlers with which to populate the territories by requiring character references 
before granting licenses to trade with Indigenous communities or passports to travel into 
Indigenous lands.  
The United States and France created similar technologies of rule in response to colonial 
exigencies, as well as to actual and perceived internal and external threats. This suggests that 
both métropoles faced congruent challenges and developed parallel solutions. Invasion continued 
past the first battle as the American militia and French army pressed their advantage, attacking 
additional Indigenous villages. Confronted with powerful Indigenous communities, American 
and French statesmen opted to augment their military forces to preserve national honor and to 
open colonial territory for new colonial settlements. After the first decade of conquest, 
metropolitan policies began to align with and support the colonization that was already 
underway. Predominantly led by settler soldiers, the first wave of colons petitioned their home 
governments to pass legislation that would make it easier to acquire land and to incorporate the 
colonial territories into the structures of metropolitan governance. Settler bellicosity also pressed 
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the metropolitan governments to install institutions of control as much to exert power over the 
settler as the Indigenous populations.  
By the end of the first two decades of colonization (1795 in the United States and 1848 in 
French Algeria), both metropolitan governments had assembled all of the elements necessary to 
maintain their settler colonies. Thousands of settlers were already established under military 
protection and oversight. Both American and French métropoles instituted military governments 
that ran through the war department for their settler colonies. Within each of those governments, 
metropolitan administrators and military commanders employed technologies of rule to 
rationalize space and control people in each of the territories. Surveyors mapped space to make it 
easier to govern and prepare for sale, track ownership, assess and tax it (in French Algeria). The 
French Cadastre also began taking a census during this early period of development, whereas 
reports on settlement in the American territories remained informal for several more years. With 
metropolitan financial, military and political backing for the de facto settler colonies that sprang 
up in the wake of military conquests in the American Wabash and Ohio Valleys and Algeria, the 
settler colonies were firmly rooted and would prove difficult to dislodge more than hundred 
years later. 
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Chapter 5: Connections 
An event, person, or process is said to be remarkable if it is worthy of observation and 
conversation. The comparison between the American and French settler colonial projects in 
North America and Algeria is “remarkable” in this sense in both the past and present. It is also 
“conspicuously unusual.” Few scholars have examined Anglophone and Francophone settler 
colonialism in a comparative framework, nor have historians contextualized the French 
colonization of Algeria in relation to its model – the flourishing American settler state.1 While 
some scholars have begun to reframe the narrative of American history within the framework of 
settler colonialism, few have looked at its influence on other settler states.2 Nevertheless, 
American settler policies and practices did not escape the notice of colonial officials elsewhere.3 
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 272 
In the international exchange of ideas, political ideals, and policies, the United States and France 
not only influenced one another, but also strengthened one another’s position as developing 
settler empires at the end of the eighteenth and through the nineteenth centuries.  
At every turn – from the war for independence, to the backcountry campaigns, to the 
establishment of a professional military to maintain the frontier settlements, France backed the 
United States and provided the support it needed to accomplish each of its objectives, fostering 
its growth into a settler state in the process. The 1778 Franco-American Alliance during the 
Revolutionary War gave the United States the men, arms, resources, and morale it needed to 
succeed in its struggle against Great Britain. It also gave the American militia in the backcountry 
a bargaining tool that was essential to their conquest of British forts in the Wabash Valley and 
Illinois Country.4 French soldiers, officers and military engineers greatly aided the America war 
effort and contributed to the professionalization of the army that the United States’ attempts to 
conquer and settle the frontiers made necessary following the Revolution.5 After the war’s 
conclusion, a veritable flood of American settlers descended on the backcountry, prompting a 
cycle of violence as Native Americans resisted further encroachments on their lands. Congress’s 
decision to provide for the defense of the western settlements and continue treaty negotiations 
with Native leaders for more land necessitated a military to protect American settlers and their 
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property.6 Along with foreign threats to the eastern seaboard, this suggested the wisdom of 
establishing a military academy to train military commanders and engineers. The French, once 
again, bolstered the new American government’s mission. Louis de Tousard, a French-trained 
artillery commander and engineer who fought with the Americans during the Revolutionary War, 
designed a training program for military officers that became the foundation for West Point 
Military Academy.7  
Following closely on the heels of the American Revolution, Enlightenment ideals, 
mingled with the rise of commercial capitalism and French discontent over economic disparities 
and hardships, provoked a revolution in France at the end of eighteenth century.8 Despite French 
political upheaval between 1789 and 1830, the legacy of the French Revolution – the idea that 
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sovereignty rested with the people and the corollary governmental duty to respect the popular 
will (albeit within certain limits) – continued to guide French politics.9 Indeed, it was the desire 
to win popular support for King Charles X’s government through the military conquest of 
Algiers, thereby propping up his flagging government, that launched the French ships toward the 
opposite Mediterranean shore in 1830.10  
As in the American western territories, militaristic settlers and soldiers compelled the 
French government to accept the settler colonization that was already underway in Algeria. 
Following the formal recognition of Algeria as a French colony, prominent nineteenth-century 
French statesmen, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Michel Chevalier, and Governor General of 
Algeria Patrice de MacMahon, used the United States as a model and a benchmark by which to 
measure French settler colonial “progress” in Algeria. French political leaders’ use of the United 
States as a standard of settler empire-building may account for at least some of the similarities in 
the colonies’ trajectories. However, it does not explain all of them, particularly those in the initial 
phases of conquest. It also does not explain variations of detail stemming from local 
environments, Indigenous cultures, religious beliefs, and economic interests. Despite the 
differences between the two contexts, the congruency between the stages of settler colonial 
development in modern Indiana and Illinois and French Algeria suggests commonalities in the 
formation of settler colonies more broadly.  
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Comparison exposes settler colonialism as a global, rather than exceptional, phenomenon 
with extensive historical roots.11 Comparative settler colonialism undermines three fundamental 
features common to hegemonic settler narratives. First, it overturns settler state claims of 
uniqueness. Secondly, this approach confronts settlers’ privileged position as sovereign subjects. 
And thirdly, comparative settler colonial studies that recognize Indigenous actors’ formative role 
in shaping the settler state undermine the state’s elision of this reality.12 
 An examination of American and French settler colonial projects in the Old Northwest 
Territory and Algeria reveals that these two prototype settler colonies were not unique 
endeavors. Rather, settler colonization in both regions went through parallel stages of 
development, and each was grounded in similar motivations and ideologies. Both the United 
States and France faced international competition with Great Britain and other imperial powers – 
Spain in America and the Ottoman Empire in North Africa. Anxieties over internal political 
unrest also compelled each government to demonstrate its power over potential colonial 
territories to either prop up or establish its legitimacy. Profit motives spurred officials to 
encourage settlement in the colonies and propelled settlers to migrate. Access to land, natural 
resources, and potentially lucrative trade routes made both the American Wabash Valley and the 
Algerian Tell desirable assets. Furthermore, officials from both metropolitan governments 
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expressed concern over the security of their citizens and property. Locating the threat within the 
desirable territories provided a justifiable cause for military invasion. 
While these reasons were rational, other, more complicated motives, lay underneath the 
decision to send militaries to these territories; the role of strong emotions in the events of history 
cannot be overlooked or underestimated.13 Revenge for insults, as well as physical and 
diplomatic attacks, motivated metropolitan administrators and militant settlers in the United 
States and France to attack and hold the land they claimed in the American western territories 
and North Africa. In America – many, but not all, Native Americans sided with Great Britain 
during the Revolution; in Algeria, the dey insulted the French foreign ambassador and supported 
pirates’ raids on European (and American) ships. Subsequently, colonial proponents and 
propagandists in both mother countries portrayed conquest as righteous revenge and liberation 
from Native American and Algerian threats. 14   
One distinguishing feature about these two settler colonies, however, was that 
colonization was not initially the plan of metropolitan administrators. Even though some officials 
dreamed of acquiring the desirable lands in America and Algeria and installing settler farmers on 
them, the governments did not formally recognize the settlements as colonies for several years 
after the initial conquest. Dreams are not plans, after all.  While scholars have largely ignored the 
settlers or treated them as given, cohesive blocs, it was the settlers and military forces in the each 
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region that provided the initial impetus for the settler colonial projects.15 After years of 
indecision, the confluence of four key interests motivated metropolitan administrators to, at last, 
engage in the task of establishing governing structures and policies for the settler colonies. 
Pecuniary interest was one of the first and most persuasive factors; there were financial gains to 
be made through the acquisition and sale of lands. This interest was interlaced, and substantiated 
by, settler desires for upward social mobility through land acquisition in both territories and new 
business opportunities in Algeria. The aforementioned access to ports and trade routes inspired 
metropolitan commercial interest in the colonies as well.16 Furthermore, administrators saw 
strategic military advantages in maintaining the hard-won territories. Through colonization, they 
could reduce or remove threats to national interests and borders and prevent further Native 
American and Algerian piratical aggressions. What was more, through monitored settlement 
processes, the governments could open an escape valve through which social and political 
agitators could pass, leaving the mother countries and their governments undisturbed.17 Both 
American and French politicians and political thinkers hoped that resettlement in the colonies, 
especially on productive farmland, would rehabilitate immigrants from the pernicious effects of 
urbanization and, later, industrialization.18 
Although separated by time, place, cultural heritage, and religion, important similarities 
existed between Algeria and the American Wabash and Ohio River Valleys prior to colonization. 
While the Indigenous populations in each location differed in their belief systems and specific 
socio-political structures, they were both heterogeneous societies with established social 
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hierarchies, political structures, and pre-capitalist economies based on subsistence farming, semi-
nomadic herding or hunting, and trade. Communities in both locations held communal and semi-
communal notions of land use and ownership and practiced careful and sustainable land 
management, which was especially important in Algeria’s harsh and fragile environment. The 
majority of both populations held varying but strong spiritual beliefs that differed in significant 
ways from the nominally Christian western colonizers.19  
Distant as the colonies were from each other, their geographies presented similar 
opportunities and benefits to the colonizers. Land in the Ohio and Wabash watersheds and in the 
region known as the Tell in Algeria, particularly in the Algerian province of Constantine, were 
fertile and appealing farmlands. Both regions had access to important ports (Algeria), navigable 
rivers (America), and trade routes. Moreover, their significant geopolitical locations meant that 
conquering these territories was essential to advance the settler colonial project and secure the 
each colony’s borders. 
Myths, military might, and legislation all advanced settler colonization. These three 
components of colonial rule promoted and rationalized structures of dispossession, creating 
racialized hierarchies of land rights and use, and entrenching American and French indigenizing 
claims to the soil as its true and rightful protectors. The military conquest of the American 
Wabash Valley and Algeria took different forms but with similar long-term results. In North 
America, George Rogers Clark and the United States militia attacked British forts in the region 
and later used their success as the basis for their claims to the territory since they acted on behalf 
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of the United States government and for its cause during the Revolution. In the Treaty of Paris 
that concluded the Revolutionary War in 1783, the United States recognized only the nominal 
British claims to land, not Native sovereignty. It was not until the United States attempted to act 
on this belief and faced stiff Native resistance that it had to reluctantly recognize Indigenous 
sovereignty over the lands it had claimed and then negotiate land sales with Native leaders 
through the end of the eighteenth century.  
“Settler-soldiers,” the militiamen who had settled in the backcountry, were largely 
responsible for the violence used to establish claims to land in these territories. Many of these 
settler soldiers initially took up arms in defense of their families and newly built homes on lands 
they believed were legitimately theirs. They then went on the offensive to push back the 
neighboring Native communities and their warriors, who fought, similarly, to protect their own 
families and homelands. On the other side of the Atlantic, France sent a naval convoy carrying 
roughly 30,000 professional soldiers rather than frontier militias to invade Algeria. However, as 
in the American case, French soldiers pushed the conquest beyond the initial point of entry 
without explicit metropolitan approval. French military commanders in Algeria saw an 
opportunity to exploit the Algerians’ desperate flight before them and continued to march on and 
conquer additional cities, abandoned properties, and their hinterlands. 
Nevertheless, both metropolitan governments attempted to live up to their lofty 
Enlightenment ideals and recognize Indigenous land ownership, especially in the first decade of 
colonization. The military and settler-soldiers obstinately refused, though, and continued their 
rampage through the countryside, expropriating lands whenever and wherever possible. 
Consequently, martial settlers were a crucial component of advancing settler colonialism in both 
the Wabash Valley and Algeria. The men tasked with carrying out the most brutal aspects of 
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colonial rule shared similar perspectives and employed parallel strategies of total war and 
simultaneous settlement to maintain the lands won in war. 
The French and American colonial toolboxes incorporated discursive instruments that 
buttressed concrete forms of dispossession, power, and invasion. Following successful military 
campaigns, whether or not they were officially sanctioned, government officials crafted 
narratives around the conquests to take advantage of what the settlers and military had already 
accomplished on the ground. Even if metropolitan administrators had not initially approved the 
campaigns, their subsequent narratives served to legitimate the actions after the fact, thereby 
coopting settler success for metropolitan objectives. Pro-colonial propagandists proclaimed the 
victories won over Indigenous peoples as glorious triumphs that accrued honor to the military 
and the métropole, even as detractors decried the violent methods used. With few easy choices, 
administrators opted to press on and drafted legislation to legalize land transactions and 
legitimize military campaigns after they had taken place. With the decision to keep the territories 
won, officials transitioned to crafting justifications for colonization, land acquisition, and 
settlement. The Treaty of Paris (1783) served as the United States’ legal and discursive gateway 
to the western (i.e. Native) territories for American settlers, just as France’s successful second 
siege of Constantine served as a discursive gateway to the rest of the Algerian Regency. Colonial 
officials and propagandists successfully used these victories to advocate for and justify the 
advancement of colonization. 
According to the myths that emerged, the United States saved Native Americans from 
malevolent British rule that drove them to commit violent raids on the frontiersmen and then 
suffer American retaliation. A number of American statesmen, like Thomas Jefferson and Henry 
Knox, also viewed the United States’ intervention into Native affairs as a benevolent civilizing 
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force that would help Indigenous peoples bridge the gap between themselves and the Americans 
in the hierarchy of civilization. Similarly, French publicists proclaimed that their military had 
saved Europeans from Algerian pirates’ depredations and, simultaneously, saved Algerians from 
the tyranny of Ottoman colonial rule.20 A witness of the conquest of Algiers exulted that despite 
the doubts of left-leaning politicians, the French army was successful. “In twenty days,” Jean 
Toussaint Merle wrote, “the piracy, that had distressed Christians for three hundred years, had 
been destroyed: Algiers, the warrior, had succumbed to French forces; the dey’s standard had 
been replaced by the white flag [of France].”21 No longer could the Algerian dey hold Christian 
governments hostage and demand ransom for the protection of their shipments and sailors from 
the Barbary pirates. No longer would European captains and crewmembers contemplate with 
dread, their fates at the hands of corsairs. So went French rhetoric about their heroic deeds in 
Algiers. 
Not only had the French saved all of Christendom from the dreaded Barbary pirates, but 
they had also saved the Algerians from Ottoman despotism! In 1847, General Bedeau reiterated 
the already common rhetoric and justification for French colonization in Algeria: 
[French] power… has destroyed the oppressive privileges of Turkish authority… In the 
eastern province, the Turkish power existed in Constantine until the French government 
decided to occupy this city. The Turkish power was oppressive: its main principle had 
been to divide and disunite the populations; to exploit the greatest number through a 
privileged minority. The French power, which has replaced it has immediately declared 
                                                
20 Addi, “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” 97–99. 
21 J.T. Merle, Anecdotes historiques et politiques pour servir à l’histoire de la conquête d’Alger 
en 1830 (Paris, G. A. Dentu, 1831), x. Author Translation. 
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and practiced its intention to be just; it has recognized the rights of all of the influential 
families.22 
Despite numerous portrayals like Bedeau’s, the Ottoman government was incapable of 
exercising anything more than a light hand in its far-flung provinces in North Africa. Algerians 
paid taxes that funded imperial governance, but those taxes also often gave them access to land 
and a percentage of its produce. In direct contrast to their circumstances under French rule, the 
Ottoman imperial government had much less impact on Algerians’ day-to-day lives than local 
and immediate community, tribal, and family affairs. 
French and American settlers also established mythic connections to Ancient Rome in an 
attempt to legitimate their colonial projects and substantiate their claims as the rightful 
sovereigns of lands appropriated from Indigenous inhabitants. American surveyors and settlers 
imaginatively linked the mounds of the ancient Indigenous peoples in the eighteenth-century 
American Northwest Territory to the burial mounds of ancient Trojans, “the ancestors of the 
Roman republicans. ‘Certainly there had been an elaborate civilization on the spot of the Ohio 
Company settlement and the Mariettans felt a primitive nobility exuding from its remnants.’”23 
George Washington, who first visited these lands during the French and Indian War, painted 
vivid images of Roman colonies, purged of slavery, purified, erected on the sites of these ancient 
civilizations and captured the imaginations of his comrades during the Revolution. The same 
men who sat dreaming with Washington around the campfires at Valley Forge formed the Ohio 
Company and set out to bring those visions into reality – connecting the new United States to 
                                                
22 Marie Alphonse Bedeau, “Projet de colonisation pour la province de Constantine,” Projets de 
colonisation pour les provinces d’Oran et Constantine (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1847), 190-
191. Author translation.  
23 Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, “’A Superior Civilization’: Appropriation, Negotiation, and 
Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795,” in Barr, The Boundaries Between Us, 122. 
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ancient Rome on sites that resembled burial mounds of Rome’s predecessors.24  
By harking back to antiquity, Americans could distance themselves from the corruption and 
decadence of contemporary Europeans, despite their shared heritage. Secondly, the stance 
shows an unwillingness or inability to acknowledge the potential sophistication of the 
American Indian population at any time, past or present. By creating parameters of savagism 
and civilization for their current situation, it would be entirely contradictory to acknowledge 
any lineage between the supposedly heathen Indians and sophisticated creators of the 
earthworks.25 
Similarly, France reimagined the significance of the ancient Roman Empire in North 
Africa and expounded a mythic connection between it and France’s nineteenth-century colonial 
project. In this myth, writers drew parallels between the two and claimed that France was the 
rightful heir of the Roman Empire and therefore the rightful governor of Algerian affairs.26 
French administrators, scholars, and colonial publicists drew the deforestation and declensionist 
narratives from their understanding of the Roman colonial legacy in North Africa. E. Pelissier de 
Reynaud’s publications in Exploration Scientifique, for example, pointed to the ubiquitous 
Roman ruins in evidence throughout Algeria to support his theory. During the Roman period, 
Reynaud postulated, a dense population lived there but Algeria had experienced massive 
deforestation and a decline in fertility since it served as the “granary of Rome.” While he didn’t 
explicitly assign the Arab population fault for this series of events, “his description pointed to a 
change in the environmental narrative from one of an innate fertility not being properly 
                                                
24 Roger G. Kennedy, Hidden Cities: The Discovery and Loss of Ancient North American 
Civilization (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994), 113. 
25 Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, “’A Superior Civilization’: Appropriation, Negotiation, and 
Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795,” in Barr, The Boundaries Between Us, 123. 
26 Davis, Resurrecting the Granary of Rome; Ruedy, Modern Algeria; Lorcin, “Rome and France 
in Africa.” 
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husbanded to one of an ancient fertility that had declined or been destroyed.”27 Views such as 
Reynaud’s served as justification for the expropriation of hundreds of thousands of acres of 
property from Indigenous Algerians. J.A.N. Périer, another member of the Commission 
Scientifique de l’Algérie, civilian colonist, and medical doctor, wrote a two-volume set on 
medical sciences for the Exploration Scientifique, remarking that ‘it is our responsibility to raise 
Algeria from her fallen state, and to return her to her past [Roman] glory; for this privileged soil 
possesses all the elements of a surprising fecundity, of a great prosperity.”28 Thus, Périer and 
Reynaud, two prominent members of the scientific commission, linked Algeria’s Roman past to 
the perception of environmental degradation, and France’s role as Algeria’s savior from both 
despotic Turkish rule and ignorant, destructive Arabs. 
French military and metropolitan administrators saw themselves as the most suitable 
inheritors of Rome’s former imperial holdings in North Africa. Out of the many studies of 
Roman colonial Algeria and comparisons between Rome and France in North Africa emerged 
two beliefs: (1) the French colonial project not only rivaled but surpassed the Roman work in 
Algeria, and (2) the Latin/Mediterranean Myth, which served to anchor “the ‘Latins’ in Algerian 
soil, both temporally and spiritually, as its ‘rightful’ owners and responded to métropole 
anxieties by emphasizing the regenerative capacities of this ‘newly emerging race.’”29 This myth 
sought to create unity out of an essentially unstable social environment “around which society 
could coalesce.”30 Highlighting the connection between Roman and French colonial projects in 
North Africa set off a contrast between Western and Eastern imperialism. The French depicted 
                                                
27 Davis, 37. 
28 J. A. N. Périer, De l’hygiène en Algérie, Vol. 1, Sciences médicales in series Exploration 
Scientifique de l’Algérie (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1847), v. 
29 Patricia Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past,” 
French Historical Studies 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 328. 
30 Lorcin, “Rome and France,” 329. 
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the latter as barbaric and retrograde and positioned themselves as Algeria’s liberators from 
Turkish tyranny. Finally, the mythical connection between Roman and French colonialism 
created a myth of regionality: the creation and regeneration of “Latin Africa.”31 
The imagined connection to the ancient Roman Empire bound the settlers to the Algerian 
soil through the discourse of reclaiming “Latin Africa.” Therefore, French colonization in 
Algeria was a figurative, as well as a spiritual homecoming. It was also a physical return of 
“Latins” to North African shores.32 At Philippeville, France re-inscribed European landholding 
on the remains of an ancient Roman city, creating a palimpsest that echoed their forbears while 
also paying homage to French modernity.33 This had the effect of literally and figuratively 
displacing urban Algerian property-holders and governors with an entirely European population. 
Similarly, the Americans saw themselves as recreating a Roman republic on American 
soil. This “mythological future” necessitated a mythical Roman past for the American landscape. 
Thus, American writers connected the elaborate mounds and remains of cities belying ancient 
Indigenous architecture to Roman predecessors, negating “the [Indigenous] present in real as 
well as ideological terms.”34 Ultimately, to achieve their desired future, “the native had to be 
marginalized and dispossessed” discursively but also in reality.35 
Ideologies of land use were prominent in the myth-making process and central to the 
development of settler colonies. French administrators attempted to understand the unfamiliar 
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land and people by situating them in existing schemas, or mental models. Metropolitan and 
military officials used the scientific studies that scholars conducted to bolster the colonial regime 
by rewriting the meaning attached to these studies. Harnessing history and appropriating the past 
gave colonizers further justification to appropriate land in the present and formed another 
intellectual technology of rule. 
A chasm of perception and experience separated metropolitan administrators and their 
aims from those of military commanders and settlers in the colonies. To gain a more objective 
sense of what was happening in the colonies and receive less biased recommendations, both 
American and French governments sent commissions on fact-finding missions, demonstrating 
the disconnect between colonial officials and settlers in situ and the metropolitan 
administrations.36 The 1783 report from the Committee on American Indian Affairs stated that 
Commissioners were sent to  
obtain information of the numbers and places of residence of the citizens of the United 
States who have seated themselves on the north west side of the Ohio; to signify to them 
the displeasure of Congress that they have taken this step, with which the publick [sic] 
interests and repose are so intimately connected, without permission or authority … to 
discourage to the utmost of their power, all intrusions into any of the territories of the 
United States within their respective Departments.37 
The settlers, acting of their own accord and in direct contradiction to both the objectives and 
policies of the federal government “seated themselves” on Native lands. Furthermore, settler 
militias attacked peaceful neighboring Native communities without metropolitan authorization. 
                                                
36 Collingham, The July Monarchy, 247; Prucha, The Sword of the Republic, 8; Ruedy, Modern 
Algeria, 50–51. 
37 JCC, 25: 689-690. 
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Consequently, tensions escalated to the point of armed conflict and obliged the United States 
government to spend money it did not have in an attempt to end hostilities between them.38 
Similarly, the French Parliament sent a delegation on a reconnaissance mission to Algeria in 
1833. Despite the report’s exposé and condemnation of the methods employed, the commission 
recommended that Parliament vote to keep the territories already occupied but suggested a policy 
of restricted occupation – a policy the military commanders in the colony chose to ignore.39 
When American and French metropolitan administrators were forced to recognize the 
colonization that had already begun, they asserted their intention to incorporate these lands into 
the metropolitan governing structure and take advantage of the opportunities they presented. 
While officials wrote policies and created a legal veneer for past actions, settlers and militaries 
continued to press into new lands, establishing settlements and staking claims. Nevertheless, 
over time in response to perceived needs and exigencies on the ground, France and the United 
States each created similar technologies of rule to govern their newly acquired and 
acknowledged settler colonies. 
As settlers continued to pour into the colonies during the second decade of conquest and 
colonization, they compelled metropolitan administrators to develop judicial and political 
structures for them. Just as the settlers in the American western territories petitioned for 
recognition, rights, and representation, settlers and proponents of colonization in Algeria sought 
similar measures from the French government. The institutions that the mother country created 
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fulfilled the government’s basic needs for control and revenue generation and provided relatively 
secure zones for settlement by quelling Indigenous resistance movements. The métropoles also 
developed systems of land management from acquisition to surveying, platting, marketing, 
selling, assessing, and taxing.  Through land surveys, officials sought to quantify and locate 
settler-claimed properties as well as those that the governments considered domanial lands.40 
Legislation followed initial land acquisition, as the American Congress and French Parliament 
sought to standardize the processes by which additional property would be legitimately 
appropriated and sold.   
Determining how to regulate the movement and behavior of people in the colonies was 
one of the central metropolitan concerns. Administrators tried to define and circumscribe who 
was allowed to settle in the territories, where they could migrate within the territories, and 
frequently differentiated what behaviors were deemed acceptable among settlers and the 
Indigenous population. In short order, they also installed courts and prisons to ensure the 
enforcement of their laws. Both the United States and France attempted to select “desirable” 
settlers to populate the territories by requiring character references before granting licenses or 
passports to travel or settle in the colonies or trade with Indigenous communities. Such efforts 
were short lived, however, and gave way to the competing notion that settler colonies could 
serve as “safety valve” for undesirable elements of the metropolitan population. 
Consequently, managing relations between the Indigenous peoples and settlers was 
another fundamental task for French and American colonial officials. During the conquest and 
initial stages of settlement, the military was primarily responsible for controlling settlers and 
                                                
40 Domanial lands are government-owned public domain lands and included those the United 
States government acquired from Native Americans through treaties and those that France 
acquired in beylikal lands following the conquest of each Algerian province. 
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maintaining peace. However, by the time the colonies were peopled with American and 
European settlers, a new institution was necessary. Bureaus of Indigenous affairs, comprised of 
men thought to be familiar with the languages and customs of the Indigenous peoples, strove to 
mediate between colons and their Native neighbors. The selection of military commanders and 
officers of the Indigenous affairs bureaus was important because, despite metropolitan 
administrators’ best efforts, those on the ground actually decided Indigenous policy. Therefore, 
colonial officials, settlers, and the soldier-settlers who existed somewhere in between ultimately 
determined American and French colonial policy and charted the course of colonial development 
within the limits that Indigenous peoples dictated during the first two decades of colonization. 
This dissertation grounds the developing theoretical framework of settler colonialism in 
two historical contexts and further supports the validity of this framework through the 
comparison of these two case studies. Theory is an abstraction from the specifics to find the 
general. This study, then, returns to the specifics to gauge how well the abstraction fits. In many 
instances, the theoretical framework holds up, but this return to case studies also reveals gaps 
and oversights. For instance, settler colonial theory begins with the assumption that metropolitan 
governments set out to create settler colonies. While settlers were the essential ingredient in their 
creation, the theory also posits that top-down policies drove development and gave the colonies 
their shape.41 Both Veracini and Wolfe recognize that the presence of settlers constituted the 
formation of settler colonies, but settlers as individuals and as agents often get lost in top-down 
analyses. However, an examination of the American Northwest Territory and French Algeria 
cases reveals that settler- and military-led ad-hoc, grassroots processes were responsible for the 
establishment of settler colonies in these two locations.  
                                                
41 See, for example: Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 2010; Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the 
Elimination of the Native”; Bateman and Pilkington, Studies in Settler Colonialism. 
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 Through the close historical analysis of the United States as a settler empire and French 
Algeria, we can expand the framework of settler colonial studies to include not three, but four, 
primary sets of actors: metropolitan officials, military/colonial administrators, Indigenous 
leaders, and settlers. Veracini's triadic approach does not differentiate the influential military 
leaders/colonial administrators on the ground from metropolitan officials.42 However, they 
deserve a separate category because their aims and means frequently conflicted with 
metropolitan instructions.  
Although Veracini observes that settler colonial studies has grown out of Indigenous 
studies, ethnohistory, and historical colonial studies, the theory that frames much of the field’s 
work neglects the heterogeneity of Indigenous peoples, motives, and objectives.43 Veracini 
argues that settler colonial studies is not, and should not be, overly concerned with the particulars 
of Indigenous societies or their histories.44 I disagree. Settler colonial structures, their formation, 
and the very real limits placed on their creation and power cannot be understood without an 
examination and understanding of the Indigenous peoples who shaped and bounded settler 
colonial socio-political institutions of power, especially in the early stages of colonization.45 In 
former British colonies, Annie Coombes and the contributors to Rethinking Settler Colonialism 
(2011) similarly found that “the colonisers’ dealings with indigenous peoples – through 
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resistance, containment, appropriation, assimilation, miscegenation, or attempted destruction – is 
the historical factor which has ultimately shaped the cultural and political character of the new 
nations, mediating in highly significant ways their shared colonial roots/routes.”46 Extending 
Coombes’ argument beyond the Anglo world, I contend that the role of Indigenous peoples was 
also important in the French Algerian settler colony. More than that, though, the Indigenous 
peoples, themselves, were significant actors – important for more than the ways in which the 
colonizing forces sought to exert power over them – in both American and French settler 
colonies. 
The motivations behind the institution of this rediscovered form of colony are important 
to understand the ways in which settler colonies developed as well as their effects over time, 
which is at the heart of settler colonial studies.47 Five key interests prompted metropolitan 
administrators to keep the colonized territory that the settlers and military had already won. 
Colonial officials saw the revenue potential that colonial lands offered both the government and 
individuals. A number of metropolitan leaders themselves were or became involved in colonial 
land speculation and sales, taking advantage of the property that the military had already 
appropriated from Indigenous populations. Merchants and traders also pressed officials to 
recognize the commercial benefits the colonies could provide through access to natural resources 
and existing trade routes. Military advisors highlighted the strategic geographic positions of the 
territories since both the Wabash Valley and Algeria bordered other imperial possessions. 
Control over these regions would also reduce the threat the Indigenous peoples posed to national 
security and settlement could provide a buffer zone between the colonial frontiers and the mother 
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country, especially in the case of the United States since the colonies were contiguous with the 
American state’s borders. Seizure of the desirable colonial lands, American and French officials 
persuaded themselves, could also convey metropolitan power and legitimacy – both in the eyes 
of their own citizens and those of foreign powers. While the specifics for other métropoles may 
have differed, some combination of similar factors – fiscal, commercial, military, and political 
interests – motivated the formation of their own settler colonies. These foundational interests 
then shaped the kinds of institutions that each government built.  
Furthermore, the mother country’s form of government mattered less than the stimuli. 
Whereas the United States was, and remained, a republic when it created its settler colonies in 
the Northwest Territory, France was a monarchy at the time of conquest, but its government 
changed drastically over the 132-year span of its colonization of Algeria. Despite its many 
transformations from various versions of constitutional monarchies to republics to “empires," 
French leaders always chose to maintain their colonial holdings and often expanded them.48  
                                                
48 Even within the time frame of this study, France began the conquest under its monarch, King 
Charles X, and shortly after the invasion of Algiers, the July Revolution replaced the king with 
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Figure 10: First and Second French Empires49 
Significantly, the stages of colonization and colonial structures that both the United 
States and France instituted were highly similar. This suggests that the forms settler colonies 
took did not depend upon their Anglophone or Francophone heritage. The objectives of 
metropolitan administrators, settlers, and the situations to which they responded on the ground – 
namely the threat that Indigenous peoples posed to continued settlement and colonial sovereignty 
– mattered more.  
That both the United States and France shared a similar philosophical heritage from 
Christianity, European legal rationales for colonizing the Americas, the Enlightenment, and the 
growth of capitalism was equally influential in shaping their approaches to settler colonial 
governance.50 This shared heritage reveals itself in common ideologies and values expressed in 
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the justifications given for colonization.51 Since at least the fourth century, European (and much 
later, American) writers penned travel narratives that incorporated elements of the Christian 
pilgrimage, including struggles against dark forces, experiencing novel and wondrous sights, 
redemption, and arrival in the Promised Land.52 Narratives of conquest and colonization often 
followed similar trajectories and cast the colonizers as the heroes, liberating both themselves and 
their countrymen from the threat of the Indigenous peoples they defeated. Simultaneously, 
colonial propagandists also proclaimed that their intention was to free the Indigenous population 
from their former colonial oppressor. Furthermore, the colonizers declared that they were 
benevolent rulers who sought to tutor the “backward” Indigenous peoples and inculcate in them 
enlightened ideas and social mores. Both the United States and France, at least initially, espoused 
assimilationist aims and built institutions to support their “civilizing missions.”53 Settler colonial 
scholars have demonstrated that these assimilationist policies served the settler colonial 
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government’s ultimate purpose – the “elimination of the Native.”54 However, it is important to 
observe the origins of this impulse in Western nations and therefore the foundational reasons for 
the similarities among their settler colonies. 
In addition to, and, in part, because of their shared Enlightenment heritage, popular will 
became the basis for political legitimacy in the mid- to late-eighteenth century as political leaders 
in America and Europe began to press against the notion that bloodlines and divine right 
sanctioned rulers. This shift in the basis for political legitimacy to popular sovereignty had 
important implications for the settler colonies that each state established. While Lisa Ford’s work 
examines the development of sovereignty as a legal construct that came to be based on land, my 
work focuses on the previous, political understanding of sovereignty and its transformation as a 
political construct in the establishment of settler colonies.55 Prior to the American and French 
revolutions, political sovereignty rested in the person of a sovereign – a king who inherited his 
position either by bloodlines, claims to divine selection, or both. However, during this period of 
political ferment, this concept underwent dramatic transformations in Euro-American political 
thought, especially in the two métropoles under present consideration.56 Settlers then connected 
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the idea of popular sovereignty to territorial rights. This compelled metropolitan governments to 
walk a fine line between placating the settlers to maintain their legitimacy and exerting power 
over them to prevent the worst of militant settlers' violent excesses. 
Grappling with the historical contingency of American and French settler colonialism 
complicates the theoretical framework and paints a more nuanced picture than the monolithic 
depictions of primary agents in the creation of settler colonies. Patrick Wolfe portrays the 
métropole as a coordinator of a “comprehensive range of agencies… with a view to eliminating 
Indigenous societies.”57 While this may have been true of many settler colonial métropoles over 
the longue durée, such a statement overlooks the objectives of the legislators involved, as well as 
the complicated negotiations that took place to create those policies. Even if metropolitan 
administrators agreed that access to more land was desirable, many were uncomfortable with the 
methods that settlers and militaries employed to acquire that land. At the same time, Wolfe’s 
larger point is valid – the elimination of Native societies was essential for the preservation of 
settler colonies.58 
Settler colonialism’s legacy continues to influence geopolitics, national policy decisions, 
and people’s daily lives. Hence, the formation and structures of settler colonialism are germane 
to understanding not only a widespread phenomenon foundational to many contemporary 
societies, but also to uncover a holistic knowledge of empire, settler roles, and Indigenous 
actions within colonial contexts.  This knowledge is especially important in modern settler 
societies where settler colonialism is no longer visible but perceived as “normal.” To deconstruct 
settler epistemologies, my research exposes the processes and institutions of settler colonialism 
in the Old Northwest Territory and French Algeria, as well as Indigenous influences on their 
                                                
57 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 393. 
58 Ibid., 388.  
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forms and limits. 
Immigrants become settlers by dispossessing the Indigenous population. This was the 
driving force behind settler colonialism, according to Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini’s 
formative work. The expropriation of land that lies at the heart of settler colonialism has left a 
legacy that continues to influence geopolitics, inter/national policies, and everyday realities 
around the world. Comparing the plantation of settler colonies in the American Northwest 
Territory (1778-1795) and French Algeria (1830-1848) uncovers how the complex interactions 
between the Indigenous populations, settlers, colonial administrators, the military, and the 
métropole shaped colonial governance.  
In spite of differences in geography, the relative size of the military presence, and 
Indigenous demographics, both colonies took similar paths from conquest through the 
establishment of settler governments. Settler colonies in the American Midwest and Algeria 
resulted from a bottom-up process in which settler desires for land and greater economic 
opportunities compelled them to migrate and stake their claim to these territories by 
dispossessing Indigenous communities. This movement then served as a catalyst for makeshift 
metropolitan policies that only became systematized and institutionalized at the end of the first 
decade of colonization.  
Nineteenth-century French statesmen, such as Gouverner Général Patrice de MacMahon 
and Monsieur Michel Chevalier, used the United States as a benchmark in their analysis of 
Indigenous relations and the rate of colonization in Algeria. The United States became an 
important model for modern settler colonialism and Indigenous policy. Likewise, Algeria has 
long been considered a model of European settler colonialism, but the process of its formation 
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required further study. Moreover, the actions of settlers and Indigenous peoples shaped the 
colony and its governance as much as those of colonial administrators.  
Based on findings from my dissertation research, I will examine the development of 
settler colonies after initial formation through the creation of stable semi-autonomous settler 
governments in the American Midwest and French Algeria. I am interested in clarifying how the 
relationship between settlers and the Indigenous populations in both locations, as well as 
administrators’ responses to prevailing circumstances on the ground shaped the establishment of 
stable settler governments in both locations (1795-1832 in the United States and 1848-1871 in 
French Algeria). Using colonial administration reports, correspondence, newspapers, legislation, 
and Parliamentary and Congressional records, I will investigate the incorporation of the colonies 
into the métropole through the transition of colonial territories into states in the United States and 
through the annexation of Algeria to France. Additionally, I will look at the development of 
parallel institutions, such as the bureaus of Indigenous affairs, as well as the suppression of 
Indigenous resistance, and the organization of semi-autonomous civil settler governments.  
In a follow-up study, I would like to compare Indigenous strategies of persistence in 
settler colonies.  For Indigenous communities, simply living and persevering as a people was an 
act of rebellion against the settler state. Thus, this study has the potential to call into question the 
dichotomy of resistance/accommodation that scholars have used to describe colonizer-colonized 
relationships in the past. Instead, an examination of the diverse ways in which Indigenous people 
endured in settler colonies offers a more nuanced understanding of colonial relations, agency, 
and the limits of colonial power.  
By examining the processes of settler colonial formation, the nature and limits of power 
becomes clear on multiple levels. The métropole played an important role in founding and 
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governing settler colonies. However, other actors previously misinterpreted by political history – 
settlers, militaries, and soldier-settlers, in particular – truly motivated the institution of settler 
colonies. These actors, along with Indigenous leaders indelibly shaped policy formation and 
implementation in the colonies.  Additionally, this study has opened up new avenues for research 
by establishing a base on which to build. With a greater understanding of the stimuli and means 
of settlement, the role of ideology and which ideologies carried the most weight become evident.  
The interplay between race, class, and gender can then be examined in context.  This study takes 
another step towards addressing French Algeria’s settler colonial past and the present state of 
settler colonialism in the United States.  The first step toward healing the wounds of the past and 
addressing continued injustice is to recognize and understand their history. 
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